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Abstract 
Contemporary U.S. democracy currently faces a catch-22. While democratic legitimacy 
and functioning can hinge on the participation of its people, the U.S. has experienced 
declines civic and political engagement. Situated in the broader political behavior 
literature, this dissertation explores explanations for why people utilize different forms of 
political exit and voice through engagement or disengagement in instrumental and 
expressive political action, i.e., voting behavior and protesting behavior, respectively. To 
do so, this dissertation pushes the existing concept of disaffection by incorporating work 
from psychology on learned helplessness. To examine the impact of learned helplessness 
on political disaffection and political involvement, this dissertation utilizes both survey 
and experimental methods. This dissertation demonstrates that learned helplessness has 
discriminant validity when compared to, and incremental predictive validity above and 
beyond, constructs of political disaffection, e.g., internal and external efficacy, trust, and 
political interest. More consequently, this dissertation demonstrates that situations and 
experiences of repeated failure that lead people to feel uncontrollability have 
consequences for feelings of disaffection and the ways in which they engage politically.  
Throughout the dissertation, three areas of investigation are pursued: 1) What are the 
causes and consequences of learned helplessness? 2) How has learned helplessness 
contributed to exit and voice in the U.S.? 3) How does contemporary political context, 
i.e., income inequality or elite polarization, exacerbate learned helplessness, and 
potentially mediate the relationship between context and participation in instrumental and 
expressive political behavior? 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Political Malaise in the 21st Century: Helplessness, Disaffection, and U.S. Politics 
 
When was the last time you failed at something? When was the last time you 
repeatedly attempted to accomplish something meaningful and you were met with 
disappointment or failure? What did that failure mean to you and how did that failure 
make you feel? Did you feel like you could change the outcome? Did you feel that you 
could change the outcome of future events like the ones you failed? This brief thought 
experiment may lead some to recall memories of losing athletic competitions, or getting 
passed up for raises and promotions at work. Yet for others, the recalled memories 
resonate from a deeper, more internalized place stemming from repeated experiences – 
failing to succeed academically or to get into college, failing to get hired, failing to be 
taken seriously, failing to be seen as unthreatening or deserving, or even failing at being 
well-represented and continually being on the losing side of elections. These examples 
strike at the heart of a concept taken from social psychology, learned helplessness, that 
captures a sense of powerlessness resulting from trauma, persistent failure to succeed, or 
loss of control, which becomes incorporated into perceptions of the self and the ability to 
change their circumstances. Within this dissertation, I argue that despite the 
contemporary U.S. political context being one of high political polarization and 
inequality, current definitions and measures of political disaffection focus too much on 
institutions and neglect individual learned helplessness. Within my argument, I expect 
that learned helplessness as a pre-political predisposition shaped by experience, will 
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impact the ways in which people experience disaffection, ultimately impacting 
engagement in (or disengagement from) political activities.  
Withdrawal from politics and political processes stems, at least in part, from what 
some scholars have identified as apathy resulting from loss of status, entrenched in 
deprived areas, and among particular marginalized groups. Decades ago, Lampman 
(1959) found that 70% of the low-income population had one or more characteristics that 
tend to push a person down. Consequently, Lampman found that it was common to find a 
person who is the victim of a whole chain of disadvantages, e.g., race, job discrimination, 
inferior educational training. Similarly, (Di Palma 1970: 181) found that apathy is 
exacerbated among the uneducated and unskilled due to the elite nature of the educational 
system and productive limits of society, reinforcing political apathy among lower status-
Americans: the young, those with insufficient education, lower income, racial minorities. 
Identified in the 1960s and 1970s, “… the waning of organized political oppositions, the 
rise of technocratic politics, and the advent of inequality on the basis of merit and talent 
particularly affect those at the bottom of the social ladder” (Di Palma 1970: 204). If 
anything, this has only worsened in the contemporary context, evidenced by political 
disaffection.  
Disaffection, which consists of negative attitudes toward democracy, centers 
around the lack of trust and confidence in political authorities and institutions to address 
the concerns of the people (Di Palma 1970; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal and Montero 
2006). The identification of disaffection in scholarly work has been more frequently 
discussed in regard to the study of developing democracies in Southern Europe, Latin 
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America, and Asia. Only a few scholars have examined disaffection in the context of 
developed, contemporary democracies, explaining political disaffection by studying its 
symptoms and consequences, which include distrust, cynicism, and general sense of 
estrangement from both politics and the political process (Torcal and Montero 2006).  
In contemporary U.S. politics, disaffection is surging through the American 
public. Americans’ trust in government has declined (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington 
and Rudolph 2015). Citizens view government institutions negatively, particularly 
Congress, because it is slow to act, seems obstructionist blocking the President’s agenda, 
and is often susceptible to outside influence (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). The 
public is also dissatisfied with political elites’ decision making that does not “show a 
sensitivity and concern to the rights of citizens, a concern with their welfare, and an 
absence of bias or favoritism” (Tyler 2001: 241). Acute attention to disaffection in the 
U.S. has become more salient, highlighting the growth of these political symptoms.  
Particularly, this was evidenced in, around, and following the 2016 Presidential 
Election, particularly related to the ongoing debate to repeal and replace the 2010 Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. “The first thing is to note that members of the public 
have a lot of legitimate reasons to have lost faith in institutions, and to feel disaffected 
and angry right now. There are also major public policy debates, and it’s right for people 
to feel strongly about proposed actions of government that would hurt them” (Barro 
2017). Americans do not believe the government is paying attention to what they need, 
they do not like the choices they have been given in the political candidates.  
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More broadly, King (2000) identifies five factors that have contributed to the 
development of disaffection, particularly why Americans have lost confidence in and 
gained distrust for the federal government. First, America has had a long-standing 
suspicion of government. Second, and somewhat related to the first, there has emerged a 
lack of dignity and honesty of many recent American presidents stemming from political 
scandals such as Watergate, and Administrations’ decisions to engage in unpopular 
international conflicts, such as Vietnam. While published years before the 2016 
presidential election, this reasoning would also apply to the more recent scandals of 
Russian involvement in the election and questions of the Trump Administration’s 
dealings. Additionally, King (2000: 97) identifies the failure of the federal government to 
establish a large and supportive constituency, increased complexity, opacity, and 
unintelligibility of the political system to a large number of ordinary American Citizens, 
and the polarization and loss of comity that has taken place among the American political 
elites as further reinforcing these feelings of disaffection among the American public. 
While King (2000) acknowledges the failure of the government to support its 
constituency, King does not discuss the personal experiences of individuals, which may 
influence why Americans have lost confidence in and gained distrust for the federal 
government. 
This dissertation does not examine the historical evolution of how levels of 
disaffection have come to be, but rather the effects of learned helplessness and 
disaffection. This dissertation posits that learned helplessness may shape how attached 
people are to the democratic system in the United States and how these feelings have 
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become incorporated into people’s identity and ability/willingness to engage in (or 
disengage from) political behavior, specifically instrumental or expressive political 
activities, i.e. voting behavior or protest behavior, respectively.  
Coupled with King’s five factors, scholars of political behavior have grappled 
with the question of weakening political and civic engagement in the United States, 
which tie to the consequences of growing disaffection. While turnout has been fairly 
consistent over the last few decades, it is still mediocre in the U.S., relative to other 
developed countries, with only about 56% of the U.S. voting-age population casting 
ballots in the 2016 presidential election (“Voting and Registration…” 2017; Desilver 
2017). Chapters 2 and 3 examine instrumental and expressive political behavior with 
more depth, yet low engagement has been identified in areas beyond instrumental action 
like voting behavior. For example, low participation has been observed in membership in 
civic organizations, community groups, and voluntary associations, as well as drop-offs 
in informal sociability and social trust.  
These elements of social capital have been declining since the mid-1980s (Hawes, 
Rocha, and Meier 2012; Putnam 1995, 2000, 2015), but as they continue, public 
discourse has turned to include notes of disillusionment, disenchantment, and frustration 
with the political system. For example, just over a year ago, Dr. Robert Reich of the 
University of California, Berkeley wrote, “Our economy and society depend on most 
people feeling the system is working for them. But a growing sense of powerlessness in 
all aspects of our lives – as workers, consumers, and voters – is convincing most people 
the system is working only for those at the top” (Huffington Post, 4/27/15). Even 
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politicians themselves have bought into the idea that the system and American dream 
only apply to a select few. On August 6, 2015, during the presidential primaries, Ohio 
governor and Republican candidate for president John Kasich noted, “America is a 
miracle country, and we have to restore the sense that the miracle will apply to you.”   
Still, this is not a new sentiment. In President Carter’s 1979 famous “malaise” 
speech, he reinforced a growing threat to the nation: a crisis of confidence. He said, “It is 
a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see 
this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a 
unity of purpose for our nation.” It is clear that this crisis continues to grow. These 
examples reflect a sense that the U.S. political system is not serving its people, leading to 
a sense of powerlessness, low political participation and trust, and what some scholars 
have pinpointed as a democratic deficit due to the rising public aspirations for 
democracy, negative media coverage of the government, and the poor performance and 
structure of the U.S. democratic system (Norris 2011; Torcal and Montero 2006). 
Some scholars have found evidence that other aspects of engagement have 
declined, such as levels of attention to and interest in politics (Macedo et al. 2005; 
McClurg et al. 2015). Beyond this, according to Roper polls, engagement with other 
political activities are also lower than they were decades ago. For example, compared to 
the mid-1960s, Americans are 10-15% less likely to run for office, or to write to an 
elected official or their local newspaper (Putnam 2000).  Moreover, Americans have been 
found to be 15-20% less interested in politics and public affairs, around 25% less likely to 
vote, 35% less likely to attend public meetings, and roughly 40% less engaged in political 
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and civic organizations (Putnam 2000). Further, political trust is at a record 60-year low 
(Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), and efficacy has plummeted from 67% in 1964 to 36% 
in 2012, as evidenced by the external political efficacy index from the American National 
Election Study (ANES).1 
Some scholars have challenged whether the severity of the decline in social 
capital is as dramatic as implied by Putnam (1995; 2000). Some have reinforced that the 
degree of erosion in social connectedness and civic engagement has been generally 
overstated (Costa and Kahn 2003) and the models depend on whether the focus is placed 
on generational/cohort differences or period/temporal effects, making it appear that 
different generations have different levels of social capital. For example, variation in the 
levels of social capital may be due to historical events, which occur as people near 
adulthood, such that people being raised after WWII experience a fundamentally different 
formative experience than those being raised in later generations (e.g. around the 
                                                
1 The ANES Guide to Public Opinion provides the percentage within study year from 
1952 to 2012 for the external political efficacy index. The External Political Efficacy 
Index is constructed from cumulative data file variables V613 and V609, recoded as 
“Agree” = 0, “Disagree” = 100, “Neither” = 50. These new scores are then totaled (Don't 
Know is not scored) and the sum is divided by the number of valid responses. The 
result is then rounded to the nearest integer. The questions used are: V613: “People like 
me don't have any say about what the government does.” And V609: “I don't think public 
officials care much what people like me think.” 2012 data are the combined (face-to-face 
and internet) sample. See: http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5b_4.htm. 
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Vietnam War, Watergate, Monica Lewinsky scandal, 9/11 and the Iraq War, or election 
of President Obama as the first Black president). With this, later generations have been 
found to be less civically engaged, and less likely to volunteer, donate, or engage in their 
communities to the same extent as older generations (Taylor, Funk, and Clark 2007). 
However, while accounting for both generational and period effects, Clark (2015) finds 
that over time, there is little change in informal social interactions (e.g., having friends 
over for dinner) or formally organized engagements (e.g., attending town hall meetings or 
book clubs), and that the “decline” in social capital may be due to rising inequality in the 
United States since the 1970s leading to the variance in trust attributed to period changes.  
Given the current political climate in the U.S., an environment that is contentious, 
unequal, and polarized, it is important to consider when someone will turn out to vote or 
turn out to a rally or protest. When do people feel like they can support the existing 
system or voice their grievances and opinions instrumentally through a vote? When do 
people feel like they cannot support the existing system and need to express their voice 
through another avenue? Is there something about individual’s learned experiences that 
impacts they ways in which they engage in political activities?  
Consequently, the dissertation that follows argues that learned helplessness, 
which is expected to be largely pre-political, has been absent from the disaffection and 
political behavior literature, and may be key to understanding the “rootedness” of 
participation and civic disengagement in the U.S. As such, learned helplessness helps to 
distinguish engagement with more instrumental political activities, such as registering 
and turning out to vote, from expressive political participation, such as joining a rally or 
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protest. Further, learned helplessness may help explain why it is difficult to engage the 
disengaged. This dissertation speaks to work on political participation and civic 
engagement more broadly, as well as work on political disaffection from political science 
and learned helplessness from social psychology. 
 
This Dissertation 
With regard to political participation, this dissertation builds on work that identifies 
demographic and attitudinal explanations for political disaffection. The dissertation defines 
disaffection among the mass public as an amalgamation of people’s negative attitudes 
toward democracy, which includes disinterest, distrust, and a lack of confidence in 
political authorities and institutions to govern and address the concerns of the people. 
However, this dissertation argues that the existing work on disaffection does not account 
for repeated or persistent feelings of failure and loss of control, which become 
incorporated into an individual’s self-identity.  
Drawing on work from psychology, the dissertation integrates the concept of 
learned helplessness into the study of disaffection in contemporary U.S. politics. Learned 
helplessness helps explain the resultant malaise and powerlessness observed in the 
American public, stemming from repeated failures and loss of control, particularly among 
those who are from the most marginalized communities, e.g., low income, or racial and 
ethnic minorities. The dissertation argues that learned helplessness is an important concept 
for understanding disaffection, and key to studying the rootedness of civic disengagement. 
In the contemporary United States, given perpetually low turnout, declines in civic 
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engagement, and increases in protesting behavior, this dissertation explores four empirical 
questions: 1) What are the causes and consequences of disaffection, and how has learned 
helplessness contributed to disaffection and engagement in instrumental and expressive 
political behavior? 2) Do contemporary political contexts, i.e., income inequality and 
political polarization, exacerbate learned helplessness? 3) Does learned helplessness 
mediate the impact of context on engagement in political activities? 4) Given the role 
learned helplessness plays in differentiating engagement in instrumental and expressive 
political activities, how can learned helplessness be mitigated? 
This dissertation is the first to study the concept of learned helplessness in a 
political context, and utilizes a multimethod approach that combines original surveys, 
factor analysis, experimental methods, and large-scale secondary data analysis. With the 
broader focus on disaffection, many of the measures are included in nationally 
representative large-scale surveys. However, since this dissertation is the first to examine 
the effects of learned helplessness as it related to political engagement, original survey 
work was necessary since learned helplessness is not measured as part of the large, 
publically available datasets that capture political attitudes and behavior. Thus, this 
dissertation required the collection of five original surveys, two of which can be weighted 
to approximate national representative and were collected in multiple waves prior to and 
following the 2016 Presidential Election. The first panel was collected as part of a multi-
investigator panel study conducted by the Center for the Study of Political Psychology 
(CSPP) at the University of Minnesota. The CSPP Presidential Election Panel Study 
(CSPP-PEPS) study included a 4-wave panel design, three waves prior to the election and 
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one post-election wave. The second panel was collected as part of a University of 
Minnesota module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), in 
conjunction with collaborative research with Joanne Miller and Kyle Saunders. The other 
samples are large convenience samples collected during the summer and fall of 2016 before 
the election, obtained from Amazon.com’s online workplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
Additional information about the five samples is available in Chapter 2 and Appendix A. 
 As the dissertation explores the ways in which learned helplessness contributes to 
political engagement and disengagement, the chapters proceed as follows. Chapter 2 lays 
the theoretical groundwork linking learned helplessness with measures of disaffection. 
Feelings of disaffection can be captured by inefficacy, distrust of government, and a lack 
of interest in politics. However, these measures of disaffection do not capture the ways in 
which disaffection results from lived experiences, such as from repeated political losses 
or feeling as if one’s side is consistently playing from behind, from feelings that elected 
officials continually do not listen, care, or represent one’s preferences, from multiple 
negative experiences with the justice system or government services, or even from 
systemic marginalization. These repeated losses and failures, could also be politically 
oriented in relation to repeated attempts to get what one wants but that fail, such that a 
political loss could stem from preferred candidates or preferred parties never winning, 
regardless of whether one voted.  
Learned helplessness captures these lived experiences, which provide people with 
multiple instances of feedback that they cannot achieve what they want or that the system 
does not work for them. These lived experiences stem from multiple domains, and the 
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political domain is only one area. Thus, Chapter 2 explores the ways in which learned 
helplessness is differentiated from the measures of political disaffection. It is argued here 
that lived experiences that lead to learned helplessness spill over to affect feelings of 
disaffection.  Chapter 2 also explores the ways in which learned helplessness may shape 
how people are attached to the democratic system, which determines how people engage 
in political activities through finding ways to voice their opinions and grievances within 
the system, opting out, or going outside of the conventional, institutional political system.  
Chapter 3 tackles the question, what are the causes and consequences of learned 
helplessness, and how has learned helplessness contributed to disaffection and 
disengagement? Building from Chapter 2, Chapter 3 explores additional predictors of 
learned helplessness, such as political ideology, partisanship, and perceptions of being on 
the losing side of politics. Following this, as disaffection has been tied to the way in 
which people participate in political activities, the chapter examines the ways in which 
learned helplessness helps us to distinguish between instrumental political behavior, such 
as registering and turning out to vote, and more expressive political action, like 
participating in political rallies and protests, particularly among people from 
marginalized and subordinated groups.  
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the role of contemporary political contexts, i.e., income 
inequality and elite polarization. One open question is whether learned helplessness 
operates temporarily, like a brief state of helplessness, or whether it has a more 
permanent duration, like a trait. Thus, introducing experimental manipulations, Chapter 4 
explores whether perceived income inequality exacerbates learned helplessness; whereas 
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Chapter 5 examines whether the salience of perceived elite political polarization 
exacerbates learned helplessness. As an extension, both chapters also evaluate whether 
learned helplessness mediates the impact of context on participation and civic 
disengagement.  
Lastly, the dissertation concludes with a discussion of the current state of learned 
helplessness as it relates to disaffection to lay the foundation for future work. Extensions 
of the dissertation include investigations of alternative contemporary contexts that might 
exacerbate or mitigate learned helplessness, specifically, and disaffection, more generally 
(e.g., community factors and social and political networks). Additional studies examining 
the mitigation of learned helplessness would also include the use of self-affirmation 
studies, lessening the effect of learned helplessness, and bolstering people’s self-esteem. 
The resulting malaise and frustration with the current political system in the U.S. is 
potentially more unique in 2016 than in other national election years. When presented 
with a polarized, unequal, unrepresentative U.S. political system, it is no wonder 
dissatisfaction with U.S. democracy is as high as it is. This dissertation is one step toward 
understanding the American public’s disaffection and political engagement. 
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework 
Political Disaffection and Participation: An Overview 
 
 During the War of 1812 between the United States and England, following the 
burning of the White House by British soldiers, Dolley Madison wrote a letter to her 
sister, Anna, stating, “Disaffection stalks around us.” This letter has since become 
famous, as it recounts the abandonment of the White House and Dolley Madison's 
famous actions to save Gilbert Stuart's priceless portrait of George Washington. This 
letter references the vast disaffection toward President James Madison (August 23, 1814). 
While this example is from the 19th century and reflective of the early tumult of a new 
country, disaffection with political elites, institutions, and systems in the United States 
has continued to ebb and flow over the course of its varied history. Two centuries after 
Dolley Madison’s letter, it is still important to understand the public’s expression of 
dissatisfaction and unhappiness toward political elites, institutions, and systems.  
This chapter specifically, and the dissertation more broadly, takes this one step 
further by examining what feeling disaffection, potentially shaped by general repeated 
failure and loss of control, does to impact overall malaise with the political system and 
ultimately political behavior. To do so, this chapter first expands the literature on 
disaffection highlighted in the introduction and differentiates it from similar measures. 
This section also reviews the literature on learned helplessness and ties in the expected 
contributions it can make to the expansion of our broader understanding of what impacts 
feelings of disaffection, as well as the concept’s consequences for political behavior. As 
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learned helplessness is discussed below, feelings of helplessness are shaped by general 
experiences that may or may not be within the political domain, but the argument is that 
feelings of repeated failure and uncontrollability carry implications for how people feel 
disaffection and engage in politics.  
Next, the chapter discusses the relations among the defining features of 
disaffection, i.e., political efficacy, trust, and interest, over time using weighted data from 
the American National Election Studies (1960-2012) and within the five dissertation 
studies collected in 2016. As disaffection’s negative attitudes toward democracy are 
predictive of attitudes like cynicism, democratic satisfaction, and attitudes toward the 
federal government, as part of a proof of concept, the chapter demonstrates how the 
measures of disaffection and learned helplessness predict these attitudes across four of 
the samples collected for the dissertation. Bringing all of this together, the chapter builds 
to the frame for the dissertation, borrowed from Hirschman (1970) regarding when 
people utilize exit, voice, and loyalty in regard to when people choose to (or not to) voice 
their opinions and grievances through more institutionalized and instrumental political 
action, i.e., voting behavior, and expressive political action, i.e., protesting behavior.   
 
Defining Political Disaffection: What is it and why does it matter?  
Generally, disaffection can be considered an expression of negative attitudes 
toward democracy, encompassing peoples’ lack of trust and confidence in political 
authorities and institutions to address the concerns of the people (Di Palma 1970; Pharr 
and Putnam 2000; Torcal and Montero 2006). More specifically, scholars have noted that 
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disaffection can lead to particular political symptoms, such as “a sense of personal 
inefficacy, cynicism and distrust, lack of confidence in representative institutions and/or 
the representatives elected, the belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of 
their citizens, and a general sense of estrangement from both politics and the political 
process” (Torcal and Montero 2006: 5). Yet, it is still not entirely clear where disaffection 
originates.  
It is conceivable that disaffection could arise from repeated political losses or 
feeling as if one’s side is consistently playing from behind, from feelings that elected 
officials continually do not listen, care, or represent one’s preferences, from multiple 
negative experiences with the justice system or government services, or even from 
systemic marginalization. However, existing constructs of disaffection do not account for 
pre-political experiences, related to repeated failure and uncontrollability. The 
dissertation herein argues that experiences inside and outside of the political domain that 
stem from situations of repeated failure and uncontrollability, explained by the 
psychological concept of learned helplessness, may impact the ways in which people 
experience disaffection, and may influence how they engage in politics. 
Political scientists have long concerned themselves with the causes and 
consequences of attitudes toward the political system. Early work on political disaffection 
identified dimensions of political efficacy, i.e., people’s belief that they have the ability 
for political influence and competence, as well as system proximity, i.e., how people 
believe the political system affects their lives (see Di Palma 1969; 1970). Disaffection 
has also been distinguished from concepts such as system satisfaction, i.e., how people 
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see that the political system benefits its citizens (Di Palma 1969; 1970), political 
discontent, i.e., frustration derived from comparing what people have with what they 
hope or expect to have (Gamson 1968; Gunther and Montero 2006; Kornberg and Clarke 
1992), and democratic support, i.e., beliefs that politics and representative institutions are 
the most appropriate and legitimate framework for government. Disaffection also diverts 
from closely related concepts like alienation, i.e., isolation from a group or an activity to 
which one should belong or be involved that may lead to powerlessness, 
meaninglessness, and/or self-estrangement (Finifter 1970; Seeman 1959; Templeton 
1966), cynicism and apathy, i.e., the inclination to believe that people are motivated 
purely by self-interest and the inhibition of social involvement and social competence (Di 
Palma 1970), and anomie, i.e., the devitalization of social norms regulating individual 
behavior,  particularly the violation and breakdown of rules intended to govern politics 
and government (Durkheim 1893; McDill and Ridley 1962). These measures are often 
used interchangeably, measured similarly, or predicted by disaffection measures, which 
results in some conceptual and methodological confusion.  
Methodologically, indicators used to capture the underlying latent concept of 
disaffection include: political efficacy, trust, the belief that political elites do not care 
about the welfare of their citizens, political interest, and political confidence (Gunther 
and Montero 2006; Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997). Political confidence, 
particularly confidence in government institutions, is associated with social trust and 
perceptions of government performance (Newton and Norris 2000). Trust and political 
efficacy, the two most frequently used indicators, have been used to capture feelings 
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associated with how political action does or can have an impact on political outcomes 
(Craig 1979; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990) and may explain why people differentially 
engage in political behaviors (Seligson 1980). For example, low political trust does not 
lead people to stay home on Election Day (Citrin 1974; Hetherington 2001), and high 
internal efficacy increases participation (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). More generally, 
the disaffected are distrusting of the political system, less interested, exposed to, and 
informed about politics, less likely to attend political rallies or engage in volunteer work 
on behalf of a party or candidate, and they avoid political discussions (Gunther and 
Montero 2006).  
In an effort to contribute to the existing political disaffection literature, this 
dissertation argues that the existing literature does not discuss the influence of pre-political 
experiences related to repeated or persistent feelings of failure and loss of control. These 
feelings may shape how people are attached to the democratic system and may affect 
people’s willingness or ability to engage in (or disengage from) political behavior. To 
introduce learned helplessness as a concept relevant to the disaffection literature and 
political behavior, the next section provides a review of the learned helplessness literature 
before moving on to discuss how the measures of disaffection are related to one another 
and to learned helplessness.  
 
Learned Helplessness 
As noted above, conceptually and methodologically, this dissertation argues that 
work on disaffection neglects pre-political experiences tied to repeated or consistent 
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feelings of inability, failure, and loss of control. One concept that captures these feelings, 
taken from the field of psychology, is learned helplessness. Boiling the concept of 
learned helplessness down, it could simply be classified as the flipside of personal 
control. However, in the realities surrounding animal and human behavior, learned 
helplessness is much more complex. While the concept is similar to some measures of 
trust and efficacy, learned helplessness provides a unique approach to get at perceptions 
of one’s repeated attempts and failures, inside and outside of the political domain, to alter 
political outcomes, which is not captured by existing measures of disaffection, including 
internal and external efficacy. Rather, it is expected that learned helplessness is causally 
prior to feelings of political disaffection. Further, learned helplessness has not been used 
to further our understanding of political behavior, as this dissertation seeks to do.  
As a popular theory in contemporary psychology, learned helplessness is often 
described as a sense of powerlessness resulting from a traumatic event or a persistent 
failure to succeed, leading to perceived loss of control over a situational outcome 
(Seligman 1972). The original learned helplessness model provides an explanation for the 
inappropriate passivity that may result from people’s experience with uncontrollable 
events (Maier and Seligman 1976). According to the model, people who experience 
uncontrollable events or environments learn that desired outcomes elude their control. 
They then generalize this belief about their own helplessness to affect the outcomes in 
similar and new situations. The helplessness model has been adapted to explain a number 
of human behaviors, e.g., systemic marginalization, depression, academic failure, 
victimization, athletic setbacks, poor work performance, illness and even early death 
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(Peterson 1990; Peterson and Barrett 1987; Peterson and Seligman 1983, 1984, 1987; 
Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993; Seligman and Schulman 1986).  
As Dweck (1975) writes, “In learned helplessness the important variable is not the 
occurrence of the aversive event, but the perception of the relationship between one’s 
behavior and the occurrence of that event” (p. 675). How people attribute cause or 
responsibility can produce depression proneness, such that when highly desired outcomes 
are believed improbable or highly aversive outcomes are believed probable and a person 
expects that no response in her/his repertoire will change the likelihood of the outcome, 
helplessness results (Abramson et al. 1978). Considering the way in which repeated 
political losses, systemic marginalization, or feelings of continually being un- or under-
represented may induce malaise and become part of an individual’s self-concept, learned 
helplessness is a fitting concept to expand our understanding of disaffection. 
However, the theory of learned helplessness is descendant from canonical work in 
psychology on animal behavior, stemming from behavioral learning theories e.g., 
classical and operant conditioning, stimulus-response theories, and avoidance learning 
(Pavlov 1927; Skinner 1938; Watson 1924), as well as two-process theory (Mowrer 
1947; Rescorla and Soloman 1967). Learned helplessness is also similar to theories of 
psychological reactance (i.e., Brehm 1966; 1972), where in situations that people’s 
choices or freedoms are threatened, people respond by increasing their motivation to 
restore that freedom or choice. It is key to acknowledge that learned helplessness 
stemming from animal behavior and learning theory research is not about knowledge 
acquirement, but rather learned helplessness is about learned responses. 
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One of the most fitting examples of the animal behavior work comes from 
Solomon’s students Russell Leaf and Bruce Overmier, who conducted laboratory 
experiments to test the two-process theory (Overmier and Leaf 1965). These laboratory 
experiments exposed dogs to 10-second tones followed by 0.5-second shocks to its feet. 
Rather than learning to jump when the dogs heard the tones, the dogs unexpectedly failed 
to learn to jump and avoid the shock. Learned helplessness scholars then sought to find 
answers to this unexpected failure to learn, answering, “Why does exposure to 
inescapable shock produce a dog who does not learn a very simple shuttle box task later 
on?” (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993: 20). When the shock is inescapable, the dog 
learns that it is unable to exert control over the shock by means of any of its voluntary 
behaviors. It expects this to be the case in the future, and this expectation of 
uncontrollability causes it to fail to learn in the future (Maier, Seligman, and Solomon 
1969; Seligman and Maier 1967; Seligman, Maier, and Solomon 1971). 
The learned helplessness model has been demonstrated beyond dogs, electric 
shocks, and avoidance learning. It has been applied to a range of species and reinforcers 
other than shocks in a number of learning tasks. Escape deficits following inescapable 
shock has been demonstrated in cats, goldfish, gerbils, guinea pigs, mice, rats, and people 
(see Maier and Seligman 1976 for a review of learned helplessness generality; also see 
Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993; Volmayer and Gass 2013). However, there are 
some aspects of human helplessness that are not commensurate in animal helplessness, 
such as people can learn to be helpless through the observation of another person 
encountering uncontrollable events (Brown and Inouye 1978). “With the advent of the 
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global television community, we can argue that more people are exposed to more 
uncontrollability than ever before in history” (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993: 112). 
Yet, regardless of animal or human behavior, it is generally understood that learned 
helplessness is a condition that characterizes animals or people who, after repeated 
failures, develop a belief of not being able to cope with negative situations perceived as 
bad or uncontrollable (Filippello et al. 2015). 
More specifically, according to the learned helplessness model for there to be a 
true case of learned helplessness, three components of learned helplessness must be 
fulfilled: contingency, cognition, and behavior (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993). 
First, contingency is the relationship between what people do and the outcomes they 
actually experience. For learned helplessness, the most important contingency is 
uncontrollability or the random relationship between people’s actions and outcomes. The 
opposite contingency is controllability, where people’s actions reliably result in desired 
outcomes. Second, cognition refers to how people perceive, explain the uncontrollability 
and then form expectations about similar or new situations. Last, behavior involves the 
observable consequences of the perceived uncontrollability. Typically, this involves 
passivity rather than action, but other consequences may ensue from the expectation of 
future helplessness, e.g., low self-esteem, sadness, immune changes, or physical illness.  
Extrapolating learned helplessness to explain all manner of failures of human 
behavior demands the need to explain passivity. Scholars who have studied human 
learned helplessness have identified it as domain specific, complex, and often where 
learned helplessness is expected or observed, it may still not be a pure case because all 
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three conditions are not fully met. Rather, many applications are middling ones, neither 
excellent nor poor, demonstrating some criteria for learned helplessness but not all 
(Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993).  
Experiences of repeated failure and uncontrollability can occur in multiple 
domains, and this dissertation posits that learned helplessness stemming from experiences 
inside and outside of the political domain have consequences for political behavior. In 
this dissertation, learned helplessness tied to the political domain, e.g. repeated political 
losses or feeling as if one’s side is consistently playing from behind, feelings that elected 
officials continually do not listen, care, or represent one’s preferences, negative 
experiences with the justice system or government services, or systemic marginalization, 
generally fits Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993)’s classification of middling and good 
examples of learned helplessness. Other good examples from the literature include 
learned helplessness stemming from institutionalization, incarceration, unemployment, 
academic failure, illness, poverty, and racial and ethnic discrimination. Peterson, Maier, 
and Seligman (1993) identify Asian Americans and Asian American immigrants who 
have experienced historical discrimination, ranging from being denied the right to vote or 
testify in court to being interned during WWII. They also highlight helplessness among 
Black or African Americans who have experienced a history of uncontrollable events, 
ranging from slavery to mass incarceration.  
More generally, in regard to poverty and discrimination, Seligman (1975) 
hypothesizes that poverty and discrimination are devastating for many Black and African 
Americans because they are deprived not only of material goods but because they are 
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deprived of psychological assets. This has also been demonstrated through helplessness 
experiments in the laboratory with Black or African American and White children, where 
it was found that Black and African American children had more difficulty with problem 
solving following uncontrollable events than the White children, demonstrating what 
scholars identify as a failure to persevere (Smith and Seligman 1978; Weisz 1981). 
“Poverty and discrimination mean uncontrollability, and uncontrollability means 
passivity and defeatism: in short, learned helplessness” (Peterson, Maier, Seligman 1993: 
255; see also Fernando 1984; Powell 1990).  
It is important to acknowledge that considering the systemic marginalization and 
continued discrimination experienced by racial minorities cannot be complete evidence of 
learned helplessness alone. Sometimes, people do not act because they perceive correctly 
that their efforts will not result in their desired outcome. Alternatively, sometimes people 
do not act because they have been punished for active attempts to control outcomes. 
However, Peterson, Maier, Seligman (1993) would identify learned helplessness as 
present in either case.  
Additionally, social problems or aversive events may co-occur. When they do, it 
may “be the result of one problem exacerbating another, as opposed to learned 
helplessness being at the root of all of them individually” (Peterson, Maier, Seligman 
1993: 262). However, “the assumption that people make attributions (and can make them 
accurately) cannot be accepted at face value.” (Wortman and Dintzer 1978: 77). People 
may struggle to make correct causal attributions. Sometimes aversive events or situations 
are too singular to allow causal relationships to be abstracted or because potential causes 
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are too numerous and confounded with one another. When people make causal 
explanations for the events they experience, these explanations may be perceived as real 
but their meaning may not be tied to a single operation/explanation (Peterson, Maier, and 
Seligman 1993: 153). Since learned helplessness follows in the wake of uncontrollable 
events, aversive events alone do not cause learned helplessness, but aversive events tied 
to the perception of uncontrollability. The more a person perceives an outcome to be 
beyond their control, the more helplessly they should behave.   
In the American political context, “The United States has witnessed an erosion of 
belief in the efficacy of its institutions…In addition, our belief in government as a 
benevolent and effective source of control has eroded. The futility of our government’s 
massive exercise of force… and its failure in bettering the lives of the poor have surely 
contributed to this erosion as well” (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993: 15). This 
dissertation seeks to test the effects of learned helplessness on political behavior in the 
contemporary political context. While some learned helplessness scholars may posit that 
passivity exhibited in people’s removal from political behavior is part of learned 
helplessness, this dissertation will examine the choices to disengage from more 
instrumental political activities, i.e., voting behavior, as a result of experienced learned 
helplessness. Further, learned helplessness scholars. Passivity, or the failing to 
demonstrate the mental or behavioral action that meets the demands of a situation, is the 
predominant coping strategy identified in the learned helplessness literature.  
However, this dissertation also discusses political actions people undertake which 
occur outside of the conventional, institutionalized political system, i.e., more expressive 
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political action like protesting and rallying. In Abramson et al. (1978)’s reformulated 
model of learned helplessness, the authors turn to the explanatory styles people use to 
explain bad events, which ultimately predict the vigor or passivity with which people 
behave in many domains. Further, in some cases, reactance effects, rather than 
helplessness effects, are produced by uncontrollability, which means that depending on 
circumstances, one or the other may take place (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993). 
Considering the ways in which protesting behavior is motivated, it is possible that it may 
be related to reactance and the ways in which people explain the events they are 
protesting.  
It is also possible that for protesting behavior, it may also be tied to expectations 
that the outcomes are not contingent in the future, unlike when uncontrollability is 
expected in the future.  For Mikulincer (1994), human learned helplessness is the end 
result of the person's active coping in an uncontrollable environment. Focusing on “active 
coping,” Wortman and Dintzer (1978) note that a question is still left open, such that it is 
unclear when exposure to lack of control results in, “deficits and when does it result in 
facilitated performance?” (1978: 75). Thus, for people who are helpless, and not getting 
what they need from the existing conventional political system by having their 
instrumental needs or goals met, they may choose to engage in more expressive political 
behavior to reassert power or status, rectify injustices, or to restore a desired state of 
affairs outside of the institutionalized, conventional political system. 
To assess whether learned helplessness is related to political behavior, fitting 
measures are needed. However, much of the work on learned helplessness has been 
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conducted in the laboratory environment or using batteries of items dedicated to assessing 
levels of depression (Peterson 1993). So as to ameliorate this and broaden the study of 
learned helplessness outside of the laboratory, scholars have worked to create a 
psychometrically sound battery to be used more broadly in the survey context. Quinless 
and McDermott Nelson (1988) created the twenty-item Learned Helplessness Scale 
(LHS) that assesses respondents’ expectations of uncontrollability (with an established 
standardized alpha reliability coefficient of .85).2 Face and content validity of the LHS 
have been clearly established, as helplessness researchers Martin Seligman and 
Christopher Peterson assisted in item LHS and scale development (McKean 1994). 
Respondents are asked to respond twenty items with response options coming from a 
four-point agree-disagree scale, and ten of the twenty items are reverse coded. For 
example, respondents are asked questions like, “No matter how much energy I put into a 
task, I feel I have no control over the outcome” or “Other people have more control over 
their success and/or failure than I do.” The full scale is included in Appendix B.  
Unlike the measures of disaffection that are tied directly to attitudes about 
government and political authorities, an additional distinguishing element of the LHS is 
that the items are exogenous from other political measures, not tied to the political 
domain, and do not use language referring to political action. As learned helplessness is 
not tied solely to experiences with politics, it is important to utilize a measure that 
captures the concept beyond the political realm. As Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) 
                                                
2 The alphas for the samples discussed below are slightly higher than the demonstrated 
reliability of the scale published from Quinless and McDermott Nelson (1988).  
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demonstrate, learned helplessness expresses itself in varying degrees depending on 
environmental conditions and context. To date, the LHS remains the most extensive 
published survey measure of learned helplessness. Other measures, like Peterson (1993: 
291) capture helplessness more related to depression, e.g., “I didn’t leave my house all 
day” or “I used another person as a crutch” and is less fitting for the use in the political 
context.   
Repeated political losses, historical and systemic marginalization, or feelings of 
continually being un- or under-represented shape the ways in which people view the 
world and their ability to interact with existing political systems. Thus, as repeated losses 
or repeated failures provide feedback to individuals over time and become part of an 
individual’s self-concept, it is important to evaluate how learned helplessness affects the 
ways in which people engage with (or disengage from) their political surroundings. 
Before moving to an exploration of how the learned helplessness affects engagement or 
disengagement with political activities, it is important to explore how learned 
helplessness is distinct from existing measures of disaffection.  
For the purposes here, and as reviewed from the literature above, it is important to 
acknowledge that learned helplessness may stem from various life experiences, related to 
and separate from the political domain. Helplessness can assert itself from experiences 
with uncontrollability like sudden illness, unemployment, academic failure, poverty, 
institutionalization, incarceration, or racial and ethnic discrimination, making success 
more difficult. As these experiences are largely prior to political engagement and if 
feeling like not being able to control one’s outcomes has downstream effects on 
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behaviors of passivity, it is also likely that helplessness may have downstream effects on 
political engagement. Further, as helplessness may be pre-political, it would follow that it 
also occurs before feelings of disaffection.   
Learned helplessness is discussed here similar to the way the concept of need for 
cognitive closure (Kruglanski 1989, 2004) is discussed in the political psychology 
literature, as it has been found to be prior to but related to the political domain, e.g., 
conservativism (Jost et al 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Jost, Federico, and 
Napier 2013), stereotyping, prejudice, and right-wing authoritarianism (Kruglanski 
2004), as well as racism (Van Hiel et al. 2004). Similarly, learned helplessness is 
expected to be prior to feelings of disaffection and will have spillover effects onto 
political behavior. However, unlike need for closure that is a cognitive trait, learned 
helplessness is shaped by experience. Whether learned helplessness is actually a trait, 
predisposition, or a state, is still up for debate in the psychological literature, and an area 
of interest for future research. 
Again, this dissertation explores learned helplessness as prior to disaffection. 
However, with only cross-sectional data, it is not possible to test whether learned 
helplessness is causally prior to disaffection. Thus, the next section discusses the trends 
and relatedness of the disaffection measures, i.e., internal and external efficacy (political 
efficacy), trust, and political interest. Following that, the dissertation begins to meet a 
minimum threshold of differentiating helplessness from disaffection. While it is not 
possible to demonstrate that helplessness causes disaffection with the current data, a 
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minimum threshold of differentiation is met that is necessary but not sufficient for 
causality.   
 
Relations Among the Defining Features of Disaffection 
Dimensions of Disaffection 
Political Efficacy 
Democratic theorists have placed emphasis on meaningful citizen involvement as 
a mechanism of holding the government accountable (Barber 1984; Pateman 1970; and 
Schumpeter 1942). Given this underlying assumption that the people are confident and 
capable of influencing or changing the system, scholars have been interested in 
determining the way in which to measure how and whether people believe they are 
politically efficacious. In the 1950s and early 1960s, when scholars found that Americans 
felt relatively efficacious and moderately trusting toward government (Nie, Verba, and 
Petrocik 1976), they took this as a signal of government stability and government’s 
ability to respond to public concerns. Yet, when toward the late 1960s and early 1970s 
when feelings of powerlessness and cynicism became more widespread, scholars become 
concerned that these attitudes may pose a threat to the established democratic order 
(Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Miller 1974). Early comparative work on disaffection 
identified aspects of political efficacy as particularly relevant (Di Palma 1969; 1970). 
Generally, political efficacy has been considered to be, “the feeling that individual 
political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process, that is, that it is 
worthwhile to perform one's civic duties” Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954:187). 
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Alternatively, “the concept of political efficacy contains the tacit implication that an 
image of the self as effective is immediately related to the image of democratic 
government as responsive to the people” (Lane 1959:149). Campbell, Gurin and Miller 
(1954) began an empirical study of political efficacy using survey data from the 1952 
American National Election Study (ANES), where measures of political efficacy have 
continued to appear, including within the latest 2016 election survey.  
As these measures have been studied over time, there has been some debate as to 
whether there are different dimensions of political efficacy. Lane (1959) made an early 
case that efficacy should be split into two related but distinct measures: internal and 
external political efficacy. Thus, external political efficacy refers to the belief that 
political elites and governmental institutions are responsive to citizen demands and 
internal political efficacy refers to the belief that one is competent to engage and exert 
influence in the political process (Clarke, Kornberg, and Scotto 2010). The two 
components of efficacy have been shown to be strongly correlated, yet two-factor models 
of efficacy demonstrate that the internal-external distinction fits the survey data 
somewhat better than does a single-factor model (Clarke and Acock 1989; Clarke et al. 
2010). The distinction between internal and external efficacy follow democratic virtues 
associated with an engaged, confident and capable citizenry, but also raises questions 
regarding whether political elites or the functioning of government institutions can 
influence perceptions of political efficacy and can affect the way in which people engage 
with politics.  
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In regard to external efficacy, Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990) differentiate 
between two dimensions of external efficacy: incumbent-based (viewing individual 
representatives as responsive) and regime-based (viewing procedures and institutions as 
legitimate and responsive) efficacy components. Taken together, items that capture 
external efficacy ask respondents about how much they think public officials care or how 
much say they have about what government does. For example, items ask, “How much 
do public officials care what people like you think?” and “How much can people like you 
affect what the government does?” External political efficacy has been found to affect 
feelings that the system is responsive (Abramson and Aldrich 1982), political trust (Balch 
1974; Craig 1979), and diffuse system support (Wright 1976; Iyengar 1980), as well as 
perceived political influence, political knowledge participation, attention, trust, and 
satisfaction with democracy (Clarke, Kornberg, and Scotto 2010). The items used in the 
dissertation samples are available in Appendix B.  
On the other hand, internal efficacy measures ask respondents about their ability 
to understand politics (politics is too complicated for me to understand) and ability to 
participate effectively (I am well qualified to participate in politics). As it is measured, 
internal efficacy is the closest concept to learned helplessness. As opposed to learned 
helplessness, where the scale does not include questions directly related to politics or 
political engagement, debates surrounding the way in which internal efficacy should be 
measured to clearly distinguish it from external efficacy have ranged from the types of 
questions abounding in the literature (Morrell 2003), inclusion of multiple questions to 
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index (see Morrell 2003; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991) to whether the questions should 
be positively or negatively framed (see Clarke et al. 2010).3  
Some scholars maintain that internal efficacy is more highly correlated with 
measures of political participation than external efficacy (Craig et al. 1990; Niemi, Craig, 
and Mattei 1991). The political consequences of internal efficacy have largely been 
studied in the context of voting behavior. Scholars have examined the ways in which 
internal efficacy may increase when people engage in participatory democracy and 
deliberative decision-making. While deliberation may not lead to direct, positive effects 
on citizens' internal political efficacy, face-to-face deliberation can lead citizens to feel 
more competent in their deliberative abilities and may increase internal political efficacy 
more than those who only vote (Dyke and Lascher 2009; Morrell 2005).  
                                                
3 For the sake of the inclusion of internal efficacy within this dissertation, it follows the 
general index combining the four items from Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) which 
were developed from a 1987 NES Pilot Study, demonstrating a reliable and valid measure 
of internal efficacy. These items include: 1) I consider myself to be well qualified -to 
participate in politics (SELFQUAL); 2) I feel that I have a pretty good under- standing of 
the important political issues facing our country (UNDERSTAND); 3) I feel that I could 
do as good a job in public office as most other people (PUBOFF); and 4) I think that I am 
better informed about politics and government than most people (INFORMED). Clarke, 
Kornberg, and Scotto (2010) do not find any evidence that negatively framing the 
statements, versus positively framing them, is problematic (see also Morrell 2003). 
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Being on the winning or losing side of an election may affect perceptions of 
external efficacy. For example, ‘‘...the impact of candidate preferences on efficacy may 
often be transient, with the heightened efficacy of those favoring ‘winners’ being eroded 
by negative evaluations of winning candidates’ (or their party’s) behavior in office’’ 
(Clarke and Acock 1989: 562). However, over time, winners become less enthusiastic 
about the degree to which they perceive government is responsive, while losers’ external 
efficacy begins to rebound (Davis and Hitt 2016). Scholars have also found other 
differential effects for external efficacy. Using survey data spanning 12 years, Secret and 
Johnson (1985) find that African-Americans have lower political efficacy (external 
efficacy) than Whites, and is more dependent upon socioeconomic correlates for African-
Americans than it is for Whites when explaining voter registration and turnout, or other 
election related activities, such as trying to influence someone else’s vote, working for a 
campaign, or attending a political event. 
 
Trust 
Beyond debates of small versus large government, general public sentiment of the 
government currently is less than positive. As with the assumptions made about an 
efficacious populace, political theorists have also approached trust in the political system 
as a normatively positive requirement, not only to ensure engagement, but proper 
representation of society’s interests.  Scholars have suggested that political trust was 
important because it contributed to the legitimacy and longevity of governments, 
providing a “reservoir of support” for leaders even during hard times (Easton 1965; 
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Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Normatively, while political knowledge may not be 
high, people can rely on a general trust as a heuristic to judge their satisfaction with the 
political system. However, Americans are more distrustful of government today, 
coinciding with a 60-year low in political trust (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and 
Rudolph 2015). This also reinforces the implications and consequences of the behavior of 
political elites on the mass public. 
Once the government has earned the trust of its citizens, it may have more leeway 
to pursue its policy goals. “Since political trust is necessary to generate support for 
redistributive and race-targeted policies, low levels of political trust have a particularly 
negative effect on those who rely most on government programs, specifically the 
economically disadvantaged and racial minorities” (Hetherington 2005: 7). Moreover, at 
the root of political trust is the degree to which people perceive that government is 
producing outcomes consistent with their expectations (see Stokes 1962). This is further 
complicated by the partisan or ideological nature that is conditioned by who is running 
the government at a given point in time, e.g., conservatives and Republicans will be more 
positive than liberals and Democrats when conservatives and Republicans are running the 
federal government, and vice versa (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Citrin 1974; 
Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Miller, Saunders and Farhart 2016). Where policy ends 
are more important than policy means, political trust reflects how positively citizens 
perceive government’s performance, relative to expectations.  
In the U.S. context, early work on political trust sought to understand its decline 
from the late 1950s to the 1980s (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974). Yet, scholars have measured 
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trust in the political context in a few different ways.4 Most often, trust in government, or 
political trust, is measured using some form of the following single item: “How much of 
the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?” 
(Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Scholars often use this measure 
because it is not only a single item, but it is also available overtime on the American 
National Election Study surveys (from the 1950s to the most recent presidential election 
in 2016). However, Hetherington (2005: 14) highlights how this political trust measure 
relates to other measures of confidence, trust, and cynicism in regard to items asking 
about waste, i.e., “Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we 
pay in taxes,” interest, i.e., “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few 
big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” 
and crooked politicians, i.e., “Do you think that quite a few of the people running the 
government are crooked?”  
Where political trust is a general evaluation of the entire government, trust in a 
single target is only one dimension of a more complex evaluation (Hetherington 2005). 
                                                
4 Scholars have distinguished social trust from political trust. Putnam (1993; 2000) 
showed that trusting relationships facilitate cooperation between people. Further, he 
shows that social trust may affect whether individuals vote or participate more actively in 
politics. Newton and Norris (2000) highlight that high macro-social trust is also tied to 
countries that experience greater overall confidence in political institutions, but there are 
still weak correlations between social trust and confidence in political institutions at the 
individual level.  
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More specifically, political trust is an evaluation of government performance. Some 
people some may have more complex feelings about the government, e.g., people may 
care not only about political outcomes, but also political processes (Hetherington and 
Rudolph 2015). However, most Americans do not want to see the processes behind the 
political curtain, but do want to trust elected representatives to be able to come together 
and implement commonsense solutions to political problems (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
2002). Anderson and LoTempio (2002) find that political trust is lowest for those who 
voted for presidential and congressional losers, but highest for voters who voted either for 
both the presidential and congressional winners or the presidential winner and 
congressional losers. 
However, overtime, political trust may also be subject to effects from scandals 
and corruption brought to light in the public eye, exacerbating general disaffection as 
well (King 2000). For example, Alford (2001) demonstrates that both Democrats and 
Republicans experienced declines in trust in government across the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations, but that both recovered some of the lost trust during the first Reagan 
administration. These measures of political trust are largely tied to how confident people 
feel about the government in general and about specific government institutions.  Newton 
and Norris (2000: 53) note, “loss of confidence in institutions may well be a better 
indicator of public disaffection with the modern world because they are the basic pillars 
of society. If they begin to crumble, then there is, indeed, cause for concern.” Tying trust 
and confidence in institutions together, Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn (2000: 76) find that 
evaluations of trust in the national government actually drive perceptions of government 
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responsiveness, but when confidence in the people running governmental institutions is 
greater, so too are the evaluations of trust in government.  
Despite the difference in trust or confidence, citizens still generally view 
government institutions negatively (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), and scholars have 
been concerned with the causes and consequences for a long time. Yet, Hetherington 
(2005) notes that one of the reasons scholars have underestimated the importance of 
declining political trust is because they were looking for effects over the same time 
period that voter turnout was declining. Therefore, scholars connected the effects of 
declining trust to declining voter turnout. Citrin (1974) has shown that low political trust 
does not cause people to stay home on Election Day. Yet, it could be conceived that for 
different people, trust would have a different impact. The connection between trust and 
participation for those high and low in trust is ambiguous. On one hand, if someone is 
trustful, they might express their satisfaction with the political system by participating. 
On the other hand, this same satisfaction might lead to abstaining or protest votes, 
because they trust that their interests will be protected regardless of whether or how they 
participate. Distrustful people might feel the greatest to participate to change the status 
quo, or they could feel so bad about the system that abstention is their only solution. 
Hetherington (2005) points to the possibility that individual psychological makeups 
might lead individuals to react to these four situations differently, that would better 
explain the lack of a direct relationship between political trust and participation.  
For this reason, this dissertation will explore the differential effects of trust and 
learned helplessness, in addition to the use of a generalized measure of trust. As may be 
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more fitting in relation to the effects of general disaffection, rather than trust in 
government specifically, the generalized measure of trust is an index of trust measures for 
trust in government, law enforcement, media, and people in general (see Miller, 
Saunders, and Farhart 2016). Alternatively, as noted above, scholars have measured 
political trust using a single item about whether government can be trusted to do the right 
thing or a battery of four questions about whether government can be trusted to do the 
right thing, how much tax money the government wastes, whether government is run in 
the interests of all, and how many in government are crooked (see Hetherington 2005). 
 
Interest 
Coinciding with efficacy and trust, scholars have long examined political interest 
as a predictor of political attitudes and behaviors, such as information seeking (Shani 
2009), and political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 1990; see Lupia 
2016 for further discussion of attention to politics and competence as it relates to political 
knowledge). Particularly related to political participation, political interest is a strong and 
consistent predictor of political participatory activities, such as turning out to vote, as 
well as campaign and non-campaign related activities (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960; Lane 1959; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948, Milbrath and Goel 
1977; Schlotzman, Lehman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  
 The findings regarding political participation and political interest are robust, to 
where political interest is classified as “the potential readiness to participate” (Deth 2000: 
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119). Moreover, in models predicting overall political participation, the size of the 
interest coefficient is considerably larger than other measures of resources and 
engagement, such as income, knowledge, and partisan strength (Verba et al. 1995). In 
conjunction with its robustness, political interest is also stable over the lifetime, such that 
“political interest behaves like a central element of political identity, not like a frequently 
updated attitude” (Prior 2010: 763).  
Beyond the robust effects, however, scholars have also grappled with evidence 
that less than a majority of the electorate is really interested in politics, classifying much 
of the electorate and general American public as apathetic (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954; Di Palma 1969, 1970; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Neuman 1986), which 
justifies why many scholars have considered interest in politics as one indication of 
political disaffection. The tie between disinterest and disengagement is greatest for those 
who have weakest ties to political parties, whereas interest is greatest for those who hold 
strong political opinions (Miller and Rahn 2002) and for those with stronger partisanship 
attachments (Bennett 1986; Miller and Rahn 2002).5 Beyond group attachments, political 
interest can also be subject to contextual influences. McClurg, Miller, Peterson, and 
Saunders (2015) find that from 1960-2008, elite polarization has shaped the public’s 
interest in politics, and demonstrated a particular decline in general political interest 
among independents. Taking note from McClurg et al. (2015), scholars often only use 
                                                
5 Interest is also higher for individuals with a stronger sense of civic duty and higher 
internal political efficacy (Bennett 1986), as well as higher external efficacy (Rosenberg 
1954). 
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general political interest and spend little time on distinguishing between general political 
interest and interest in and attention to political campaigns, which may operate differently 
and may be more sensitive to political contexts, such as McClurg and his colleagues 
show in regard to sensitivity to elite polarization.6 For this dissertation, measures of 
interest will be more general, including questions about how interested individuals are in 
politics, broadly, rather than focus on interest in the campaign, as the data were collected 
at different times leading up to and following the 2016 Presidential Election.   
Thus, taken all together, one could conceive of a perfect storm of political 
disaffection—someone who is low in internal and external efficacy, low in political trust, 
and low in political interest. It is conceivable that they would be the most disengaged 
from voting behavior, e.g., registering and turning out to vote. However, individuals may 
differ in their levels of efficacy, such that they may be high in internal efficacy and low in 
political trust, which may lead them to participate in alternative political activities or 
civic engagement, such as attending rallies or volunteering with an organization in their 
community, but not to turnout to vote. There is a rather complicated relationship between 
the various facets of disaffection, and it is this to which the next two sections turn. 
 
Disaffection Trends (1960-2012) 
                                                
6 One example where interest in campaigns is used to explain directly voter turnout, 
rather than general political interest, can be found in Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and 
Weisberg (2008). 
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While measures of learned helplessness have not been included in publically 
available, nationally representative datasets, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) or 
the American National Election Study (ANES), the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data 
File does include measures of disaffection across multiple decades. As noted above, 
disaffection may be assessed with various measures, such as low internal and external 
efficacy, lack of trust, and low political interest. Consequently, Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
overtime trends in disaffection for each presidential election year from 1960 to 2016. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 Here] 
 For the sake of comparison, all of these measures were placed on a 0-100 scale, 
with higher values reflecting higher levels of each measure. The trends reflect the 
weighted average for each survey year. The 2016 Time Series data was added to the 
cumulative data trends, as the 2016 data was not yet available in a new release of the 
cumulative data file.7 The 2012 and 2016 averages include both face to face and online 
survey interview modes. Table 2.1 reflects the weighted averages across the 15 
presidential election years for each measure.  
[Insert Table 2.1 Here] 
                                                
7 There were also three missing values: internal efficacy in 2004, trust in government in 
1960, and interest in public affairs/politics in 2012. The averages treat these three time 
points as missing data. The graph includes the previous year’s measure for graph 
continuity for internal efficacy in 2004 and interest in public affairs/politics in 2012. The 
2016 measures were recoded to match how the measures were coded and scaled in the 
cumulative data file.  
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 Focusing on the change from 1960 to 2016, the most dramatic decline is for the 
external political efficacy index. The external political efficacy index is an average of two 
questions “Public officials don’t care much what people like me think” and “People like 
me don’t have any say about what the government does,” where disagreement with these 
questions reflect greater external efficacy. In 1960, on a 0-100 scale, average external 
political efficacy was 74. Respondents in 1960 seemingly felt that public officials were 
responsive and cared about what the public thought. However, this has shifted 
dramatically where by 2016, the average on this index was only 35, reflecting more than 
a 38-point decline in external political efficacy. Similarly, for trust in government, the 
overtime trends support the nearly 60-year low in trust highlighted by Hetherington and 
Rudolph (2015). Reflected in Figure 2.1, trust in government falls from 64 in 1964 to 
only 36 in 2016. This is a considerable 28-point drop. Considering the current political 
and media environment, these declines are potentially unsurprising, albeit substantial. 
Internal efficacy, on the other hand, has been more consistent over these 15 
presidential elections, with the exception of 2016. Measured using disagreement with the 
question, “Politics and government are too complicated to understand,” internal efficacy 
scores hovered between 25 and 41, until it spiked in 2016 with an average of 57. 
Additionally, reported interest in campaigns and elections has increased since the 1960s. 
Despite external efficacy and trust in government dropping, interest in campaigns and 
elections was fairly stable through the early 2000s, but increased from 2004 to 2016, 
peaking in 2012. This increase could be due to the political and economic climate and the 
particular candidates running, e.g., the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in 
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2003, the re-election of President George W. Bush, the Great Recession of 2008, and the 
election and re-election of President Barack Obama. However, reported interest in public 
affairs and politics does not exhibit the same increase, as it hovers around its 1960-2016 
average of 59.0.  
Affecting these trends is not only the political and economic climate of each 
election cycle, but it is also likely that in the 21st century, the increase in ease of access to 
media and news through the proliferation of the internet and the 24-hour news cycle has 
jaded the American public against the federal government, while providing them 
frequently with attention-grabbing information. Overall, these trends illustrate that 
disaffection is multifaceted and while one aspect of disaffection may be increasing, other 
aspects may be simultaneously decreasing. Reviewing these trends reinforces the need to 
examine these various dynamics of disaffection, the ways in which they operate in 
conjunction with one another, how they impact political behavior, and what external 
factors may influence the dynamics of disaffection. The remainder of the chapter turns to 
addressing the relatedness and distinctiveness of the multiple aspects of disaffection, 
providing context for the dissertation’s theoretical framework.  
 
Relationship Between Helplessness and Disaffection 
This dissertation argues that existing work on disaffection does not discuss the 
influence of pre-political experiences related to repeated or persistent feelings of 
uncertainty, inability, or failure, which may contribute to internal and external efficacy, 
trust, and political interest. Thus, it is important to illustrate that this concept, learned 
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helplessness, is methodologically distinct from the measures of political disaffection. 
Since learned helplessness is not measured in large, publically available datasets, 
surrounding the 2016 Presidential Election, five samples were collected that included 
measures learned helplessness, along with the measures of disaffection and measures of 
instrumental and expressive political activities. However, since these samples are not 
longitudinal, it is not possible to test whether learned helplessness actually causes 
disaffection. A table summarizing the variables included in and the organization of the 
samples, as well as further information about the demographic breakdown of each sample 
is available in Appendix A.  
 
Dissertation Data 
 Sample 1. This sample is a large internet convenience sample, collected between 
May 20, 2016 and July 20, 2016 from Amazon.com’s online workplace, Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Four thousand, three hundred and forty-nine U.S. adults 18 years of age or 
older were recruited. However, this survey was collected in collaboration with Joanne 
Miller and Kyle Saunders and includes two survey manipulations not directly relevant to 
the analyses discussed within this dissertation: 1) a political loser experimental 
manipulation and 2) a self-affirmation manipulation. For the sake of the analyses within 
this chapter, the analyses focus on the 728 respondents who were randomly selected to 
participate in the true control condition. Despite sampling from the MTurk online 
population, respondents who participated in this survey were prevented from 
participating in subsequent MTurk surveys utilized for the dissertation. 
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 Sample 2. This sample of U.S. adults was also recruited from MTurk through 
TurkPrime. A total of 816 respondents were surveyed between June 11 and July 24, 
2016. Respondents were randomly assigned to participate in the control condition or to 
two survey experiments: 1) a learned helplessness manipulation, and/or 2) an elite 
polarization experiment, discussed in Chapter 5. Of the 816 respondents, 201 respondents 
were randomly assigned to the true control condition, and 72 respondents were randomly 
assigned learned helplessness condition, only.  
 Sample 3. This is another MTurk sample of U.S. adults, recruited from MTurk 
through TurkPrime. Within this sample, 3,696 U.S. adults over the age of 18 were 
recruited during the week leading up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election (November 3 
- 8, 2016). This data collection effort included two survey experiments: 1) income 
inequality discussed in Chapter 4, and 2) elite polarization discussed in Chapter 5. 
Respondents were not assigned to overlapping survey conditions, so the analyses 
presented here from Sample 3 focus on the 731 respondents randomly assigned to the 
control condition. Respondents from previous MTurk samples were prevented from 
participating in this data collection effort. 
 Sample 4. This sample was collected as part of a large, multi-investigator panel 
study conducted by the Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) at the 
University of Minnesota during the 2016 Presidential Election. The CSPP Presidential 
Election Panel Study (CSPP-PEPS) study included a 4-wave panel design, three waves 
prior to the election and one post-election wave. This data collection effort recruited 
3,552 U.S. citizens using Survey Sampling International (SSI).  
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The first pre-election wave was conducted July 1 - 18, 2016. The second wave 
was administered September 10 - 16, 2016, wave three was collected between October 20 
- October 29, 2016, and wave four measures were administered post-election, November 
7 - 10, 2016. Attrition from wave 1 (n= 3,552) to wave 4 (n=1,713) for participants who 
responded to all of my measures was approximately 39%. In wave 2, Sample 4 also 
includes my elite polarization survey experiment and a learned helplessness experiment. 
The analyses reported for Sample 4 have been weighted to approximate national 
representativeness. The raked weights follow the iterative proportional fitting procedure 
proposed by DeBell and Krosnick (2009). These weights adjust the observed data to 
match several different known population parameters, i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, 
education, and income. As a few weights can be quite large, weight scores were truncated 
at 5.0, following general practices. The raked weights reflect distributions similar to other 
gold standard surveys, such as the American National Election Studies. 
 Sample 5.  This sample was collected as a University of Minnesota 1,000-person 
module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), in collaboration 
with Joanne Miller and Kyle Saunders. Brief measures of key dissertation items were 
included, with the exception of a measure of external efficacy, which was excluded from 
the 2016 CCES Common Content (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). Particularly, a 
brief measure (five items) of learned helplessness on the pre- and post-election waves of 
a 1,000-person module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). 
Analyses from this sample include other brief disaffection measures, plus demographic 
measures included within the CCES Common Content. The pre-election wave of the 
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2016 CCES was fielded in October and the post-election wave was fielded in November 
2016 through YouGov. The analyses for this sample presented in this chapter are also 
weighted using raked weights to approximate national representativeness. 
As noted above, these samples included survey experiments. To summarize, 
Samples 2, 3 and 4 included elite polarization experiments. Samples 2 and 4 included 
learned helplessness experiments and Sample 3 also included an income inequality 
survey experiment. The manipulations may be found in Appendices C, D, and E, and are 
discussed in depth in Chapters 3-5. The remaining sections of this chapter explore the 
correlates and predictors of political disaffection and demonstrate the ways in which 
learned helplessness is distinct from the measures of political disaffection. 
 
Measurement: Helplessness and Disaffection Measures 
Building off of the dimensionality analysis of disaffection conducted by Gunther 
and Montero (2006), the four indicators of disaffection were measured. Each of the five 
samples contain measures of disaffection and learned helplessness, as well as other 
demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral measures. As survey space can be difficult to 
obtain, most of the disaffection measures were captured using multiple item indices, but 
there was some variation across samples. For example, in Samples 4 and 5, which were 
surveys collected with multiple investigators, it was not possible to get the same number 
of items onto the surveys to capture the concepts under investigation. Appendix B 
includes specific question wordings for all survey measures conducted.   
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As a brief overview, Samples 1-3 included the full 20-item learned helplessness 
scale, a five-item internal efficacy scale, a four-item external efficacy scale, a four-item 
generalized trust scale, and a single political interest in national politics item. Sample 4 
included the same LHS, trust, and interest measures, but only two-item scales for internal 
and external efficacy. Sample 5 included a five-item measure of learned helplessness, a 
single measure of internal efficacy, a four-item measure of generalized trust, and a single 
national political interest item. Sample 5 did not include a measure of external efficacy.  
Learned Helplessness. To measure observed learned helplessness in the surveys, 
Quinless and McDermott Nelson’s (1988) 20-item scale of learned helplessness was 
included. Ten of the 20 items are reverse coded. On the LHS, respondents indicate their 
level of agreement on 4-point Likert scales (strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly 
disagree) for questions such as, “No matter how hard I try, things never seem to work out 
the way I want them to,” or “When I do not succeed at a task, I do not attempt similar 
tasks because I feel that I would fail them also.” Possible scores range from 20 to 80, 
with higher scores suggesting greater helplessness due to the perception that events are 
beyond the respondent's control. Respondents who at least “agree” with most statements 
attain scores above 41. For the analyses presented below, the 20-item scale was placed on 
a 0-1 scale with standardized and unstandardized Cronbach’s alphas of .88, .90, .88, .88, 
and .88 for the control conditions in Samples 1, 2, and 3, wave one in Sample 4, and pre-
election wave in Sample 5, respectively. Figure 2.2 illustrates the kernel density plots of 
the LHS across the five samples. 
[Insert Figure 2.2 Here] 
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Exploratory factor analyses were conducted across the samples and the 20 
helplessness items load overwhelmingly onto one factor across the samples (Sample 1 
Eigenvalue 5.55, proportion explained .71; Sample 2 Eigenvalue 6.61, proportion 
explained .75; Sample 3 Eigenvalue 5.38, proportion explained .75; Sample 4 Eigenvalue 
4.84, proportion explained .67; Sample 5 Eigenvalue 2.88, proportion explained 1.13).8 
There were consistent mean differences between ideology and party identification on 
measures of learned helplessness, such that Democrats and liberals scored significantly 
higher than Republicans and Conservatives across Samples 2, 3, and 4, but not Samples 1 
and 5.9  
                                                
8 Sample 5 includes a brief measure of learned helplessness that includes only five of the 
20 items, averaged and rescaled to create a single scale. The five questions are: 1) No 
matter how much energy I put into a task, I feel I have no control over the outcome; 2) 
Other people have more control over their success and/or failure than I do; 3) I feel that I 
have little control over the outcomes of my work; 4) I feel that anyone else could be 
better than me in most tasks; 5) No matter how hard I try, things never seem to work out 
the way I want them to. 
9 In the control condition in Sample 2, the mean difference between Republicans and 
Democrats was .05 (t = 2.42, p<.01) and between conservatives and liberals was .03 (t = 
1.50, p<.10). For the control condition in Sample 3, the mean difference between 
Republicans and Democrats was .01 (t = 1.10, n.s.) and between conservatives and 
liberals was .02 (t = 1.70, p<.05). Lastly, in wave 1 of Sample 4, the mean difference 
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As the LHS is a more generalized measure not directly asking about political 
helplessness, Sample 3 also included a brief five-item measure of learned helplessness in 
regards to political outcomes. This index was modeled after the five-items utilized in 
Sample 5, but were altered such that the emphasis was placed on respondents’ abilities to 
alter political outcomes.10 In the control condition of Sample 3, these five items have 
good internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha of .81, standardized and unstandardized. 
As the disaffection measures are worded to be directly politically relevant, the political 
learned helplessness index is expected to be highly correlated with the disaffection 
measures. However, these questions are similar to those that construct the internal and 
external efficacy measures, so it is possible that this index is not tapping into individuals’ 
political learned helplessness, but rather their internal and external efficacy. In fact, in the 
control condition of Sample 3, the political learned helplessness measure is significantly 
                                                                                                                                            
between Republicans and Democrats was .01 (t = 2.13, p<.05) and between conservatives 
and liberals was .01 (t = 1.43, p<.10).  
10 The five political learned helplessness items in Sample 3 are: 1) No matter how much 
energy I put into a politics, I feel I have no control over the outcome; 2) Other people 
have more control over political successes and/or failures than I do; 3) I feel that I have 
little control over the political outcomes; 4) I feel that anyone else could be better than 
me in most tasks related to politics; 5) No matter how hard I try, political outcomes never 
seem to work out the way I want them to. However, since this was only measured in 
Sample 3, analyses focus on the LHS measured across multiple samples. 
 
   52 
 
correlated at p<.001 with the other measures in the expected directions (Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients: LHS=.32, internal efficacy=-.33, external efficacy=-.54, trust=-
.17, interest=-.29).  
Trust. The first of the disaffection measures, trust was measured with a four-item 
index including trust in government, media, law enforcement, and people in general. This 
measure is built off of a four-item measure of generalized trust (Miller, Saunders, and 
Farhart 2015). The trust index is an average of responses to the four questions (each 
question had four response options, which were coded to range from 0 to 1 such that 
higher values correspond to greater trust) that assessed how much of the time respondents 
thought that the target of the question can be trusted to do what is right. The index has 
internal consistency across the five samples (Sample 1 a = .58; Sample 2 a = .50; Sample 
3 a = .62; Sample 4 a = .70; Sample 5 a = .61). 
Internal Efficacy. This index, which refers to beliefs about people’s own 
competence to understand and participate effectively in politics, combined five items, 
taken from Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) in Samples 1-3. Each item had five response 
options, which were coded to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values correspond to 
greater internal efficacy. For the MTurk samples, the internal consistency of the internal 
efficacy index in the control conditions was quite high (Sample 1 a = .84; Sample 2 a = 
.88; Sample 3 a = .81).  However, due to space on the two large collaborative surveys, 
Sample 4 included two of the four internal efficacy questions (wave 1 a = .37) and 
Sample 5 only included only one of the four internal efficacy question. These differences 
are noted in Appendix B.  
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External Efficacy. This index, which refers to beliefs about the responsiveness of 
governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands, was measured using an 
average of four items similar to the ANES external political efficacy index (e.g., “People 
like me don’t have any say about what the government does,” and “Public officials don’t 
care much what people like me think”). Each item included four response options, coded 
to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values correspond to greater external efficacy. The 
index in Samples 1-3 utilize four items, whereas the index in Sample 4 utilizes only two 
of the four items and Sample 5 does not include a measure of external efficacy. The index 
shows high internal consistency across the samples (Sample 1 a = .78; Sample 2 a = .81; 
Sample 3 a = .84; Sample 4 wave 1 a = .66). 
Political Interest. Across all five samples, political interest was captured using a 
single measure of interest in national government and politics. In Samples 1-4, this item 
had five response options, which were coded to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values 
correspond to greater political interest. Sample 5 had slightly different wording, such that 
respondents were asked as part of the CCES Common Content, “How much of the time 
are you interested in the news on government and politics?” This item had four response 
options, which were recoded to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values corresponded to 
greater interest. The overall average scores on these disaffection measures are shown in 
Figure 2.3. This figure illustrates that these disaffection measures are quite consistent 
across the samples. The means are also listed in Table 2.2.   
[Insert Figure 2.3 Here] 
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Overall, the measures perform consistently across the five samples. To 
demonstrate a first illustration of measurement consistency, Table 2.2 shows the sample 
means across the five samples. With the exception of a missing measure of external 
efficacy in Sample 5, the sample means are quite stable, despite sample size variation.  
[Insert Table 2.2 Here] 
Second, considering that across the samples, most of these measures are scaled 
and averaged across multiple items, it is important to examine the scales’ internal 
consistency reflected by the scales’ Cronbach alpha coefficients. Table 2.3 shows the 
reliability of the multi-item scales across the five samples. With the exception of the use 
of fewer items to measure internal and external efficacy in Samples 4 and 5, the internal 
consistency of the scales is quite consistent and high across the five samples.  
[Insert Table 2.3 Here] 
 
Common Correlates  
As learned helplessness captures a sense of repeated uncertainty or failure and 
related loss of control, it is important to acknowledge how it differs from the measures of 
disaffection. To justify the inclusion of the LHS as a measure that has political 
consequences beyond the measures of disaffection, bivariate analyses were conducted 
using pairwise correlations between learned helplessness and the measures of 
disaffection. These bivariate results are shown in Table 2.4. 
[Insert Table 2.4 Here] 
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It is expected that learned helplessness would be negatively related with the 
disaffection measures. Bivariate analyses from the samples revealed that the LHS is 
negatively correlated with internal and external efficacy, trust, and political interest, all at 
least at the p<.05 levels and in the expected directions. The only two exceptions were in 
Samples 4 and 5 between LHS and generalized trust which were not statistically 
significant and between LHS and external efficacy in Sample 4, which was only 
marginally statistically significant (p<.10). The bivariate correlations presented in Table 
2.4 provide evidence of discriminant validity that learned helplessness is associated to the 
measures of disaffection, as reflected in the significant correlations, but that it can be 
distinguished from these measures, as the correlations are not large.  
It is also expected that these five measures would not load onto the same 
underlying factor. If factor analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis, the disaffection 
measures and learned helplessness load on separate factors, as we would expect from the 
factor analysis conducted on internal and external efficacy and trust (Craig, Niemi, and 
Silver 1990). Since Sample 5 is missing a measure of external efficacy, factor analyses 
were only conducted on Samples 1-4. Across these four samples, the multiple factor 
models fit the data better than the single factor models. These factor models were 
constructed utilizing the factor command, as well as the sem, stand command in Stata 14. 
Samples 1, and 2 struggled to converge using the structural equation modeling 
techniques. However, focusing on the analyses using the factor command with orthogonal 
varimax rotation with Horst normalization, reflect the notion that the multiple factor 
model is a better fit for the items than the single-factor model.  
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In Sample 1, the single-factor model produces an eigenvalue of 6.95, explaining 
48.8% of the variance. Similarly, in Sample 2, the single-factor model produces an 
eigenvalue of 7.62, explaining 43.9% of the variance. Sample 3’s single-factor model 
produces an eigenvalue of 6.59, explaining 46.2% of the variance and Sample 4, 
produces an eigenvalue of 5.17, explaining 49.7% of the variance. Given that these 
single-factor models explain less than half of the variance, it is reasonable to expect that 
the items for learned helplessness, internal and external efficacy, trust and interest would 
load on more than a single factor. Further, as noted above, this expectation in reinforced 
by findings from Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990), which demonstrates that internal 
efficacy, external efficacy, and trust load on separate factors. Thus, it is expected that the 
five-factor model will perform better than the single-factor model across the samples.  
To test whether this is the case, we can compare the AIC and BIC goodness of fit-
statistics for the single vs. five-factor models in Samples 1-4. In Sample 1, for the single-
factor model, the AIC is 4928.44 and the BIC is 5082.29. However, the five-factor model 
produces an AIC of 1374.58 and a BIC of 2098.58. These goodness-of-fit statistics are 
smaller in the five-factor model, suggesting a better fit to the data, than the single-factor 
model. Samples 2-4 produce similar results. In Sample 2, the single-factor model 
produces an AIC of 1977.25 and a BIC of 2088.36, whereas the five-factor model 
produces an AIC of 943.29 and a BIC of 1466.15. Similarly, in Sample 3, the single 
factor model’s AIC is 5260.84 and the BIC is 5415.53, and the five-factor model’s AIC is 
1740.88 and the BIC is 2468.83. Lastly, Sample 4’s single factor model produces an AIC 
of 16254.51 and a BIC of 16431.19, whereas the five-factor model produces an AIC of 
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2096.10 and a BIC of 2918.60. Consistently across the four samples, the five-factor 
model is a better fit for the items of learned helplessness, internal and external efficacy, 
trust, and interest, loading on separate factors rather than on a single factor. 
Moreover, since the items were measured using different response scales, they 
have not been standardized and scaled together as a single disaffection measure. Thus, 
the measures of learned helplessness and disaffection will be included as individual 
indices, rather than a single index of disaffection in the analyses in the remainder of the 
dissertation.  
 
Common Predictors 
To reinforce the discriminant validity beyond bivariate correlations, common 
predictors among the measures of learned helplessness and disaffection should also be 
compared. Again, as the dissertation data does not allow for tests of whether learned 
helplessness causes disaffection, one method of differentiating these measures cross-
sectionally is to evaluate differences across common predictors of learned helplessness 
and measures of disaffection. Across the samples, as learned helplessness captures the 
internalization of repeated failures or perceived uncontrollability, it is expected that it 
would be explained by different demographic and attitudinal predictors than those 
predicting efficacy, trust, and interest. Utilizing multivariate OLS regression, common 
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predictors may be compared across samples, allowing the inclusion of multiple 
demographic covariates.11  
Tables 2.5-2.9 present OLS models of common predictors for each measure 
across the five samples However, there is one exception for external efficacy in Sample 
5, which was not measured as part of the 2016 CCES. Table 2.10 presents a summary of 
Tables 2.5-2.9, denoting where the relationship between the predictors and the measure 
of disaffection was significant in two or more samples.  
All of the following models include measures coded 0 to 1 of respondents’ level 
of education, income, gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent 
identified as female (coded as 1) or male (coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy 
variable to represent whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic 
(coded as 1) or not (coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether 
the respondent identified as White (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Appendix B includes 
the question wording for all variables discussed and within the sample summaries, 
Appendix A shows the distribution of these demographic variables across the five 
samples. Additionally, since learned helplessness is negatively related to the measures of 
disaffection, it has been reverse coded in the following set of models, so that 0 reflects 
                                                
11 As with the sample means reported above, the common predictor analyses reflect 
unweighted OLS models for Samples 1-3 control conditions from these cross-sectional 
surveys and Wave 1 or pre-election weighted analyses for Samples 4 and 5. Ns reflect the 
smallest sample size for the measures from each sample.  
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high learned helplessness and 1 reflects low learned helplessness. This should allow for 
more direct comparison between the measures in Tables 2.5-2.10.  
[Insert Table 2.5 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.6 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.7 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.8 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.9 Here] 
 Across the five samples, there are some consistent predictors. However, it is clear 
that the predictors do differ across the measures. Table 2.10 presents a summary of the 
Tables 2.5-2.9, where the predictors presented a statistically significant relationship in 
two or more samples. The statistically significant, positive relationships are represented 
by a (+) and the statistically significant, negative relationships are represented by a (-).  
[Insert Table 2.10 Here] 
From Table 2.10, it is clear that the demographic predictors of learned 
helplessness differ from the measures of disaffection. Across the samples, controlling for 
other demographics, as income increases, learned helplessness decreases (since it is 
reverse coded for the sake of comparison), and internal efficacy and trust increase. 
Increased education is related to a reduction in learned helplessness and greater internal 
and external efficacy, as well as greater trust and interest in politics. Women experience 
less internal efficacy and interest across the samples. Age is positively related to 
decreased learned helplessness and greater internal efficacy, trust, and political interest.  
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Lastly, the main effects of race and ethnicity on the measures across the samples 
should be interpreted carefully. Controlling for other demographics, identifying as 
Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish descent is related to lower internal efficacy. This is only 
marginally significant in Sample 3, a larger MTurk convenience sample, and is 
statistically significant at p<.05 level in Sample 5, the weighted CCES sample. 
Additionally, controlling for other demographics, White respondents were shown to have 
lower external efficacy. However, this is only significant in Sample 1 and marginally 
significant in Sample 2, both of which are unweighted MTurk convenience samples, and 
Sample 2’s control condition is small.  
Taken together, it is possible that these relationships may be more complicated 
and conditional than the main effects suggest. The next chapter addresses this particularly 
for learned helplessness. Regardless, the summary presented in Table 2.10 illustrates 
additional discriminant validity evidence in support of the ways in which learned 
helplessness is differentiated from the measures of disaffection. While learned 
helplessness can be viewed as related to but different from the existing measures of 
disaffection, the next section turns to a demonstration of how learned helplessness also 
assists in explaining cynicism attitudes, as well as democratic (dis)satisfaction.   
 
Cynicism and Democratic (Dis)satisfaction 
 As measures of disaffection have been shown to predict measures of cynicism, 
democratic satisfaction, and general attitudes toward the federal government (Abramson 
and Aldrich 1982; Clarke, Kornberg, and Scotto 2010; Di Palma 1970; Hetherington 
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2005; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal and Montero 
2006; Tyler 2001), it is worth demonstrating how learned helplessness may also predict 
these attitudes. This will provide further justification that learned helplessness should be 
considered as politically consequential, despite not asking politically oriented questions. 
The OLS analyses that follow report results from Samples 1-4, as measures of cynicism 
and democratic satisfaction were not available in Sample 5, the 2016 CCES module. 
Cynicism. To demonstrate the impact of these measures on cynicism, three 
questions were evaluated. First, in three samples, respondents were asked, “How often do 
politicians lie?” This measure was recoded from 0-1 so that higher values corresponded 
to responses that politicians lie most or all of the time. This question was present in 
Samples 1, 2, and 3. Second, an index was created measuring perspectives on how 
crooked government officials are. The following items were placed on a 0-1 scale and 
averaged, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .65, .63, and .64, across the control conditions of 
Samples 1-3, respectively. Sample 4 only included a single question regarding federal 
government officials. The items averaged together were: “Do you think that quite a few 
of the people running your federal/local government are crooked, not very many are 
crooked, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?” Lastly in all four samples, 
respondents were asked whether, “Having elections makes the government pay attention 
to what people think.” Responses were recoded from 0-1 so that higher values 
corresponded to agreement that elections lead the government to pay more attention to 
the people. Table 2.11 shows the average scores of the cynicism measures.  
[Insert Table 2.11 Here] 
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Democratic Satisfaction. A fourth measure, similar to the three cynicism 
measures, was asked of respondents in Samples 1-3, “On the whole, how satisfied are 
you with the way democracy works in the United States?” Respondents were given four 
response options from “very satisfied” to “not at all satisfied” and the responses were 
recoded to range from 0-1 so that higher values correspond to greater satisfaction. Across 
the two MTurk samples, mean satisfaction varied slightly (Sample 1 mean = .45, std. dev. 
= .24; Sample 2 mean = .44, std. dev. = .27; and Sample 3 mean = .47, std. dev. = .25), 
also reported in Table 2.12. 
[Insert Table 2.12 Here] 
Government Feeling Thermometer. Fifth, a feeling thermometer, similar to the 
trust in government measure, was asked in Samples 1-3. Respondents were asked to rate 
the federal government on a 0 to 100 scale, where lower values are less favorable or 
warm toward the federal government and higher values reflect greater favorability or 
warmth toward the federal government. The mean for Sample 1 was 38.28 (std. dev. = 
23.73), and Sample 2 was 37.23 (std. dev. = 24.59); whereas Sample 3 was slightly 
higher (mean = 39.83, std. dev = 24.47), also reported in Table 2.13. 
[Insert Table 2.13 Here] 
 Taking these measures together, to further illustrate learned helplessness’ 
relevance in explaining politically consequential attitudes, the three measures of cynicism 
were regressed on learned helplessness (LHS) and demographic controls. Tables 2.14-
2.18 present these OLS regression models. Within these Tables, Samples 1-3 report 
coefficients for the control condition only from the cross-sectional surveys. Sample 4 
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coefficients reflect wave 1 measures, which were administered in a separate wave from 
one of the survey experiments discussed in later chapters. Beyond demographic controls, 
LHS inconsistently predicts cynicism, dissatisfaction with U.S. democracy, and feelings 
toward the federal government.  
First, regarding the measures of cynicism, from Table 2.14, LHS significantly 
predicts perceptions of how often politicians lie in Sample 3 only (b1=.06, n.s.; b2=.11, 
n.s.; b3=.17, p<.01). Second, Table 2.15 shows that LHS is a significant predictor of 
perceptions that people in government (federal and local) being crooked in Samples 1 and 
3, such that higher learned helplessness corresponds to a perception that many people in 
government are crooked (b1=.14, p<.10; b2=.11, n.s.; b3=.21, p<.01; b4=-.07, n.s.). Lastly, 
learned helplessness is significantly, negatively related to perceptions that elections make 
the government pay attention to what people think in Samples 1, 3, and 4 (b1=-.18, p<.01; 
b2=-.18, n.s.; b3=-.22, p<.01; b4=-.12, p<.05), such that as learned helplessness increases, 
agreement that elections make the government pay attention decreases.  
As for satisfaction with the way democracy works in the U.S., learned 
helplessness is a negative, statistically significant predictor in Samples 2 and 3 (b1=-.06, 
n.s.; b2=-.31, p<.05; b3=-.23, p<.01) – as learned helplessness increases, democratic 
satisfaction decreases. Lastly, regarding feelings toward the federal government, the 
federal government feeling thermometer was regressed on learned helplessness to show 
that less favorable feelings toward the federal government are predictive of higher 
learned helplessness.  (b1=-4.44, n.s.; b2=-5.33, n.s.; b3=-17.73, p<.05). Since there is 
some variability in the significance of these relationships, it is possible that the measures 
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from Samples 1 and 3 are significant where they are not in Sample 2 due to sample size 
limitations in the control condition or the timing of the sample data collection.  
[Insert Table 2.14 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.15 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.16 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.17 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.18 Here] 
In addition to the bivariate association with the measures of disaffection, across 
the various measures of cynicism, democratic satisfaction, and feelings about 
government, learned helplessness helps to explain politically consequential attitudes 
toward government and politicians, expressive of frustration with the existing political 
system. The next section sets up for the crux of the dissertation: who experiences greater 
learned helplessness and how does learned helplessness impact engagement with (or 
disengagement from) political activities.   
 
Causes of Learned Helplessness: Who’s Helpless? 
Before moving to the explicit hypotheses, it is important to evaluate who is more 
likely to experience learned helplessness. Table 2.19 illustrates the regression models 
across the three samples. Utilizing ordinary least squares regression, across the five 
samples, income (b1=-.07, p<.01; b2=-.08, p<.05; b3=-.10, p<.01; b4=-.06, p<.01; b5=-.11, 
p<.01) and age (b1=-.07, p<.05; b2=-.12, p<.01; b3=-.02, n.s.; b4=-.10, p<.01; b5=-.15, 
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p<.01) are consistent significant predictors of learned helplessness, controlling for basic 
demographics, authoritarianism, as well as party identification and ideology.  
The models in Table 2.19 include measures for the following (all coded to range 
from 0-1): education, income, gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the 
respondent identified as female, coded as 1 or male, coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a 
dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or 
Hispanic, coded as 1 or not, coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent 
whether the respondent identified as White, coded as 1, or not, coded as 0).  
The models also include measures of partisan identification, with two dummy 
variables, one coded “1” for Republicans versus Democrats and independents, and the 
second coded 1 for Democrats versus Republicans and independents. These allow 
independents to be the reference category in the OLS models. A recoded 0-1 measure of 
political ideology is also included, where 0 represents “Extremely liberal” and 1 
represents “Extremely conservative.” Also, as authoritarianism has been connected to 
conservative ideology and conservative ideology (rather than liberal ideology) has been 
found to satisfy “epistemic needs to attain certainty, order, and structure” (Jost et al. 
2013: 236), the child-rearing scale is included at a potential predictor of learned 
helplessness. 12 Lastly, an attitudinal measure of whether respondents perceive 
                                                
12 Further, Cheung and Kwok (1996) found that among first-year college students in 
Hong Kong that conservative orientations (authoritarianism being one orientation 
identified) leads to feelings of hopelessness (a form of helplessness identified by the 
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themselves to be on the losing side of politics is also included in the models, where 0 
represents the perception that their side has been winning more often than losing in 
politics and 1 represents the perception that their side has been losing more often than 
winning in politics. Appendix B includes the question wording for all variables discussed 
and Appendix A shows the distribution of the demographic control variables across the 
samples. 
To provide examples of graphic representations of these relationships, Figure 2.4 
illustrates the relationship between learned helplessness and income and Figure 2.5 
illustrates the relationship between learned helplessness and age. Both of these images 
are generated from Model 4 in Table 2.19. This model was selected to be demonstrative 
as the analyses include the largest N and the model was weighted to approximate national 
representativeness. Thus, as people’s level of income increases or as they age, their 
feelings of learned helplessness decrease. In Sample 4, moving from the minimum value 
of income to the maximum value of income, there is a 7% decrease in learned 
helplessness. Moving from the minimum age in Sample 4 (18 years of age) to the 
maximum (93 years of age), there is a 10% decrease in learned helplessness. These 
factors may coincide with work that points to the crystallization of political attitudes and 
consistency of behaviors as one ages, thus reducing political uncertainty and clarifying 
political identities. 
[Insert Table 2.19 Here] 
                                                                                                                                            
authors). See Stenner (2005) and Feldman and Stenner (1997) for a greater discussion of 
authoritarianism. 
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[Insert Figure 2.4 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2.5 Here] 
Additionally, in Samples 2 and 3 (b1=-.05, p<.05; b3=-.03, p<.05), identifying as 
white, rather than non-white is negatively related to learned helplessness.  This is fitting 
theoretically, as individuals from marginalized communities, particularly those related to 
non-white racial identity, are expected to experience greater learned helplessness. Figure 
2.6 displays this relationship in Samples 2 and 3. Lastly, in Samples 3, 4, and 5, feeling 
as if one is on the losing side of politics is positively related to learned helplessness 
(b3=.03, p<.01; b4=.02, p<.05, respectively; b5=.04, p<.10, respectively). Figure 2.7 
illustrates this relationship graphically across samples 3, 4, and 5.  
[Insert Figure 2.6 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2.7 Here] 
The measures of disaffection were also included in Table 2.19 to demonstrate the 
complex and interrelated relationship between learned helplessness and disaffection. As 
expected, above and beyond all controls and the measures of disaffection, increased 
internal efficacy is highly predictive of decreased learned helplessness in Samples 1-4. In 
Samples 1 and 3, increased external efficacy is also predictive of lower learned 
helplessness.  Similarly, in Samples 2, 3, and 4, an increase in interest is predictive of 
lower learned helplessness. While in Samples 2 and 3 an increase in trust is significantly 
predictive of a decrease in learned helplessness as expected, in Sample 4, increased trust 
is actually significantly related to an increase in learned helplessness. This is unexpected 
based upon the theory of disaffection and also evident in the non-significant bivariate 
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correlations for Sample 4 discussed above. While Sample 4 was collected by a survey 
organization, Survey Sampling International, it is possible that the sample collected is an 
anomaly or it is possible that when the responses were collected, something occurred to 
influence respondents’ trust in an unexpected direction. However, the latter is unlikely. 
Again, with the current data, it is impossible to establish directions of causality among 
these variables. However, given the evidence presented here, it seems clear that they are 
empirically linked. 
While Table 2.19 clearly assessed the demographic predictors of learned 
helplessness, by following the learned helplessness literature, other uncontrollable 
situations may also influence how helpless people feel. In Sample 3, respondents were 
asked three items to capture a few of the experiences that may increase learned 
helplessness (all rescaled to range from 0 to 1). The first measure asked respondents if 
they were pulled over by law enforcement officials, how negative were those experiences 
on a 1-5 scale from “Extremely positive” to “Extremely negative.” The second measure 
asked respondents if they had to go to a government official to explain an issue, how 
much consideration would the government official give to the respondent. This was on a 
scale of 1-5, ranging from “I wouldn’t say anything” to “A great deal of consideration.” 
The last measure asked respondents about their experiences with government programs. 
The focus here is on experiences of the respondent and the respondent’s family’s 
experience with welfare. Respondents were asked whether they had received welfare. 
Dummy variables were created where respondents said that 1 “yes” they had received 
welfare and 0 if they had not. 
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As it is expected, Table 2.20 demonstrates that for people who had increasingly 
negative experiences with being pulled over, learned helplessness increased. This is the 
case in the bivariate model (Model 1, b=.06, p<.01), as well as above and beyond 
demographic controls (Model 2, b=.05, p<.01), as well as beyond the measures of 
disaffection when they are included in the model (Model 3, b=0.04, p<.01). As concern 
grows over law enforcement, their use of force, and media coverage of greater 
occurrences of negative experiences with law enforcement, it makes sense that those who 
have greater negative experiences with law enforcement officials during traffic stops also 
experience greater learned helplessness. However, since this is a cross-sectional dataset, 
no conclusions about causal ordering may be made, as these respondents may have felt 
helpless prior to their negative experiences.  
[Insert Table 2.20 Here] 
For Table 2.21 it is expected that respondents who feel that their concerns would 
be given greater consideration by government officials, they would feel less learned 
helplessness. In fact, these models reflect that expectation. In the bivariate model, as 
perceived consideration increases, respondents feel less helpless (b=-.12, p<.01). When 
demographic controls or the disaffection measures are included, a significant, negative 
relationship between perceived consideration and learned helplessness is apparent (Model 
2, b=-.10, p<.01; Model 3, b=-.07, p<.01). As expected from the learned helplessness 
literature, feeling as if one has greater control over the ability to get a government official 
to listen would decrease learned helplessness.  
[Insert Table 2.21 Here]  
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Last, in a similar way that we would expect resources, such as income, to impact 
feelings of learned helplessness, Table 2.22 illustrates that for respondents who are 
receiving needs-based assistance from the government, i.e., welfare assistance, also 
experience greater learned helplessness. This expectation stems from Kane (1987) who 
shows that the perception of lack of personal control and learned helplessness are 
common among Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients.  Decades 
later, in Sample 3, this is evident in Model 1, the bivariate model (b=.03, p<.01), as well 
as when demographic controls are included (Model 2, b=.02, p<.01) and when 
disaffection measures are included (Model 3, b=.02, p<.01). Like with the first example, 
there is no way to tell whether respondents felt helpless prior to receiving welfare 
assistance, or as a result of receiving welfare assistance. However, this is interesting to 
note that, at least in correlational analyses, respondents who receive welfare assistance 
experience greater learned helplessness. This would be as expected from the learned 
helplessness literature, as Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) identify experiencing 
poverty is one of the truest examples of learned helplessness.13  
[Insert Table 2.22 Here] 
Thus, considering the predictors of learned helplessness explored above, in 
addition to the relationships with the existing measures of disaffection and the 
explanatory power demonstrated across the various measures of cynicism, democratic 
                                                
13 Further, this evidence carries implications for engagement in voting behavior, as 
Schlotzman, Verba, and Brady (2012) found that only 6% who received support from 
means-tested programs reported as having voted. 
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satisfaction, and feelings about government, we can consider learned helplessness to be 
politically consequential. Given this evidence, we may now move to our broader 
theoretical framework for the dissertation regarding how learned helplessness impacts 
exit or voice through civic engagement and participation.  
 
To Vote or Not To Vote: Feeling Helpless and Disaffected, Protest Instead? 
 As this dissertation is concerned with the consequences of learned helplessness on 
(dis)engagement with instrumental and expressive political activities, this section builds 
from the exit, voice, and loyalty framework proposed by Hirschman (1970). Much of the 
work on American political behavior focuses on engagement or disengagement with 
political activities which serve to affect and incrementally change the existing political 
system through action set to fulfill instrumental goals, e.g., registering and turning out to 
vote. These activities may be considered instrumental, in many ways, such that these 
activities are structured and responsive to the existing representative political system in 
the U.S. Instrumental political behavior, such as voting behavior, seeks to accomplish a 
specific, often self-interested, goal, i.e., a voter likes a candidate so they turn out and vote 
for the preferred candidate. However, another area of political behavior literature studies 
how people engage politically, beyond the institutional electoral system, utilizing more 
expressive actions, by sending social or public signals through engagement. One of the 
most prominent of these expressive activities is attending rallies, marching, or protesting.  
Piven and Cloward (2000) find that the United States is the only major democratic 
nation in which the less-well-off, as well as the young and minorities, are substantially 
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underrepresented in the electorate. Further, they point to ways in which institutions 
intended to make registration and voting easier, as well as the political parties 
themselves, have contributed to demobilizing the electorate, rather than improving 
access. For people who have been historically and systemically marginalized, un- and 
under-represented, or those who have experienced multiple political losses, they receive 
feedback through these experiences that inform them that they cannot get what they need 
from the existing system, and consequently, cannot get what they need by participating 
within the existing system. So, what options might they take? 
Taking lessons from the learned helplessness literature in the academic domain, 
for example, students who believe their academic failure reflects their low ability and 
lack of skills, they struggle to reverse school failure (Filippello et al. 2015). Yet, when 
students are trained to not attribute their failures to ability, but instead to lack of effort, 
students’ reactions to failure are improved as is their academic performance (Dweck 
1975). Thus, it may be expected that for those who experience greater learned 
helplessness, they may be likely to disengage from the existing electoral system and not 
participate in the aforementioned instrumental political activities. If they feel as if they 
are unable to fulfill their instrumental goals or that the political outcomes are truly 
uncontrollable, they may engage in more expressive actions to reassert control. Thus, 
alternatively, they may turn to avenues outside of the institutional political system to 
voice their opinions and grievances. 
Democracies are largely built around the act of voting. Voting “is the manner the 
state provides for citizens to express their displeasure or satisfaction with government 
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policies, collectively. To rely only on this form of conventional participation, however, 
means that citizens must wait until the next election before they can offer opinions” 
(Crozat 1998: 59). Additionally, when voting does not produce desired outcomes, 
repeatedly, or when people are demobilized, they learn that the vote outcomes are largely 
uncontrollable. While voting may be more of a blunt instrument, to pass judgment on 
candidates and their platforms, it is much more difficult to express approval or 
unhappiness with specific policies or to recommend alternatives through the act of 
voting. While more conventional activities, like sending a letter to or calling an elected 
representative may provide an opportunity to do this, these actions may be less effectual 
than other “louder” actions that draw greater attention. This may particularly be the case 
for members of the electorate who have been marginalized or demobilized, or even for 
those who are less knowledgeable about the democratic system.  
Thus, more expressive activities like rallying, marching, and protesting can be 
used by any group to convey specific and timely feedback, providing a voice without 
elections (Crozat 1998; Tilly 1983). Protesting behavior generally has been perceived as 
“politics by other means,” providing an alternative way of influencing public decisions 
(McCarthy and McPhail 1998). This form of democratic responsiveness can express 
strong informational cues to the government to change federal policies, particularly for 
minority groups engaged in protest actions, such as those that took place during the Civil 
Rights Era (Gillion 2013). The power behind protesting behavior lies in its public nature 
and its ability to disrupt normal routines, gathering attention from political elites, with the 
goal of having authorities respond to protesters’ demands (McCarthy and McPhail 1998). 
   74 
 
However, protesting activities may range from actions confirming to norms of the 
existing social system, e.g., petitioning and taking part in a demonstration, to actions that 
challenge or violate existing social norms, e.g., illegal protests and civil disobedience 
(Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam 1990), which may impact the way in which the 
government and political actors respond. 
Classic work on protesting behavior posited that people participate in protest to 
express grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice 
(Berkowitz 1972; Gurr 1970; Lind and Tyler 1988). Alternative work points to ways in 
which efficacy, resources, and opportunities predict protest participation (Klandermans 
1984; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977), along with the role of collective 
politicized group identities (Klandermans and De Weerd 2000; Klandermans 2014; van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010). The more effective people believe the protest 
activity will be in addressing their grievances with a reasonable cost, the more likely they 
are to participate (Klandermans 1984, 1997). 
Most related to the investigation of learned helplessness, disaffection, and protest 
behavior, is prior work on efficacy, cynicism and political unrest. As such, efficacy is 
treated in a slightly different manner than outlined above, as the belief that individual 
actions may alter political conditions or policies through protest (Gamson 1992). In the 
comparative context, highly efficacious people tend to engage in more normative protest 
activities, such as petitioning or attending demonstrations; whereas low efficacious 
people are more likely to engage in actions such as civil disobedience (Tausch et al., 
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2011). Similarly, Klandermans et al. (2008) finds that those who are high in cynicism and 
feel that they have been unjustly treated, are the most likely to engage in protest behavior. 
Post-World War II in the U.S. and Western Europe, the mostly stable social and 
political life of the 1950s was replaced by social unrest, political protest, and social 
movements into the 1960s and 1970s (Gundelach 1995). Regardless of whether protest 
behavior has become more accepted over time (see Crozat 1998 and Kaase and Newton 
1995 for opposite findings in this debate), beyond the 1970s, protest behavior in the U.S. 
has become more incorporated into the repertoire of political action, particularly less 
contentious protest actions, such as boycotts, petitions, and marches.  Considering the 
current contentious and polarized political environment in the U.S., predicting whether 
someone is likely to participate in instrumental or expressive activities can be 
complicated, taking into account individual demographic differences, personal 
experiences, and specific attitudes about democracy and government.     
Thus, when can we expect someone to turn out to vote versus turn out to a rally or 
protest (or engage in both)? How can we predict when people feel like they can support 
the existing system and voice their opinions through a vote? How can we predict when 
people feel like they cannot get what they need from the existing system and need to 
voice and express their opinions through another avenue? To capture how repeated or 
consistent experiences of uncontrollability, inability, or failure spill over to the political 
domain, this dissertation turns to the concept of learned helplessness and its effects on 
political behavior.  
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Borrowing the frame of exit, voice, and loyalty from Hirschman (1970), the 
dissertation explores when people are likely to participate or disengage in political 
situations. Applying Hirschman’s model to the contemporary U.S. political context, the 
government provides services to its people and when its people are disappointed or 
dissatisfied with how it is operating, people have two choices: exit or voice. While exit 
and voice may signal decline, they can also operate as feedback mechanisms so that the 
government remains in good health.  
Exit. In the economic sense, if customers are displeased with a product they stop 
buying a firm’s product or if members of an organization are dissatisfied with the quality 
of the organization, they leave the organization. In a political context, if citizens are 
dissatisfied with the way government is operating, they can either opt out of voting 
within the existing system or choose a more extreme action and leave the country. 
Additionally, exit does not necessarily need to be a physical action. Rather, it can be 
psychological or emotional, if people are unable or unwilling to voice their 
dissatisfaction. Hirschman’s concept of dissatisfaction stems from an instrumental 
perspective, such that customers, workers, or even citizens operate from a place of self-
interest and seek self-interested outcomes. This applies to learned helplessness, for those 
who have experienced repeated failures to accomplish a desired instrumental outcome, 
they are more likely to exit from the existing system and not participate in instrumentally-
oriented political activities, such as registering and turning out to vote.  
Voice. As with exit, in the economic sense for voice, when customers of a firm or 
members of an organization are dissatisfied, they express these opinions to management 
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or anyone who cares to listen. Voice serves as an alternative to exit, such that customers, 
members, or citizens must weigh the tradeoffs from the certainty of exit against the 
uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product or democratic system, as well 
as their ability to influence the outcome (Hirschman 1970: 77). Within a democratic 
system, depending on its decline and how people view dissatisfaction, voice may operate 
through turning out to vote to support the existing system or through protesting to voice 
greater displeasure and need for change.  
Voice is a far more “messy” concept, as “it can be graduated, all the way from 
faint grumbling to violent protest” (Hirschman 1970: 16).  In the U.S. context, for those 
have experienced greater learned helplessness, which may be evidenced by identity with 
historically and systemically marginalized groups, feeling under or un-represented by the 
existing political system, or feeling as if they are always on the losing side of politics, the 
expectation is that these individuals may turn to expressive activities, e.g., rallying or 
protesting, over instrumental political activities.  
When people are dissatisfied with their government, it is unlikely that they will 
chose to move to another country. “If one’s own government deteriorates one does not 
usually ‘go over’ to another… Because exit has an essential role to play in restoring 
quality performance of government, just as in any organization. It will operate either by 
making the government reform or by bringing it down, but in any event, the jolt provoked 
by clamorous exit of a respected member is in many situations an indispensable 
complement to voice” (Hirschman 1970: 117). Rather, they are more likely to make an 
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effort to revitalize the system and voice their grievances, providing space for exit and 
voice to work in conjunction with one another.  
Loyalty. Democratic systems need both exit and voice to healthfully persist. The 
way in which people utilize exit or voice may be a function of their loyalty to the system. 
For firms and organizations, loyalty operates like a special attachment to a firm’s 
products or an organization’s mission. For democracies, loyalty attachments may 
function through feelings of patriotism, or even attachment to one political party over the 
other. Theoretically, loyalty may prevent complete exiting, allowing people to select 
forms of voice. However, this may depend on people’s ability to exert influence and 
pressure toward addressing their grievances.  
In examining the effects of learned helplessness on political activity, this 
dissertation posits that learned helplessness may shape how attached people are to the 
democratic system in the U.S. Helplessness results when preferred outcomes are 
perceived to be improbable and uncontrollable, or aversive outcomes are perceived to be 
highly likely, and people believe that their actions are unlikely to change the outcome 
(Abramson et al. 1978). For those who feel they are well-served, well-represented, and 
able to achieve what they need and want in the existing U.S. democratic system, they are 
likely to be well attached to the system and may voice their opinions through 
instrumental political actions, e.g., voting behavior. However, for those who feel they are 
under or un-represented by the existing political system, on the losing side of politics, or 
are member to historically or systemically marginalized groups, their attachment to the 
existing system is expected to be much more tenuous, leading them to opt out of 
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instrumental political activities, e.g., voting, and potentially voice opinions through other 
more socially expressive means, e.g., rallying or protesting, depending on the extent of 
grievances and feelings of injustice. 
 
Discussion 
As this dissertation seeks to explore the causes and consequences of disaffection, 
this chapter began by discussing and illustrating that general feelings that stem from 
experiences of repeated failure and loss of control, differ from measures of disaffection 
are politically consequential. This concept is captured by a measure borrowed from 
psychology, learned helplessness. Not previously studied in the political context, the 20-
item learned helplessness scale from Quinless and McDermott Nelson (1988) was applied 
in this chapter and will be applied in the remaining dissertation. To demonstrate that 
learned helplessness differs from the disaffection, this chapter utilized five survey 
samples to show consistent and significant bivariate relationships between the measures 
in the expected directions. The only exception was between learned helplessness and trust 
in Samples 4 and 5.   
The chapter then illustrated that while learned helplessness is significantly related 
to disaffection, the bivariate correlations are not large. Theoretically, it is expected that 
feelings of helplessness occur prior to feelings of political disaffection. However, the 
current dissertation data is unable to test this causality. One additional way to 
differentiate helplessness from disaffection was to demonstrate that these measures have 
different demographic predictors, which suggests that these concepts are distinct from 
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one another.  The chapter also sought to demonstrate that learned helplessness has 
implications for politically consequential attitudes. Thus, the chapter tested whether 
helplessness would predict cynicism, democratic satisfaction, and attitudes toward the 
federal government. While not overwhelmingly consistent across multiple samples, 
learned helplessness did predict, in the expected direction in at least one sample, attitudes 
about how often politicians lie, perceptions about how many of the government officials 
were crooked, whether elections make the government pay attention to the needs of the 
people, democratic satisfaction, and attitudes toward government.   
There are likely numerous potential explanations for what causes learned 
helplessness and political disaffection. This chapter explored some of the demographic, 
attitudinal, and experiential predictors of learned helplessness, as the LHS has not been 
widely used in survey work.  The most robust and consistent predictors of learned 
helplessness were income and age. As people earn more money or live in a household 
with a greater household income, their reported learned helplessness decreases. There is 
no question that employment, mobility, earning potential, and other aspects of class 
create an overall feeling of economic security, or lack thereof. Further, level of income 
has long been identified as one of the greatest predictors of whether someone is likely to 
engage in instrumental behavior, i.e., voting behavior. Additionally, as people age, they 
showed less learned helplessness. There is a possibility that as the aging process 
continues and potential negative health diagnoses are received, that learned helplessness 
would increase. The data in this dissertation cannot speak to that, however.  
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Learned helplessness stems from experiences with uncontrollable situations, 
where people learn that they cannot change a current or similar future uncontrollable 
situation and thus respond with passive behavior. In the political context, being low 
income, from a historically or systemically marginalized and subordinated group, or 
experiencing repeated political losses could affect learned helplessness. Moreover, 
experiences with government institutions, such as the law enforcement and justice 
systems or government assistance programs may also shape feelings of learned 
helplessness. This chapter demonstrated that this is the case. In Sample 3, people who 
had negative experiences with being pulled over showed greater learned helplessness 
than those who did not have negative experiences with law enforcement. Also in Sample 
three, people who had received state or federal government assistance (welfare) also 
showed greater learned helplessness than those who did not receive assistance.  
Despite the deeper dive into the covariates of learned helplessness and 
disaffection, the causes and consequences of disaffection and learned helplessness are 
wide and quite numerous. This chapter only scratches the surface. It is clear that learned 
helplessness, however, stems from experience. Theoretically, it is expected that feelings 
of helplessness that impact passive behavior are likely to spill over into the political 
domain and thus, affect political behavior. In applying the discussion of learned 
helplessness to Hirschman’s (1970) theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, it is possible to test 
when people exit, and disengage from politics, i.e., voting behavior, and choose to voice 
their opinions and grievances through expressive political action, i.e., marching, rallying, 
or protesting. For those who are helpless, do they disengage from the conventional, 
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institutionalized political system and not engage in voting behavior? For those who are 
helpless, and not getting what they need from the existing political system, do they 
attempt to reassert some control to cope with the helplessness by engaging in expressive 
political behavior that goes outside of the conventional, institutionalized political system? 
To explore these questions, the next chapter first focuses on how learned helplessness is 
tied to the ways in which people utilize exit or voice through political behavior. 
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Chapter 3 
Disaffected (Dis)Engagement  
 
There are a number of ways that the mass public can “show up” to participate. To 
show their support for or dissent from the conventional, institutionalized political system, 
for example, people can turn out to vote, they can write to their elected representatives, or 
they can donate money to issue and candidate campaigns. However, these conventional 
activities can limit how people choose to voice their opinions and grievances with the 
existing political system. Alternatively, they could seek more expressive actions that go 
outside of the institutionalized political system through actions like rallying, marching 
and protesting. 
Much of the disaffection literature has been politically oriented, but learned 
helplessness has yet to be examined explicitly in relation to its potential impact on 
political behavior. The current chapter begins to assess the effects of learned helplessness 
on engagement in political activities in the contemporary U.S. context. It is expected that 
people’s choice to exit and disengage from the existing political system (choosing not to 
vote), or their selection for voice utilizing instrumental or expressive political 
participation (voting or protesting) is a result of feeling helplessness. On one hand, it is 
expected that people engaging in protesting behavior who feel helpless may hold less 
clear instrumental goals and view the outcomes as more controllable with greater payoffs, 
leading to a way to reassert control from feeling helpless. This is opposed to voting 
behavior, on the other hand, which may be viewed as highly uncontrollable with few 
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incentives for participation. The application of learned helplessness to explain activity in 
rallying, marching or protesting behavior, rather than solely explaining passivity and 
disengagement from political behavior like voting, is a divergence from the classical 
learned helplessness literature. 
To study this divergence further, this chapter anchors the above expectations in 
the vast participation and voting behavior literature, as well as turning to research on 
expressive participation activities like rallying, marching, and protesting. Taken together, 
these literatures ground the chapter so as to better frame the ways in which learned 
helplessness impacts both exit and voice in contemporary American political behavior. 
The chapter first discusses some of the challenges with placing an overabundant amount 
of attention to instrumental voting behavior, as the United States has had a complex and 
conflictual history. The chapter then turns to a review of the literature to set up the 
hypotheses to be tested. After the hypotheses are tested, the chapter concludes with a 
broad discussion of implications for mass political behavior, for the ways in which 
contextual salience may impact learned helplessness and political behavior.  
 
Democratic Participation in America: Historical and Contemporary Influences 
 Given the Preamble of the Declaration of Independence, it is seemingly the 
responsibility of citizens to participate, to drive and shape their government. This implies 
engagement in more instrumentally-oriented actions, such as voting, but could also echo 
a call for participation in more expressive activities, harkening back to the Revolutionary 
War. However, taking a step back, would this Preamble ring as true in the same way 
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today for all Americans? For a first-time African-American voter? Or, for a Latino 
immigrant? Or, even for a well-educated, retired White voter? While there are 
demographic differences in participation and possibly in interpretation, there are also 
historical influences ingrained into the American democratic system that impact the way 
in which political participation is expected from and available to different groups.  
 Since its Founding, America has grappled with two sides of a democratic coin of 
“inclusion.” One side, America is seen as a nation of immigrants. As the Statue of Liberty 
states, “Give me your tired, your poor,/Your huddled masses yearning to breathe 
free,/The wretched refuse of your teeming shore./Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost 
to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door.” Yet, on the flip side of the coin, America 
has struggled with deep racial tensions. The first side implies an open, more pluralistic 
system supporting and including diverse groups into the political system; the second side 
reinforces the violent racial and economic friction and lack of political inclusion and 
power among groups based on ascribed racial and ethnic identity. 
 The American democratic process and desire for “liberty” have historically 
excluded racial, ethnic, and gender minorities, leading them to be underrepresented and 
preventing their political incorporation and influence. It is not always clear whose liberty 
is preserved, and to what extent, such that, “In society, liberty for one may mean the 
suppression of liberty for others” (Myrdal 1996: 9). The historical exclusion of particular 
social groups reduces their ability to seek power and influence. Yet, exclusion is not a 
distinct experience of only one particular social group. Rather, intersectionality across 
race, gender, ethnicity, class, immigration status and other subordinated identities lead to 
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further exclusion, marginalization, subordination, and disenfranchisement. As identities 
overlap, the bright boundaries of power and influence between social groups are blurred, 
but also create greater conflict and contradictions within the American political system. 
These conflicts and exclusions, whether chosen or systematically engrained, have the 
possibility of resulting in a deep malaise and withdrawal from the political system.  
 Normatively, the American democratic system is supposed to function in response 
to its citizens. Assuming that is the case, American citizens have a normative 
responsibility to respond in-kind and actively engage in their communities, participate in 
the political process, and turn out to vote to select their representatives. However, 
historically, and in contemporary context, in the U.S. all who can engage do not, or are 
prevented from doing so. This is particularly true where participation in the political 
process can be costly, requiring expendable free time and/or financial resources 
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  Requirements to dedicate time and 
energy in learning about the candidates and political issues of the day, as well as the 
ability to take time off of work or away from family to engage can overburden 
marginalized and low income communities. Yet, disengagement is not only limited to a 
lack of resources, or identity from a historically or systemically marginalized group. 
Scholars have widely debated whether overall political and civic engagement is in 
decline. Rates of political participation in the United States have been low for much more 
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than just the past decade.14 On one hand, the 2016 Gallup Global Civic Engagement 
Report ranks the U.S. as second in the world on its civic engagement index, based on 
more than 145,000 interviews with adults in 140 countries in 2015.15 However, mediocre 
turnout has placed the U.S. behind most other developed countries. 
On average, 40% of the U.S. voting eligible population does not vote during 
Presidential elections, and nearly 60% do not cast a ballot during congressional midterm 
elections. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that of the 235 million eligible 
voters in November 2012, approximately 40% (nearly 90 million voters) failed to turn 
out, and the 2014 midterm elections pointed to the lowest turnout since World War II.16 
Further, in November 2016, some reports note that about 55% of voting age citizens cast 
                                                
14 According to U.S. Census Bureau statistics, since 1980, voting-age turnout has varied 
within a 9-percentage-point range – from 48% in 1996, when Bill Clinton was re-elected, 
to 57% in 2008, when Barack Obama won the White House (Desilver 2017). 
15 Respondents were asked about inclinations to donate time and money, as well as to 
provide assistance to others in need. The 2016 Gallup Global Civic Engagement Report 
was released September 19, 2016 (Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/195686/2016-
global-civic-engagement-report.aspx).  
16 See DelReal, Jose A. Nov. 10, 2014. “Voter turnout in 2014 was the lowest since 
WWII.” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2014/11/10/voter-turnout-in-2014-was-the-lowest-since-wwii/ 
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ballots; yet, approximately 59% of the voting eligible population turned out to vote, 
which is nearly commensurate with turnout from 2012.17 
However, turnout is only one way in which people choose to voice their opinions 
and grievances with the existing political system. This chapter begins to assess the effects 
of disaffection, and in particular, learned helplessness. In the political context, it is 
expected that people’s choice to exit and disengage from the existing political system, or 
their selection for voice utilizing instrumental or expressive political participation is a 
result of feelings of learned helplessness, which may compound disaffection. Before 
digging into the hypotheses and tests of whether this is the case observationally and 
experimentally, the next two sections frame the chapter theoretically. The first explores 
the instrumental political participation related to voting behavior. The second delves into 
work on one specific type of expressive political participation, e.g., rallying, marching, 
and protesting. Taken together, these literatures ground the chapter to better frame how 
learned helplessness impacts both exit and voice in contemporary American politics.  
 
                                                
17 For a discussion of the turnout percentage for the voting age population in 2016, see 
Wallace, George. Nov. 30, 2016. “Voter turnout at 20-year low in 2016.” CNN Politics. 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/. For a discussion of 
the turnout percentage for the voting eligible population in 2016, see Regan, Michael. 
Nov. 20, 2016. “What does voter turnout tell us about the 2016 election?” PBS 
Newshour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/voter-turnout-2016-elections/ and the 
U.S. Elections Project at University of Florida, http://www.electproject.org/2016g.  
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To Vote or Not to Vote, That Seems to be the Question 
To explain trends in civic and political engagement, scholars of American 
political behavior have focused on research aimed at determining: 1) who is likely to turn 
out, and 2) how to temporarily boost voter turnout. In studying turnout, scholars have 
looked at both demographic and attitudinal variables. Voters are more likely to be from 
privileged groups, e.g., White, male, older, more educated, and affluent (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980), and at the individual level, tend to have higher trust, be more 
interested in politics, and feel more positive about the system’s responsiveness and their 
own ability to impact political outcomes (Cook and Gronke 2005; Hetherington and 
Rudolph 2015; Hetherington 2005; Timpone 1998). Beyond resources and the 
characteristics noted above, people with civic skills obtained from employment, religious 
involvement, or volunteering for nonpolitical organizations, e.g. writing letters, oral 
communication, or planning meetings, are more likely to participate (Verba et al. 1995).  
Due to considerable demographic differences in turnout, scholars have sought 
ways to boost turnout, e.g., by matching Get Out the Vote (GOTV) canvassers’ race and 
ethnicity with demographic backgrounds of potential voters (García Bedolla and 
Michelson 2012), or by inducing social pressure to overcome low interest in elections by 
using direct mail GOTV campaigns sharing neighbors’ voting records (Green and Gerber 
2008; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008), since voting in one election can increase the 
likelihood of voting in the future (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003). Yet, despite 
substantial strides to advance mobilization, turnout and civic engagement are still 
relatively low on average.  
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Mediocre civic engagement and low turnout would be less problematic if those 
who voted were demographically and attitudinally similar to those who do not. Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone (1980) originally concluded voters were approximately representative of 
nonvoters on policy issues. However, more recent work demonstrates this is no longer the 
case. While voter preferences predict aggregate Senator roll-call behavior, nonvoter 
preferences do not (Griffin and Newman 2005). If nonvoters were to vote, consensus 
around issue attitudes would likely shift, leading campaign content to change in response 
(Highton and Wolfinger 2001). Further, voters and nonvoters hold different attitudes on 
economic and redistributive issues, underscoring how turnout demographics have 
changed since 1972 (Leighley and Nagler 2014). Indeed, “the flaw in the pluralist heaven 
is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (Schattschneider 1960: 
35). Yet, variables that often explain participation do not do enough to help us understand 
nonvoters and those who are disengaged.  
Racial and ethnic disparities in socioeconomic resources and rootedness in the 
community do not explain overall group differences in participation (Logan, Darrah, Oh 
2012). Relatedly, variables found to be highly correlated with participation at the cross-
sectional level do not adequately explain individual-level variation in political behavior 
over time. In particular, resources (income, employment, and education), mobilization 
(contact by a political party), and political engagement (interest in and attention to 
politics) vary too slowly over time to be able to explain the variability in participation 
(Miller and Saunders 2015).  
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While these individual factors have been found to widely influence turnout, many 
models of political behavior are anchored on instrumental explanations, particularly in 
regard to voting behavior. As instrumental behavior is inherently self-interested and goal 
oriented, many political scientists have considered voting behavior as instrumental. For 
example, the Downsian model assumes that a person’s vote has value only insofar as it 
helps push their preferred candidate over the top (Downs 1957). Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968), as well as Fiorina (1976) suggested that voting behavior may be both 
instrumental and expressive, such that voters may want to not only influence the outcome 
of the election, but they want to express their opinions about the candidates, the policies 
the candidates represent, and may want to signal publically that they did their “duty” to 
support the democratic system.  
Importantly, the difference between instrumental and expressive political 
behavior lies in the different rewards or outcomes sought. Particularly, expressive 
political behaviors are not instrumentally outcome-related. As such, it is possible that 
learned helplessness may shape people’s motives to participate with instrumental or 
expressive motives in mind. For the broader discussion herein, the dissertation will 
consider voting behavior as more instrumental than expressive, but acknowledges that 
voting can be expressive under certain circumstances. Tying instrumental and expressive 
behavior to exit and voice, the, scholarly literature still has space to study when and why 
people voice their opinions and grievances through engagement in voting behavior, 
compared to when they exit. 
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Rallying, Marching, Protesting: Voice of a Different Nature 
 For people who are not well represented by the political system or by their elected 
officials, what options for engagement do they have to express and voice their opinions 
and grievances? Those who are feel helpless or politically disaffected—people who feel 
the political system does not serve them—are less likely to turn to methods of political 
engagement that supports the existing system, as their efforts to change the system are 
likely to be ineffectual. These more instrumental of political acts, like registering and 
turning out to vote, writing letters to their elected officials, or volunteering for 
campaigns, may lead people to feel that they cannot impact the existing system. These 
feelings of uncontrollability may also disproportionately affect members of communities 
that have been marginalized and subordinated within the conventional, institutionalized 
political system. As instrumental political actions continue to fail or remain 
uncontrollable, people may turn to less instrumental and more expressive activities 
outside of the political system, such as volunteering with community organizations or 
attending rallies, marches, and protests, to reassert control.  
 Taking feet to the streets is not new in the U.S., particularly for historically 
marginalized and subordinated communities seeking voice and change. Historical 
marches such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s March on Washington August 28, 1963 or 
the Moratorium March against the war in Vietnam November 15, 1969 serve as 
prominent examples, as do the sit-ins and protests on college campuses in the 1960s, e.g. 
Berkeley’s “Free Speech Movement.” Later in the 1980s and 1990s, marches centered 
around equal rights, e.g., LGBT rights, solidarity for Black men and women in American 
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through the Million Man (1995) and Million Women (1997) Marches, and solidarity for 
women’s rights. In the early 2000s, protests turned to voicing disagreement with the Iraq 
War, and today, engagement through rallies, marches, and protests is peaking again. 
The recognition of different types of protest, e.g., signing petitions, boycotts, 
marches, occupations, and uprisings, have been identified as forms of democratic 
responsiveness. These actions can serve as informational cues voicing displeasure with 
policies, administrations, decisions to go to war, or they may represent solidarity with 
marginalized populations. These signals are important as they often serve to the provide 
feedback to the government during times not centered around elections and also give 
political power and voice to those who may not be eligible to vote.  
Meyer and Tarrow (1998) point to the end of the 20th century and looking toward 
the 21st century as a time of contentious politics, creating an era of a movement society 
(Tarrow 1994). From formal movements like Occupy Wall Street that started in 
September of 2011 and Black Lives Matter that started in July 2013, to more recent 
protests in response to police shootings of young black men, marches and shutting down 
of airports across the country in response to President Trump’s immigration ban, the 
Women’s March, and the March for Science, protests continue to serve as a common 
expressive form of political activity and engagement, and are widely supported in 
American public opinion. For example, in a Pew survey from February 2017, 79% of 
people view the right to nonviolent protest and 74% of people view protecting the rights 
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of those with unpopular views as very important components of a strong democracy.18 In 
the same survey, some differences in attitudes were identified, such that Republicans 
were less likely than Democrats to view the right to nonviolent protest or protecting the 
rights of people with unpopular views as very important. Further, the survey highlighted 
that younger people and those who are more educated view both of these actions as 
important to maintain a strong American democracy.  
As it is expected for younger people to feel less represented and incorporated into 
the existing political system, it is unsurprising that they not only historically have been 
more likely to engage in social and public expressive political participation, from the sit-
ins and protests in the 1960s, but they are also more engaged today. The Higher 
Education Research Institution at UCLA has identified a rising interest in activism, citing 
a survey of their incoming freshmen students (CIRP Freshman survey). They found an 
increase from 2014, citing the highest percentage ever of incoming students who said 
they would be likely to participate in protests.  Further, Black students were the most 
likely to say they would protest, “with 16 percent reporting that they had a very good 
chance of demonstrating for a cause while in college.”19 This coincides with recent 
                                                
18 “Large Majorities See Checks and Balances, Right to Protest as Essential for 
Democracy.” March 2, 2017. Pew Research Center, U.S. Politics and Policy. Retrieved 
from http://www.people-press.org/2017/03/02/large-majorities-see-checks-and-balances-
right-to-protest-as-essential-for-democracy/. 
19 “College students’ commitment to activism, political and civic engagement reach all-
time highs.” February 10, 2016. UCLA Newsroom, Higher Education Research Institute. 
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successful protests by college students across the country in response to a perceived lack 
of responsiveness of university administrators to racial bias and discrimination.  
 Given the current political climate in the U.S., an environment that is contentious 
and polarized, it is important to consider when someone will turn out to vote versus turn 
out to a rally or protest (or engage in both). When do people feel like they can support the 
existing system or voice their opinions and grievances through a vote? When do people 
feel like they cannot support the existing system and need to voice their opinions and 
grievances through another avenue? Thus, is there something about individual’s repeated, 
learned experiences that impacts the ways in which they engage in political activities?  
Stemming from Hirschman (1970), the expectation here is that when people feel 
helpless and as if their vote does not and cannot help them get what they need or want 
from the political system, they will choose to disengage, or exit. However, for those how 
feel helpless, they may choose to cope with their loss of control by expressing or voicing 
their opinions and grievances in an attempt to reassert control through actions outside of 
the political system that is failing them, i.e., through rallying, marching, or protesting. 
Though, it is possible that as the cost of being politically expressive increases, the 
likelihood of expressiveness declines (Copeland and Laband 2002). This chapter seeks to 
explore these questions and test possible explanations.   
Consequently, this chapter furthers the argument from Chapter 2 that learned 
helplessness, has been absent from the political behavior literature, and may be key to 
                                                                                                                                            
Retrieved from http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/college-students-commitment-to-
activism-political-and-civic-engagement-reach-all-time-highs. 
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understanding the “rootedness” of disengagement from instrumental political activities in 
the contemporary American political context. As such, learned helplessness helps to 
distinguish likelihood of engagement with more instrumental political activities, such as 
turning out to vote, from more expressive political participation, such as joining a rally or 
protest. This distinction further assists in separating the utilization of voice or exit. 
Further, learned helplessness may help explain why it can be difficult to engage those 
who have disengaged from the conventional, institutionalized political system.  
 
Hypotheses 
This chapter further examines the political consequences of learned helplessness 
and tests its direct effects on the various ways people choose to voice their opinions and 
grievances through political participation. To test the relationship between learned 
helplessness and people’s choice to voice or exit, H1, the helplessness hypothesis, 
expects that those who experience higher levels of learned helplessness will be more 
likely to exit and thus, less likely to participate in politics through instrumental 
participation, e.g. voting. This is based on the expectation following from the learned 
helplessness literature that helplessness is related to passivity. As those who experience 
learned helplessness may feel as if the existing system is uncontrollable and that they do 
not get what they want or need from the conventional, institutional political system. They 
would be expected to not support the existing system, and exit by choosing to not vote.   
The data used here presents a challenge in regard to determining causal ordering 
with cross-sectional and single-election panel data. Thus, H1a and H1b examine 
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moderation and mediation. First, it is possible that the effects of learned helplessness on 
instrumental political behavior may be moderated by loser perceptions, racial 
identification, ethnic identification, gender or income. Accordingly, H1a expects that the 
effect of learned helplessness may be moderated by loser perceptions, racial 
identification, ethnic identification, gender or income, as it is expected that attachments 
to the existing system may be more tenuous.  
As the resources literature expects that level of income is one of the most robust 
predictors of whether an individual is likely to turn out to vote, it is expected that in the 
dissertation samples that this would hold (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980). However, as is predicted by the learned helplessness literature, poverty is one of 
the truest forms of learned helplessness (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993). Thus, H1b 
explores whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between income and 
instrumental political behavior, i.e., vote likelihood and turnout. 
Alternatively, if learned helplessness predicts exit, it is possible that it may also 
explain alternative forms of voice where people are seeking reassert control over the 
uncontrollable conventional political system by going around or outside of it. Thus, H1c 
expects that as learned helplessness increases, people will turn to methods of expressive 
participation, e.g., rallying or protesting, to voice their opinions and grievances. Lastly, 
since the observational data presents challenges with causal ordering, Samples 2 and 4 
include experimental manipulations of learned helplessness, with the expectation that if 
learned helplessness is made salient, respondents will report a lower likelihood of voting. 
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H1d expects that if learned helplessness is exacerbated experimentally, when made 
salient, the tendency to exit will be evident through lower reported voting behavior and a 
turn to more expressive actions, like rallying or protesting.    
 
Procedure 
Data 
 This chapter includes data from all five of the dissertation samples. Samples 1-3 
are unweighted internet convenience samples collected from Amazon.com’s online 
workplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Samples 4 and 5 are also internet samples. 
However, the analyses from Samples 4 (CCES-PEP) and 5 (CCES) are weighted to 
approximate national representativeness. Further information about these samples may be 
found in Chapter 2, as well as in Appendix A. Additionally, the learned helplessness 
experiment was conducted across two of the dissertation samples (Samples 2 and 4). 
Additional information about this experiment may be found in Appendix E. 
 
Measures and Manipulation 
Helplessness and Disaffection Measures: As noted in Chapter 2, building off of 
the dimensionality analysis of disaffection conducted by Gunther and Montero (2006), 
the four indicators of disaffection (internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest) were 
measured, in addition to the learned helplessness scale (LHS). These measures were 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 and the specific question wordings utilized may 
be found in Appendix B.  
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Control Variables. The analyses conducted in this chapter control for the 
following demographic and attitudinal variables (all coded to range from 0-1): education, 
income, gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as 
female, coded as 1 or male, coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy variable to 
represent whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic, coded as 1 or 
not, coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent 
identified as White, coded as 1, or not, coded as 0). The models also include measures of 
partisan identification, with two dummy variables, one coded “1” for Republicans versus 
Democrats and independents, and the second coded 1 for Democrats versus Republicans 
and independents. These allow independents to be the reference category in the OLS and 
logistic regression models. A recoded 0-1 measure of political ideology is also included, 
where 0 represents “Extremely liberal” and 1 represents “Extremely conservative.” 
Lastly, an attitudinal measure of whether respondents perceive themselves to be on the 
losing side of politics is also included in the models, where 0 represents the perception 
that their side has been winning more often than losing in politics and 1 represents the 
perception that their side has been losing more often than winning in politics. Unlike the 
models assessing the predictors of learned helplessness, the models reviewed in this 
chapter do not include a measure of authoritarianism. Appendix B includes the question 
wording for all variables discussed and Appendix A shows the distribution of the 
demographic control variables across the samples. 
Dependent Variables: Instrumental Political Participation – Voting Behavior. 
With the expectation that learned helplessness will decrease engagement in more 
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instrumental political behaviors like voting behavior, the five samples included a range of 
prospective and retrospective participation questions. The analyses below focus on three 
measures of instrumental political participation: vote likelihood/intention, vote 
confidence, and reported voter turnout. In four of the five samples, vote likelihood was 
measured on a 5-point scale from “Extremely likely” to “Not at all likely” and was 
recoded to range from 0 to 1. In Sample 1, 59.7% was “Extremely likely” to vote, 
whereas in Sample 2, 59.3%, in Sample 3, 70.14% and Sample 4 wave 2, 76.2% were 
“Extremely likely” to vote. In Sample 5, the CCES common content did not ask about 
vote likelihood, but vote intention. Respondents were asked whether they intended to 
vote in the 2016 election. This question was collapsed into a dummy variable, where 1 
was coded for “Yes, definitely,” and “I already voted (early or absentee),” and 0 was 
coded for “Probably,” “No,” and “Undecided.” In Sample 5, 80.4% of respondents said 
that they intended to or already had voted.  
Vote confidence, measured in Samples 3 and 4, was measured with a five-point 
scale in Sample 3 and a seven-point scale in Sample 4, ranging from “Extremely 
confident” to “Not at all confident” and recoded to range from 0 to 1. Similar to vote 
likelihood, vote confidence provides an additional assessment of how people feel about 
their decision to vote. For people who experience learned helplessness, it is expected that 
they are likely to be less confident in their preferred candidate, as they may feel like their 
choice will not matter and impact the result, or they may not feel that the candidate 
options will do anything to assist, support, or represent them if they do win the election.  
In Sample 3, 42.35% of respondents were “Extremely confident.” In Sample 4, vote 
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confidence was measured at waves 1, 2 and 4. In wave 1, 44.82% of respondents were 
“Extremely confident,” whereas in waves 2 and 4, 43.37% and 63.54% were “Extremely 
confident.” The key difference here is that wave 4 reflects vote choice confidence post-
election, thus reflecting post-election increases in confidence.  
Lastly, since Samples 4 and 5 are panel surveys, in wave 4 of Sample 4 and the 
post-election wave of the CCES, reported turnout was also collected. In Sample 4, 
turnout was coded as 1 for “I am sure I voted” and 0 for other responses, i.e., “I did not 
vote in the election this November,” “I thought about voting this time, but did not,” and 
“I usually vote, but did not this time.” In Sample 4, unweighted, 90.0% reported having 
voted. Similarly, in Sample 5, turnout was coded 1 for “I definitely voted in the General 
Election,” and 0 for other responses, i.e., “I did not vote in the election this Nov.,” “I 
thought about voting this time - but didn’t,” “I usually vote, but didn't this time,” and “I 
attempted to vote but did not or could not.” In Sample 5, unweighted, 92.3% of 
respondents said they voted. It is important to note that reported participatory activities 
are often inflated due to social desirability, and it is possible to speculate that is the case 
here, particularly in the post-election reported voter turnout.20 While reported 
                                                
20 The weighted values for Sample 4’s voting behavior measures are as follows: 1) vote 
likelihood in Sample 4 wave 2, 69.29% of respondents were “Extremely likely” to vote; 
2) vote confidence in wave 1, 41.56% of respondents were “Extremely confident,” 
whereas in waves 2 and 4, 40.91% and 61.05% were “Extremely confident”; 3) reported 
turnout in wave 4, 87.82% reported turning out to vote. The weighted values for Sample 
5: 1) 73.7% intended to vote; 2) 94.7% reported turning out.   
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participatory activities are likely to be inflated due to social desirability, Sample 3 does 
include a direct behavioral measure of participation. 
Expressive Political Participation – Protesting Behavior. The analyses below also 
include a measure of retrospective protesting and rallying behavior. Respondents were 
asked in two questions whether they had participated in a rally in support or in opposition 
in the last three or six months. These two questions were combined into a single dummy 
variable, coded 1 for “Yes” and 0 for “No.” The one exception was in Sample 4, where 
respondents were asked these two questions in a single item that was still coded 1 for 
“Yes” and 0 for “No.” In Sample 1, 16.2% said they had participated in a rally, whereas 
in Sample 2, 7.32%, in Sample 3 10.47%, in Sample 4 9.36%, and in Sample 5 8.02% of 
respondents said they had participated in the last three months.21  
Experimental Manipulation of Learned Helplessness. While learned helplessness 
has been widely studied in the experimental context for animal behavior, fewer studies 
have focused on human learned helplessness in the laboratory. Since previous studies 
have focused on a laboratory context, even fewer have considered learned helplessness in 
a survey context, let alone an online survey context. Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 
(1993) note that laboratory investigations of the helplessness reformulations are 
underutilized due to wider interest in personality dimensions like explanatory style, 
outside of laboratory applications. Further, they reinforce that it is difficult to study 
                                                
21 In wave three of Sample 4, the weighted percentage for the protesting and rallying 
measure was 9.7% in the last 3 months. In the post-election wave of Sample 5, the 
weighted percentage for rallying and protesting was 6.4% in the last 6 months.  
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individual differences in conjunction with situational manipulations in laboratory 
experiments, since the manipulations of situational factors must be strong enough to 
affect dependent measures but not so strong as to swamp the effect of individual 
differences (1993: 168-169). Thus, prior studies have focused on the random assignment 
of respondents to conditions where they experience repeated successes or failures, to 
induce feelings of learned helplessness (for further discussion, see Dyck, Vallentyne, and 
Breen 1979; Mikulincer 1988, 1994; Wortman, Panciera, Shusterman, and Hibscher 
1976). Yet, these studies demonstrated less than reliable results in producing differential 
effects of small and large amounts of helplessness on anger, sadness, or stress.  
Thus, the learned helplessness manipulation used in this dissertation takes a 
different approach and is modeled after self-affirmation manipulations from Steele (1988) 
and Cohen, Aronson, and Steele (2000). Traditional self-affirmation manipulations often 
have respondents bolster their self-esteem through acknowledgement of a characteristic 
or value that is important to them and having them write a brief paragraph about a 
personal experience in which that characteristic or value made them feel good about 
themselves. Rather than have the respondents bolster their self-esteem, this manipulation 
had respondents write a brief paragraph about a time that they repeatedly tried to do 
something and failed to succeed. The specific wording of the manipulation may be found 
in Appendix E. This experimental manipulation appears in Sample 2 and wave 2 of 
Sample 4. The next section discusses the results from the formal hypothesis tests. To test 
the hypotheses stated above, bivariate and multivariate analyses were utilized to test 
whether learned helplessness impacts exit or voice through political participation.  
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Results 
Helplessness’ Consequences on Exit and Voice: Hypothesis 1 
As a politically consequential measure, this chapter seeks to evaluate how general 
learned helplessness influences the ways in which people engage in instrumental and 
expressive political activities. Turning to the first hypothesis, H1, tests the direct effects 
of the disaffection measures on the various ways people choose to exit or voice their 
opinions and grievances with the conventional, institutionalized political system. The 
helplessness hypothesis expects that people who experience higher levels of learned 
helplessness will be more likely to exit and thus, less likely to participate in politics 
through outcome-oriented, instrumental participation, e.g. voting.  
This hypothesis stems from the learned helplessness literature, assuming that 
learned helplessness leads to passive behavior. People how experience learned 
helplessness may feel as if the political system around them is uncontrollable, meaning 
that they do not and cannot get what they want or need from it. It is expected that they 
would not support that system, and consequently disengage, or exit, by choosing to not 
participate in behavior that supports that political system, i.e., through voting behavior. 
To test the main effects of helplessness on instrumental participation, three different 
measures may be considered: vote confidence, vote likelihood, and voter turnout.22  
                                                
22 Results discussed below include only the control condition when the analyses are 
conducted on the cross-sectional waves that include survey experiments. Further, all 
Sample 4 and Sample 5 analyses are weighted to approximate national 
representativeness.  
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First, to test how disaffection explains engagement in voting behavior, a 
dichotomous vote likelihood or vote intent measure was regressed upon the measures of 
disaffection, and demographic and attitudinal controls. Before the 2016 election, vote 
likelihood was measured across Samples 1-4, and vote intent was measured in Sample 5.  
Taking the social desirability of these responses into account, vote likelihood has been 
dichotomized, where 1 represents “Extremely likely to turnout” and 0 represents the 
response options less than extremely likely to turnout. Table 3.1 shows the logistic 
regression models, with consistent effects of learned helplessness and interest. In these 
models, it is expected that as learned helplessness increases, the probability of being 
likely to turnout will decrease. Across the samples, learned helplessness and interest are 
the only two consistent predictors.  
[Insert Table 3.1 Here] 
As with many likelihood and turnout models, we would expect interest to be a 
significant predictor of vote likelihood. People who are interested in politics are more 
likely to be invested in the campaign, and interested in is outcome. For a one-unit 
increase in interest, the odds of being extremely likely to vote increase by 26.64 in 
Sample 1, 144.97 in Sample 2, 14.43 in Sample 3, 439.36 in Sample 4, and 1.34 in 
Sample 5. With a one-unit increase in interest, the percentage increase in the probability 
of being extremely likely to vote is sizeable across samples (Sample 1 = 2,564%; Sample 
2 = 14,397%; Sample 3 = 1,343%; Sample 4 = 43,836%; Sample 5 = 34%).  
As for learned helplessness, a one-unit increase in learned helplessness changes 
the odds of being extremely likely to vote by .23 in Sample 1, .03 in Sample 2, .06 in 
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Sample 3, and .001 in Sample 4 Wave 2. Since it is expected that higher learned 
helplessness to decrease the probability of being extremely likely to vote, for a one-unit 
increase in learned helplessness the percentage decrease in the probability of being 
extremely likely to vote is fairly consistent across samples (Sample 1 = 77%; Sample 2 = 
97%; Sample 3 = 94%; Sample 4 = 99.9%). However, learned helplessness did not 
significantly predict vote intent in Sample 5, which utilized the five-item brief measure of 
learned helplessness.  
Notably, the measures of disaffection are not consistently significant across the 
samples. Internal efficacy is significant in Samples 1, 3, and 5, but not 2 and 4. It is 
possible that is the case because these are the smallest samples where vote likelihood was 
collected. In Sample 1, the odds of being extremely likely to vote change by 1.50 in 
Sample 1, 8.80 in Sample 3 and 8.54 in Sample 5. For a one-unit increase in internal 
efficacy the percentage increase in the probability of being extremely likely to vote is 
50% in Sample 1, 780% in Sample 3 and 754% in Sample 5. External efficacy and trust 
are not significant in any of the samples predicting vote likelihood. Additionally, as all of 
the measures are scaled to range from 0 to 1, it is interesting to note that while 
significant, the relative odds of learned helplessness, compared to interest and internal 
efficacy are smaller than the other two significant disaffection measures.  
[Insert Figure 3.1 Here] 
Second, as with vote likelihood, for individuals who experience higher levels of 
learned helplessness, it is expected that they will feel less confident about their vote 
choice. As with vote likelihood, reported vote confidence is expected to be inflated due to 
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social desirability. Taking the potential biases of these responses into account, vote 
confidence has been dichotomized, where 1 represents “Extremely confident” and 0 
represents the response options less than extremely confident. To test how the measures 
learned helplessness and disaffection, explain vote confidence, the dichotomous vote 
confidence measure was regressed on the LHS and measures of disaffection, as well as 
the demographic and attitudinal controls. Table 3.2 shows these logistic regression 
models from Samples 3 and 4, with consistent effects.23 Coefficients reflect log 
likelihoods, rather than odds ratios. Learned helplessness and internal efficacy are the two 
consistent significant predictors across the three samples. As internal efficacy measures 
beliefs about people’s own competence to understand and participate effectively in 
politics, it is expected that it would play an important role in predicting confidence in 
selecting a candidate. Thus, for a one-unit increase in internal efficacy, the odds of being 
extremely confident would change by 7.60 in Sample 3, 2.24 in Sample 4 Wave 1, and 
2.57 in Sample 4 Wave 4, post-election. This translates to a 660% increase in the 
probability of being confident in ones’ vote choice in Sample 3, and a 124% increase in 
Sample 4 Wave 1 pre-election. Interestingly post-election, we see a slightly larger 157% 
increase in the probability of being confident in ones’ vote choice in Sample 4 Wave 4. 
[Insert Table 3.2 Here] 
External efficacy and trust were not significant predictors of vote confidence in 
Samples 3 or 4. However, interest was significant in Samples 3 and 4 prior to the 
                                                
23 Vote confidence was measured in Sample 4 at wave 1, before the 2016 election and at 
wave 4 during the post-election wave. 
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election. For a one-unit increase in interest, the odds of being extremely confident would 
change by 4.10 in Sample 3, and 3.60 in Sample 4 Wave 1. This indicates an expected 
310% increase in the probability of being extremely confident in ones’ vote choice in 
Sample 3, and a 260% increase in Sample 4 Wave 1. While it is expected that people who 
are more interested in politics would be more confident in their vote, it is interesting that 
interest is not a significant predictor following the election. 
There are also consistent, albeit relatively smaller, statistically significant effects 
for learned helplessness on vote confidence. It is expected that as learned helplessness 
increases, the probability of being confident in ones’ vote would decrease. For a one-unit 
increase in learned helplessness, the odds of being extremely confident would change by 
.28 in Sample 3, .14 in Sample 4 Wave 1, pre-election, and .18 in Sample 4 Wave 4, post-
election. This indicates an expected 72% decrease in the probability of being extremely 
confident in ones’ vote choice in Sample 3, and an 86% decrease in Sample 4 Wave 1. 
Looking post-election, we see the same pattern. For a one-unit increase in learned 
helplessness, we would expect a 72% decrease in the probability of being extremely 
confident in one’s vote choice. Figure 3.2 illustrates the predicted probability of being 
extremely confident in one’s vote choice, across the levels of learned helplessness for the 
two samples pre- and post-election.  
 [Insert Figure 3.2 Here] 
Lastly, since Samples 4 and 5 are panel studies, it is possible to examine whether 
learned helplessness predicts post-election reported turnout. Table 3.3 shows the logistic 
regression models predicting turnout. As with vote likelihood, both interest and learned 
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helplessness are significant predictors in both samples. However, the measures of 
disaffection, internal efficacy, external efficacy (only measured in Sample 4), and trust 
are not. Trust is only significant in Sample 4, such that for a one-unit increase in trust, the 
odds of turning out to vote increase by .006 and there is an unusual 99.4% decrease in the 
probability of turning out to vote 
For a one-unit increase in interest, the odds of turning out to vote increase by 
22.02 in Sample 4 and 5.81 in Sample 5. With a one-unit increase in interest, the 
percentage increase in the probability of turning out to vote is sizeable across samples 
(Sample 4 = 2,102%; Sample 5 = 481%). Turning to learned helplessness, the effect sizes 
are smaller than interest, but consistently significant. For a one-unit increase, the odds of 
turning out to vote change by .0005 in Sample 4 and .07 in Sample 5, which translates to 
a 99.95% decrease in the odds of turning out to vote in Sample 4 and 93% in Sample 5. 
Figure 3.3 demonstrates the change in predicted probability of turning out to vote across 
the learned helplessness scale. It should be noted that the confidence intervals are quite 
large in Sample 4 at the highest values of the learned helplessness scale, as there were 
few individuals at the highest end of the LHS.  
[Insert Table 3.3 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.3 Here] 
Taking this evidence together for vote likelihood, vote confidence, and reported 
turnout, there is clear support for the first hypothesis. Learned helplessness performs as a 
consistent, significant predictor of exiting from in political participation, expressive 
before and after the 2016 presidential election.  
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Consequences of Learned Helplessness – Hypothesis 1a 
As noted above, it is causally challenging to untangle temporally the potential 
cyclical nature of helplessness, disaffection, and political marginalization, given the 
largely observational data collected for this dissertation. Focusing on learned 
helplessness, it is possible that the effects of learned helplessness on voting behavior may 
be moderated by perceptions of being on the winning or losing side of politics, being a 
member of a historically or systemically marginalized group, or by income level. As 
such, H1a expects that the effect of learned helplessness on exit or disengagement from 
voting behavior may be moderated by loser perceptions, racial identification, ethnic 
identification, gender or income. Exit is expected since attachment to the existing system 
may be more tenuous for those who have perceive repeated political losses, systemic 
marginalization, or lack of representation.  
 First, it is expected that the effect of learned helplessness on voting behavior will 
be moderated by loser perceptions. Thus, for those who feel, for issues that matter to 
them, that they are on the losing side of politics more than on the winning side, it is 
expected that learned helplessness will decrease their probability of engaging in 
instrumental political behavior. However, for those who perceive themselves to be on the 
winning side, it is expected that learned helplessness will not have an effect on 
instrumental voting behaviors, i.e. vote likelihood and turnout.  
In order to test whether this is the case, the loser perception dummy variable was 
interacted with learned helplessness to predict both vote likelihood and turnout. Table 3.4 
illustrates the conditional effect of learned helplessness and loser perceptions on vote 
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likelihood, whereas Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.9 demonstrates this effect on turnout. In 
both tables, for Sample 4, it is the case that the interaction statistically significantly 
predicts both vote likelihood (b=13.72, p<.05) and turnout (b=22.76, p<.01), controlling 
for all measures of disaffection and demographics. For vote likelihood, the marginal 
effect for those who perceive themselves on the winning side is significant (b=-1.73, 
p<.001), but not for losers. Similarly, for turnout, the marginal effect for winners is 
significant (b=-1.66, p<.001) but not for losers (b=-.15, n.s.). Figure 3.4 shows these 
conditional relationships graphically.  
[Insert Table 3.4 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.4 Here] 
Interestingly, this result is not in the expected direction. Rather, there is little 
effect of learned helplessness for losers in regard to whether they are likely to vote or 
report actually turning out to vote. It is possible that perceiving oneself as on the losing 
side of politics serves at its own demobilizing factor. However, for those who perceive 
themselves as on the winning side of politics, but are high in learned helplessness, they 
may not feel motivated to support the conventional, institutionalized political system and 
are thus more likely to exit, resulting in lower probability of vote likelihood and turnout. 
 Second, some marginalized identities may affect the experiences of learned 
helplessness on disengagement from instrumental voting behavior. As two examples, we 
can look at the moderating role of racial or ethnic identity. It is expected that the effect of 
learned helplessness will be moderated by whether people identify as being from a non-
dominant racial or ethnic group.  
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Thus, for those who identify as non-White or as being Latino, Hispanic, or 
Spanish, it is expected that learned helplessness will decrease their probability of 
engaging in instrumental voting behavior and will be more likely to exit. However, for 
those who identify as being from a dominant racial or ethnic group (i.e., White or not 
Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish), it is expected that learned helplessness will not have an 
effect on instrumental voting behavior. To test whether these expectations are observed in 
the data, the White/non-White racial dummy measure and the dummy measure for 
Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish identity were interacted with learned helplessness to predict 
vote likelihood and turnout. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate the interactions predicting 
vote likelihood across the five samples, whereas Models 3 through 6 in Table 3.9 show 
the interactions predicting reported turnout.  
Regarding vote likelihood, the White/non-White dummy variable interaction is 
not statistically significant across the samples. However, this dummy variable collapses 
multiple racial identities, which may mask the significant effect. As Peterson, Maier, and 
Seligman (1993) identify, individuals from Black and African American communities are 
expected to experience some learned helplessness due to historical and systemic 
marginalization. Thus, if the interaction is assessed between Black and African American 
respondents and White respondents, rather than collapsing all non-white respondents, the 
interaction between race and learned helplessness is statistically significant (b=14.84, 
p=.10), controlling for all measures of disaffection and demographics in Sample 4. The 
interaction was not significant in the other samples. However, this is likely due to not 
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having enough Black or African American respondents in the other samples.  Figure 3.5 
illustrates the conditional relationship for White compared to Black respondents.  
In Figure 3.5, as learned helplessness increases in Sample 4 for White 
respondents, the probability of being extremely likely to vote decreases. The marginal 
effect is statistically significant (b=-1.06, p<.01). As learned helplessness increases for 
Black or African American respondents, the probability of being extremely likely to vote 
increases. However, the marginal effect is only significantly different at the highest end 
of learned helplessness (b=.69, n.s.). However, looking at actual reported vote behavior 
reported in Table 3.9, rather than vote likelihood, the interaction between race and 
learned helplessness is statistically significant (Sample 5, Model 4, Table 3.9: b=6.76, 
p<.05). Figure 3.6 illustrates this conditional effect on reported turnout. The marginal 
effect of being White on learned helplessness is statistically significant for White 
respondents only (b=-.31, p<.01), as the marginal effect for non-White respondents is not 
significant (b=-.04, n.s.). From Figure 3.6, it looks like as learned helplessness increases, 
the probability of turning out to vote does decrease. Yet, the confidence intervals are 
quite large at the highest levels of learned helplessness, and they do overlap, suggesting 
that the effect of learned helplessness for non-White respondents is not different from 
that for White respondents. This result is not as expected, as the significant effects are for 
the dominant identity group, rather than the marginalized or subordinated racial groups. 
 [Insert Table 3.5 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.5 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.6 Here] 
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 Third, identifying as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may moderate the effect of 
learned helplessness on the probability of exiting and disengaging from instrumental 
voting behavior. Table 3.6 shows the interaction between an ethnicity dummy measure 
and learned helplessness, predicting vote likelihood. The conditional relationship is only 
marginally significant in Sample 2 (b=-29.75, p<.10). The marginal effect of learned 
helplessness for those who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish is statistically 
significant (b=-2.46, p<.001) and larger than the marginal effect for those who do not 
identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish (b=-.49, p<.10). Figure 3.7 shows this 
conditional relationship. For those who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, as 
learned helplessness increases, their probability of being extremely likely to vote 
decreases significantly, approximately to zero. For those who do not identify as Hispanic, 
Latino, or Spanish, an increase in learned helplessness also decreases the probability of 
being extremely likely to vote, but the effect is not as severe as it is for those who 
identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish. These conditional effects are not significant for 
turnout, as evidenced in Models 5 and 6 in Table 3.9. This result is as hypothesized, in 
the expected directions. Interestingly, the effect of learned helplessness is still marginally 
significant for the dominant identity group, as it has been for those who identify as being 
on the winning side of politics, and who identify as White.   
[Insert Table 3.6 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.7 Here] 
 Fourth, gender may play a role in moderating the effect of learned helplessness on 
disengagement from instrumental voting behavior. Considering how gender may impact 
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the ways in which men and women engage in voting behavior, women who experience 
learned helplessness may also be more likely disengage than men who experience learned 
helplessness. To test this, the female dummy measure was interacted with learned 
helplessness to predict vote likelihood (Table 3.7) and turnout (Table 3.9: Models 7 and 
8). While the conditional effects are not significant for actual reported turnout, for vote 
likelihood in Samples 1 and 3 we see significant, but slightly different effects. Figure 3.8 
shows these two opposite conditional effects.  
 In Sample 1, the marginal effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood is 
significant for females (b=-.36, p<.05), but not significant for males (b=-.13, n.s.). Thus, 
in Sample 1, as learned helplessness increases, there is no effect on the probability of 
being extremely likely to vote for males, but learned helplessness does decrease the 
probability of being extremely likely to vote for females. On the other hand, in Sample 3, 
the marginal effect of learned helplessness for males is larger for males (b= -.88, p<.001) 
than for females (-.27, p=.10). Thus, the effect of learned helplessness in Sample 3 has a 
demobilizing effect for both men and women, but the effect is larger for men. The effect 
for women is in the expected direction but, the effect for men in Sample 3, is unexpected.  
[Insert Table 3.7 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.8 Here] 
 Lastly, it is conceivable that income level may moderate the effect of learned 
helplessness on disengagement. It is expected that for those who are at the lower levels of 
income, learned helplessness will decrease the probability that respondents will be 
extremely likely to vote or report having turned out. However, for those who are at higher 
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levels of income, it is expected that learned helplessness will not impact their engagement 
in instrumental voting behavior.  
As such, to test whether this is the case, learned helplessness was interacted with 
the measure of income across all five samples. Surprisingly, for vote likelihood, level of 
income did not condition the effect of learned helplessness as evidenced in Table 3.8. 
However, for turnout, income did condition the effect of learned helplessness, 
demonstrated in Models 9 and 10 in Table 3.9 for both Samples 4 and 5 (b=-24.34, p<.10 
and b=-5.27, p<.05, respectively). Figure 3.9 shows the average marginal effect of 
learned helplessness across the levels of income on the probability of turning out to vote. 
Interestingly, learned helplessness in both samples had the greatest impact in decreasing 
the probability of turning out to vote for those at the higher levels of income. However, 
the confidence intervals are extremely large, as there are very few respondents who are 
high in income and learned helplessness. Again, we see some of the strongest effects of 
learned helplessness for the dominant group, rather than for the marginalized group.  
 [Insert Table 3.8 Here] 
[Insert Table 3.9 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.9 Here] 
 Taken together, the evidence in support of Hypothesis 1a is mixed, with some 
strong demobilizing effects of learned helplessness on dominant groups, rather than 
marginalized or subordinated groups. First, for those who perceive themselves to be on 
the losing side of politics, learned helplessness did not decrease the probability of 
engaging in instrumental voting behavior, but it did for those who identify as being on the 
   117 
 
winning side of politics.  Second, for those who identified as non-White (or Black or 
African American in Sample 4), learned helplessness actually increased the probability of 
being extremely likely to vote for Black or African American respondents and decreased 
the probability of being extremely likely to vote or turnout for White respondents. Third, 
in support of the hypothesis, the effect of learned helplessness decreased the probability 
of engaging in instrumental voting behavior for those who identified as Hispanic, Latino, 
or Spanish. These effects were also significant for those who did not identify as Hispanic, 
Latino, or Spanish, but to a lesser extent. Fourth, also in support of the hypothesis, the 
effect of learned helplessness on disengagement for females was significant in both 
Samples 1 and 3, but the effect was greater for males in Sample 3. Last and unexpected, 
the effect of learned helplessness on disengagement was greatest for those at the higher 
levels of income. It is possible that for those in marginalized and subordinated groups, 
there is a ceiling of experienced learned helplessness, such that there is less variation 
across the levels of learned helplessness. However, for those in dominant groups, there is 
greater variation of learned helplessness, which allows for clearer statistical analysis.  
 
Consequences of Learned Helplessness – Hypothesis 1b 
The resources literature expects that income is one of the most robust predictors 
of whether an individual is likely to turn out to vote (see Rosenstone and Hansen; 
Schlotzman, Lehman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980). Additionally, it is one of the most consistent and robust predictors of 
learned helplessness (see Chapter 2, as well as Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993). 
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Since cross-sectional and limited panel observational data make it more difficult to 
determine the true relationships in the population. The following hypothesis suggests that 
there may be a different relationship between income and learned helplessness than the 
moderated relationship tested above. Thus, H1b explores whether learned helplessness 
may mediate the relationship between income and voting behavior, i.e., vote likelihood 
and turnout.  
To test this relationship, Imai’s mediation package in Stata 14, medeff, was used 
to evaluate whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between income and 
vote likelihood across the five samples, as well as reported turnout in Samples 4 and 5. 
Regarding vote likelihood in Samples 1-4 and vote intention pre-election in Sample 5, 
learned helplessness does significantly partially mediate the relationship between income 
and vote likelihood or intention.24 Across the samples, between 10% and 25% of the total 
effect is mediated by learned helplessness. Figure 3.10 shows the path diagrams for all 
five samples.  
[Insert Figure 3.10 Here] 
 Similarly, since reported turnout was measured in Samples 4 and 5, it is possible 
to test whether learned helplessness partially mediates the relationship between income 
and reported voting behavior. In both Samples 4 and 5, learned haplessness does mediate 
the relationship, mediating just over 14% in Sample 4 and nearly 15% in Sample 5 of the 
                                                
24 As with the previous results, these mediation models are limited to the control 
conditions or waves without experimental conditions. Additionally, all analyses from 
Samples 4 and 5 are weighted.  
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total effect. Figure 3.11 illustrates the path diagrams for turnout in Samples 4 and 5. The 
effect of income when learned helplessness is added to these models is significant across 
all samples for vote likelihood and turnout.  
[Insert Figure 3.11 Here] 
Before concluding that the resources model is missing a psychological component 
tied to helplessness in explaining voting behavior, the measures of political disaffection 
should also be tested. Accordingly, the mediation models were conducted for the 
measures of disaffection, internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest. None of these 
measures of disaffection perform as consistently across the five samples and across both 
vote likelihood and turnout as does learned helplessness. External efficacy only partially 
mediates the effect of income on vote likelihood in Sample 3 (8% of the total effect 
mediated). Trust only partially mediates the effect of income on vote likelihood in 
Samples 1 and 3 (5% and 8% of the total effect mediated, respectively).  
Interest partially mediated the effect of income on vote likelihood in Samples 1, 4 
and 5, as well as on reported turnout in Samples 4 and 5. However, the amount of the 
total effect mediated was inconsistent. For vote likelihood, in Sample 1, less than 6% of 
the total effect was mediated, but in Sample 4 18% was partially mediated and in Sample 
5, 31% of the total effect was mediated. For turnout, in Sample 4, 20% of the total effect 
was mediated and in Sample 5, 18% of the total effect was mediated. The stronger effect 
of interest is somewhat expected, as it has been shown to be a strong predictor of voting 
behavior (see Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Lane 1959; Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, and Gaudet 1948, Milbrath and Goel 1977; Schlotzman, Lehman, Verba, and 
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Brady 2012; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Interest has also 
been shown to perform as a measure of resources with greater effects on political 
engagement than other resource measures, e.g. income, knowledge, and partisan strength 
(Verba et al. 1995). These mediation models suggest that the relationship between 
income and interest as measures of resources may be more interconnected, such that 
interest may actually mediate the effects of income on instrumental voting behavior. 
Lastly, internal efficacy, the closest measure to learned helplessness, partially 
mediates the effect of income on instrumental voting behavior in Samples 1, 4 and 5 for 
vote likelihood and in Samples 4 and 5 for reported turnout.  For vote likelihood, internal 
efficacy mediates 25% of the total effect in Sample 1, 11% in Sample 4 and nearly 30% 
in Sample 5. For reported turnout, internal efficacy mediates 12% of the total effect in 
Sample 4 and nearly 18% in Sample 5. In comparing learned helplessness and internal 
efficacy, the measures of learned helplessness are generally larger and more consistent 
across the samples. Some of the inconsistency across the models may be possibly due to 
some measure differences across the samples. However, it cannot be denied that there is a 
partially mediated effect of internal efficacy.  
These mediation models present at least some initial evidence that is contrary to 
the participation literature pointing to the overwhelming effect of resources, particularly 
income, as the most important predictors of participation. Often, this work uses income, 
and sometimes race, as stand-ins for measures of resources. However, taking the 
evidence above for hypothesis 1 and 1a, along with these mediation models, while race 
and income may capture resources, this chapter has provided evidence that there is likely 
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a missing psychological component tied to learned helplessness, which helps to more 
fully explain voting behavior.  
Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2 and the introduction of this chapter, people do not 
participate only in limited voting related behavior. Possibly as an attempt to reassert 
control over a perceived uncontrollable political system, people may seek to voice their 
opinions and grievances outside of the conventional, institutionalized political system. 
Thus, the next section and hypothesis 1c turns to questions related to engagement in more 
expressive forms of political behavior, i.e. marching, rallying, and protesting.  
 
Consequences of Learned Helplessness – Hypothesis 1c 
For individuals who are removed, marginalized, or subordinated from the 
conventional, institutionalized democratic system, the previous hypotheses have 
demonstrated that they tend to exit from the system by disengaging from voting behavior 
because they have learned that they are unable to get what they need or want from the 
conventional political system. However, it is conceivable that in an attempt to reassert 
some control, they may turn to activities outside of the institutionalized political system 
to voice their opinions and grievances, through more expressive political activities such 
as rallying, marching, or protesting behavior. Thus, H1c expects that as learned 
helplessness increases, people will turn to one type of more expressive participation, e.g., 
rallying or protesting, to voice their opinions and grievances, particularly if they come 
from marginalized or subordinated communities.  
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As identified by Hirschman (1970), voice, encapsulates action taken by customers 
of a firm or members of an organization when they are dissatisfied. They may express 
their opinions to management or even to anyone who cares to listen. Yet, voice is a messy 
concept as “it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest” 
(Hirschman 1970: 16). Further, Hirschman’s theory is focused more on instrumental 
motives and outcomes. However, in the U.S. context, options for voicing opinions or 
grievances may differ for those who come from or identify as being from a historically or 
systemically marginalized or subordinated group. Tied to learned helplessness, for those 
who have learned that the conventional political system does not serve them well, rather 
than trying to change the conventional political system through instrumental voting 
activities, they seek to regain some control by going outside of the institutionalized 
political system and turning to more expressive actions, e.g., rallying or protesting.  
To test whether this is the case, a dummy variable measuring whether respondents 
said they had participated in a rally in support of or in opposition to a political issue or 
political candidate in the last three months was regressed upon learned helplessness, the 
measures of disaffection, and demographic and attitudinal controls. Table 3.10 shows 
these models for all five samples. One caveat to note is that the measures of protesting 
and rallying in Sample 4 was collected during wave 3, shortly before the 2016 
presidential election, and the measure in Sample 5 was collected during the post-election 
wave. Measuring the reported protesting behavior following the presidential election may 
have impacted the social desirability of reporting, as well as the opportunity for the 
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behavior itself. These main effects models are limited to the control conditions or waves 
without experimental conditions, and analyses from Samples 4 and 5 are weighted.  
[Insert Table 3.10 Here] 
For the protesting models presented in Table 3.10, learned helplessness, internal 
efficacy, interest, and age are statistically significant across three or more samples in the 
expected directions. For a one-unit increase in age, the odds of rallying or protesting 
decrease by .13 in Sample 1, .01 in Sample 2, .10 in Sample 3, and .19 in Sample 4. With 
a one-unit increase in age, the percentage decrease in the probability of having rallied or 
protested is slight across samples (Sample 1 = 87%; Sample 2 = 99%; Sample 3 = 90%; 
Sample 4 = 81%). Thus, for Samples 1-4, as age increases, the probability of having 
engaged in rallying or protesting behavior decreases.  
For a one-unit increase in interest, the odds of having engaged in rallying or 
protesting behavior increase by 11.40 in Sample 1, 11.49 in Sample 4, and 32.85 in 
Sample 5. For a one-unit increase in interest, the percentage increase in the probability of 
participating in this expressive political activity is considerable (Sample 1 = 1,040%; 
Sample 4 = 1,049%; Sample 5 = 3,185%). Similar to evidence in the previous section 
showing that those who are more politically interested are more likely to engage in voting 
behavior, those who are more politically interested are also more likely to engage in 
protesting behavior.  
As a measure of disaffection, it is expected that as internal efficacy, or the belief 
that one has the ability and comprehension to participate in politics, increases that the 
probability of having participated in protesting behavior to increase. For a one-unit 
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increase in internal efficacy, the odds of having rallied or protested increase by 8.00 in 
Sample 1, 5718.55 in Sample 2, 60.13 in Sample 3, and 71.93 in Sample 5. This 
translates to very sizable percentage increases for each one-unit increase in internal 
efficacy (Sample 1 = 700%; Sample 2 = 571,755%; Sample 3 = 590.13%; Sample 5 = 
7,093%). This would follow expectations that internal efficacy may serve as a motivating 
factor, such that those who believe they have the ability and comprehension to participate 
will participate in both instrumental and expressive political activities.  
On the flip side, it is expected that as learned helplessness increases, the 
probability of participating in protesting behavior will increase, rather than decrease as 
would be expected for exit and disengagement from instrumental voting behavior. It is 
expected that this may be the case because learned helplessness results in feelings of loss 
of control and expressive political behavior may be one way for people to reassert some 
control. For a one-unit increase in learned helplessness, the odds of having participated in 
protesting or rallying activities increases by 9.81 in Sample 1, 334.64 in Sample 2, and 
9.61 in Sample 4. This converts to a percentage increase in the probability of having 
engaged in protesting behavior across the samples (Sample 1 = 881%; Sample 2 = 
33,464%; Sample 4 = 861%). Thus, those who experience greater learned helplessness 
are more likely to turn to these expressive political activities to voice their opinions and 
grievances outside of the institutionalized, conventional political system. 
 Although the main effects models help to further our understanding of those who 
are likely to engage in instrumental versus expressive political activity, given the main 
effects for learned helplessness increasing protesting behavior, these effects should be 
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investigated in more depth. It is possible that like the conditionality of instrumental 
voting behavior presented under H1a, the effect of learned helplessness on protesting and 
rallying may also be conditional. To whether the effect of learned helplessness is 
moderated, learned helplessness was interacted with the dummy measure of whether one 
perceives themselves to be on the winning versus the losing side of politics, a White vs. 
non-White dummy measure, a Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish ethnic identity dummy, a 
gender dummy, and income. First, unlike with the conditional effect of loser perceptions 
on voting behavior, the effect of learned helplessness is not conditional upon loser 
perceptions. These logistic regression models are reported in Table 3.11.  
 [Insert Table 3.11 Here] 
 However, the effect of learned helplessness may be exacerbated by racial and 
ethnic identification, with the expectation that learned helplessness will increase the 
probability of engaging in protesting behavior for those who identify as non-White or as 
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish. Given this expectation, it is also expected that learned 
helplessness will not have an effect on probability of engaging in protesting for those 
who identify as White or not as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish. The models showing the 
interaction between race and learned helplessness are reported in Table 3.12 and the 
models showing the interaction between Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish identity and learned 
helplessness are reported in Table 3.13. While the interaction between race and learned 
helplessness is statistically significant (b=12.64, p<.05), the conditional effect is only 
marginally significant for White respondents, not for non-White respondents in Sample 4. 
Figure 3.12 shows the conditional effect of learned helplessness by race. As learned 
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helplessness increases, the probability of having participated in protest behavior increases 
for White respondents, but there is no effect of learned helplessness for non-White 
respondents. However, the confidence intervals do overlap with one another. This finding 
is unexpected and not in the direction of the moderation expectations.  
[Insert Table 3.12 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.12 Here] 
There is a possibility that non-White respondents felt greater learned helplessness 
than White respondents, and thus hit a ceiling, which would explain no difference of 
learned helplessness on protesting behavior for non-White respondents. In Sample 4, 
where this conditional effect was significant, average learned helplessness is significantly 
greater for non-White respondents than for White respondents (mean diff. = .04, p<.05).  
Table 3.13 reports the logistic regression models testing the conditional effect of 
ethnicity on learned helplessness. The interaction is marginally significant in Sample 4 
and significant at p<.01 in Sample 5. Breaking these interactions down further, Figure 
3.13 shows the conditional effect of ethnicity and learned helplessness on the probability 
of having engaged in protesting behavior. In Sample 4, the marginal effect of learned 
helplessness for those who do not identify as Hispanic, Latino or Spanish is not 
statistically significant (b=.27, n.s.), but the marginal effect is significant for those who 
do identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish (b=1.35, p<.05). Similarly, in Sample 5, the 
marginal effect of learned helplessness for those who do not identify as Hispanic, Latino, 
or Spanish is not statistically significant (b=.01, n.s.), but is significant for those who do 
identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish (b=.42, p<.001). Figure 3.13 illustrates that the 
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effect of learned helplessness increases the probability of having protested or rallied 
increases for those who identify as Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish, but learned helplessness 
has no effect for those who do not identify as Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish. This result is 
in line with expectations for the conditional effects of learned helplessness.   
[Insert Table 3.13 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.13 Here] 
 The effect of learned helplessness on protesting behavior may also be conditioned 
by gender. Table 3.14 shows the logistic models for the interaction between gender and 
learned helplessness.  The conditional effect is only significant in Sample 5 (b=-3.75, 
p<.05). However, in looking at the marginal effects, the effect of learned helplessness for 
males and females is unexpected, such that the marginal effect is only significant for men 
(b=.13, p<.01), but not for women (b=-.07, n.s.). Thus, unexpectedly, as learned 
helplessness increases for men, the probability of engaging in protesting or rallying 
activities increases. Figure 3.14 illustrates this interaction further, such that there is also 
no effect of learned helplessness for females on the probability of having engaged in 
protesting or rallying activity.  
[Insert Table 3.14 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.14 Here] 
Last, it is possible that the effect of learned helplessness on protesting and rallying 
activities may differ based upon respondents’ level of income. Thus, it is expected that 
the effect of learned helplessness at lower levels of income will increase the probability 
of engaging in protesting behavior and there will be no effect of learned helplessness for 
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those at higher levels of income. Table 3.15 displays the logistic regression models with 
the interaction between income and learned helplessness. Interestingly, there are opposite 
conditional effects on protesting behavior before (Sample 4) and after the 2016 
presidential election (Sample 5). Figure 3.15 shows the conditional effect of income on 
learned helplessness for protesting behavior for Samples 4 and 5.  
[Insert Table 3.15 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.15 Here] 
The effect of learned helplessness is different across levels of income when the 
rallying and protesting questions are asked before the presidential election (Sample 4) 
compared to being asked after the presidential election (Sample 5). In Sample 4 before 
the election, the effect of learned helplessness for those at the lower levels of income 
increased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior, but decreased the probability 
of engaging in protesting behavior for those at higher levels of income. However, in 
Sample 5, following the election, the effect of learned helplessness for those at lower 
levels of income decreased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior, but 
increased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior for those at higher levels of 
income. These opposite results before and after the presidential election are puzzling.  
It is likely that the opposite effects are context specific, as following the election 
of Donald Trump, a number of marches, rallies, and protests across the country took 
place to demonstrate dislike and disapproval of the election outcomes. Further, the 
Women’s March and the March for Science were placed on the calendar nationwide. It is 
estimated that more than 1 in 100 Americans participated in the Women’s March on the 
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second day of President Trump’s Administration (Chenoweth and Pressman 2017). 
Where many marchers were middle class and upper middle class White women, this 
march reified intersectional boundary tensions between class, race, and gender where 
non-White participants sought greater voice and space from their White co-marchers 
(Grigby Bates 2017). Further, this may provide an example of the conditional effect of 
learned helplessness following the presidential election for those at the higher levels of 
income. Regardless, the highlighted intersectional tensions from the Women’s March are 
only one example of the complexity behind exit and voice, suggesting that future work 
necessitates deeper investigation into intersectional experiences across income, gender, 
race, ethnicity (and possibly immigration status), and age.  
 
Consequences of Learned Helplessness – Hypothesis 1d 
As there may be multiple origins of learned helplessness, one method of testing its 
effects is to experimentally manipulate it. Thus far, learned helplessness has been 
discussed as operating more like a predisposition, but it is likely more of a state than a 
trait, shaped by particular experiences and potentially made salient in different contexts. 
Given this, it is worth considering what happens in the political context. For example, 
what happens to voting and protesting behavior when helplessness is made salient? When 
people are reminded of their failures or inability to access or change the institutionalized, 
conventional political system, how does helplessness impact people’s motivation to 
engage? Further, does the salience of learned helplessness impact the way people view 
the democratic system within which they live? For example, is it possible for campaign 
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adds, news stories that remind people of voter suppression, or losing poll projections to 
make learned helplessness salient, subsequently driving down motivation to turn out or 
motivation to rally or protest? Before these specific contexts can be tested in future work, 
the first step is to determine whether it is possible to experimentally manipulate learned 
helplessness. Hypothesis 1d expects that if learned helplessness is exacerbated 
experimentally, when made salient, the tendency to exit through lower reported 
instrumental voting behavior will increase and expressive behavior, like rallying or 
protesting will increase. 
 Did the manipulation work? To evaluate whether the learned helplessness 
manipulation actually did exacerbate the learned helplessness, difference of means tests 
were conducted for the learned helplessness scale between the un-manipulated control 
condition and manipulated condition. First, in Sample 2, respondents who received the 
learned helplessness manipulation did score marginally significantly higher on learned 
helplessness than those who were in the control condition and did not receive the 
manipulation (mean diff.=-.02; p=.06). However, in Sample 4, respondents who received 
the learned helplessness manipulation did not score significantly higher on the learned 
helplessness scale than those who were in the control condition (mean diff.=-.002; n.s.). 
This could have been due to noise created by all of the other experimental manipulations 
with which respondents interacted. Further, when placed in a linear regression format 
controlling for the other investigators’ experimental conditions and weighting the model, 
a treatment dummy variable for the learned helplessness manipulation was still not 
statistically significant (b=.01, n.s.). 
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 Testing Hypothesis 1d. Considering that learned helplessness ended up not being 
not experimentally manipulated in Sample 4, it is only possible to test H1d in Sample 2. 
However, manipulated learned helplessness did not significantly impact reported voting 
or protesting behavior, reported in Table 3.16.  
[Insert Table 3.16 Here] 
 This raises a handful of questions about the experimental manipulation and the 
ability to manipulate learned helplessness. Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) note, 
learned helplessness is difficult to study in the laboratory context because the 
manipulations of situational factors that induce learned helplessness have to be strong 
enough to affect dependent measures, but not too strong as to overwhelm the effect of 
individual differences. As such, it is possible that the learned helplessness manipulation 
was not strong enough to make learned helplessness sufficiently salient for the 
respondents. Alternatively, it is possible that learned helplessness is an experience so 
strongly incorporated into one’s identity, that it will not be easily manipulated. Future 
work will look at learned helplessness experimentally where respondents will engage in 
experiences of winning or losing to make helplessness salient, similar to the experiments 
conducted in prior learned helplessness work (e.g., Dyck, Vallentyne, and Breen 1979; 
Mikulincer 1988, 1994; Wortman, Panciera, Shusterman, and Hibscher 1976). 
 
Discussion 
This chapter sought to expand the study of disaffection in the political context by 
accounting for perceptions of repeated failure and loss of control that become part of 
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individuals’ self-identity, and further impact the way in which they engage in political 
activities, utilizing exit or different forms of voice. By incorporating learned helplessness, 
we may better understand the effects of experiencing repeated failure and persistent 
losses of control that contribute to political disaffection, and consequently, affecting the 
ways in which people voice exit or voice. These feelings of repeated failure and loss of 
control may stem from experiences with repeated political losses, systemic 
marginalization, feelings of being un- or underrepresented, or even from negative 
experiences with the legal system or government services and thus, should be 
incorporated into our study of disaffection and political behavior. This chapter has shown 
that those who experience greater learned helplessness are less likely to engage in 
instrumental behavior (i.e., vote likelihood, vote confidence, and reported turnout), but 
are more likely to engage in expressive behavior (i.e., reported rallying and protesting).  
It is important to note that across the models predicting different forms of voice, 
outside of learned helplessness, the measures of disaffection are less consistent. Overall, 
internal efficacy, the closest measure to learned helplessness was only a consistent 
predictor of increased probability of vote confidence and protesting behavior. Internal 
efficacy, unlike learned helplessness, less consistently predicted vote likelihood across 
the samples, and was not significant in either Sample 4 or 5 in predicting reported 
turnout. Alternatively, political interest was a consistent predictor of increased probability 
of vote likelihood and turnout, but not less so for vote confidence or protesting behavior. 
External efficacy was not predictive of any of the measures of voting behavior, but was 
inconsistently predictive in Samples 1 and 3 for protesting behavior. Similarly, trust was 
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only predictive of turnout in Sample 4 and of protesting in Samples 1 and 5. Taking these 
main effects together, this chapter reinforces the need for capturing the concept of learned 
helplessness so as to better explain and understand political exit and voice through 
(dis)engagement. Yet, the chapter also tells a more nuanced story behind exit, and voice.  
While Chapter 2 explored the numerous potential explanations for what causes 
helplessness and disaffection, this chapter began to explore the ways that helplessness 
and disaffection impact instrumental and expressive political behavior. While level of 
income consistently was shown to shape learned helplessness, this chapter also 
demonstrated that learned helplessness consistently partially mediates the relationship 
between income and the probability that someone will be likely to vote or report as 
having actually voted. Further, a few of the measures of disaffection also partially 
mediate the relationship between income and voting behavior, i.e. internal efficacy and 
political interest. However, these measures less consistently mediate the relationship than 
learned helplessness. The evidence from these mediational models presents an addendum 
to the broader resources literature on political participation, such that it is not just the 
level of income alone that predicts whether someone is likely to or will actually turn out 
to vote, but that the way in which that level of income makes them feel and experience 
disaffection, particularly an aspect of helplessness related to class experiences. Further 
questions related to this inquiry are explored in the next chapter.  
While the chapter explores both the mediational and conditional effect of income 
and learned helplessness on examples of instrumental and expressive political behavior, 
the results of the mediational models are stronger than the moderation results. 
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Additionally, while strong experimental evidence for learned helplessness was not found, 
future work plans to investigate alternative experimental tests of learned helplessness, 
e.g., making repeated losses salient through repeatedly losing or winning at a game with 
financial incentives. Taken together, this chapter has provided evidence that learned 
helplessness is a consistent predictor of both exit and voice. However, the effect of 
learned helplessness on exit and voice was conditional upon particular marginalized 
identities, some of which were unexpected and opposite from what was hypothesized.  
First, unexpectedly, there was no effect of learned helplessness on voting or 
protesting behavior for those who felt that they were on the losing side of politics. Since 
feeling like one is on the losing side of politics on issues that matter to them is tied more 
clearly to direct outcomes from elections, it is not surprising that loser perceptions are not 
tied to protesting and rallying behaviors, as they are less tied to specific actors and 
outcomes. However, in Sample 4, for those who felt that they were on the winning side of 
politics, learned helplessness drove down the probability of being extremely likely to 
vote, as well as the probability of turning out.  
Second, in assessing how the effects of learned helplessness on voting and 
protesting behavior might be moderated by subordinated racial and ethnic identities, the 
results uncovered some interesting, and again unexpected, effects. Before summarizing 
the results, it is worth noting that utilizing survey work to assess the complex role of race 
and ethnicity can leave the interpretation of the results as less rich, as survey items 
restrict the measurement of these identities down to simple response items in order to 
quantify these identities with only a few items. It must be acknowledged that this identity 
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reduction is a drawback of the survey approach utilized here. Consequently, in making 
conclusions about these flat and restricted measures of racial and ethnic identity, the 
evidence should be considered with a critical eye. 
First, while it was expected that the effect of learned helplessness for Black and 
African American respondents would decrease the probability of engagement in voting 
behavior, in Sample 4, the effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood for Black and 
African American respondents actually increased the probability of engaging in 
instrumental voting behavior. Additionally, when using the White/non-White measure, 
again unexpectedly, learned helplessness decreased the probability of engaging in 
instrumental voting behavior, i.e., both vote likelihood and turnout in Samples 4 and 5 
and increased the probability of engaging in more expressive behavior, i.e., reported 
protesting and rallying behavior in Sample 4 for White respondents.   
Second, for respondents who identify ethnically as Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish, 
the effect of learned helplessness on voting and protesting behavior operates as 
hypothesized. It was expected that for those who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, 
that the effect of learned helplessness would decrease the probability of engaging in 
instrumental voting behavior, but increase the probability of engaging in more expressive 
protesting behavior. However, in regard to protesting, the effect of learned helplessness 
for those who do not identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish does decrease the 
probability of engaging in voting behavior, but to a much lesser extent.  
Third, the conditional effects of learned helplessness by gender were a bit mixed. 
It was expected that learned helplessness for females would decrease the probability of 
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engaging in instrumental voting behavior, and increase the probability of engaging in 
more expressive protesting and rallying behavior. While in Samples 1 and 3, the effect of 
learned helplessness for females did decrease vote likelihood and turnout, the effect of 
learned helplessness also decreased vote likelihood for males. Additionally, in Sample 5, 
while the effect of learned helplessness did not increase the probability of protest for 
females, it did increase the probability of protest, unexpectedly, for males.  
Last, given challenges with observational data, this chapter also tested whether 
the effects of learned helplessness on political behavior were moderated by income. For 
engagement in instrumental voting behavior, the effect of learned helplessness on vote 
likelihood was not moderated by income. However, for turnout in Samples 4 and 5, the 
effect of learned helplessness was moderated, but only significantly for those at the 
higher levels of income, which is not what was expected. Additionally, for protesting 
behavior, the conditional effect of learned helplessness flipped after the election, 
compared to results before the election. In Sample 4 before the election, the effect of 
learned helplessness for low income respondents increased the probability of protesting 
behavior, but in Sample 5, following the election, the effect of learned helplessness for 
low income respondents decreased the probability of protesting. The exact opposite 
occurred for high income respondents, such that in Sample 4 before the election, the 
effect of learned helplessness for high income respondents decreased the probability of 
protesting, but increased the probability of protesting after the election. These results, as 
well as the gender results, could be in part due to the timing of when the questions were 
asked in relation to the presidential election and advertisement of political marches 
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following the 2016 presidential election. More work, particularly intersectional work, is 
needed to elucidate the conditional effect of gender on learned helplessness for exit and 
voice. 
In seeking to further the study of feelings of uncontrollability as it relates to 
political behavior, this chapter introduced the concept of learned helplessness with the 
expectation that it would help explain people’s choice to exit and disengage from the 
existing political system (choosing not to vote), or explain their selection for voice 
utilizing instrumental or expressive political participation (voting or protesting). While 
the traditional learned helplessness literature focuses on passivity, and is thus a nice 
match with explaining when people disengage from voting behavior, this dissertation 
diverges from the helplessness literature by using learned helplessness to explain action 
in more expressive forms of political behavior. This chapter posits that engagement in 
protesting and rallying behavior may be one way those experiencing helplessness may 
seek to reassert control over their experience with the political system.  
At its root, learned helplessness stems from experience. What this chapter did not 
determine is the other factors that might also shape the experiences that effect overall 
feelings of learned helplessness, disaffection, and choices for voice and exit. It is possible 
that environmental contexts within which people experience the political system may 
shape the way learned helplessness is incorporated into people’s self-concept. As the 
literature is still debating whether helplessness is more of a state or trait, shaped my 
unexpected experiences or uncontrollability, it is possible that other contextual factors 
that influence helplessness may spill over to influence political behavior. The next two 
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chapters begin to explore two dominant contemporary contexts shaping the way in which 
people experience the political environment, i.e., income inequality and elite polarization. 
These chapters examine the role context plays in shaping helplessness, and impacting exit 
or voice. The next chapter, Chapter 4, explores the impact of income inequality, whereas 
the following chapter, Chapter 5, explores the role of elite polarization.  
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Chapter 4 
Reification of Inequality: Helplessness, Disaffection, and Financial Insecurity 
 
When was the last time you or your household worried about your finances or 
“making ends meet”? If you have, you are not alone. In 2015, nearly 60% of American 
households reported worrying about their finances over the last year (“Americans’ 
Financial Security…” 2015). More acutely, financial distress affecting Americans who 
fall below the poverty line is undebatable, and pervasive across the country.  
The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) found in a recent report 
that the wage a full-time worker makes is not enough to rent a two-bedroom apartment or 
house anywhere in the country, and in more than 99% of American counties, it is not 
even enough to make a one-bedroom affordable (NLIHC 2017a). Thus, “in no state can a 
minimum wage worker afford a one-bedroom rental home at the average Fair Market 
Rent, working a standard 40-hour work week, without paying more than 30% of their 
income (NLIHC 2017a). Moreover, the report shows that an extremely low income (ELI) 
household, whose income is less than the poverty level or 30% of their area’s median, 
cannot afford the average cost of a modest one-bedroom rental home in any state. In a 
related report, NLIHC also found that many low-income households - more than 20 
million renter households live in housing poverty - cannot afford to meet their other basic 
needs like food, transportation, medical care, and other goods and services after they pay 
for their housing (NLIHC, 2017b). Taken together, this means that many Americans are 
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spending as much as half of their income on housing, struggling to not sacrifice other 
basic necessities. 
Yet, these strains and experienced poverty do not encapsulate a wide range of 
concerns with financial distress experienced by the middle and upper-middle class, as 
well. Concerns about job loss and insecurity, the cost of children’s education, and 
healthcare, and acquired debt are only a part of this financial distress.  It is assumed that 
as people climb the income ladder, material shortages become less predominant and 
consumer power grows.  
However, there may be greater access to purchasing “‘things’—goods, houses, 
and, most importantly, education—to show for their higher earnings, but they do not have 
healthy finances. Having those ‘things’ is of course an improvement over not having 
them, but only for the very, very rich (or the very, very unusual) is there any real escape 
from the pressure-cooker of American household finances” (Rosen 2016). According to 
the Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking (SHED) conducted annually by 
the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, a sizable 
number of American adults are struggling with regular expenses and coping with 
unexpected hardships.25 For example, the survey in 2016 found that approximately 25% 
                                                
25 Since October 2013, the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of Consumer and 
Community Affairs has conducted a Survey of Household Economics and 
Decisionmaking (SHED) and released a Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. 
Households. The statistics above reflect the Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. 
Households in 2016 released in May 2017, based on 6,634 respondents who completed 
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of American adults are not able to pay all of their current month’s bills in full, and 44% 
say they could not cover an emergency expense costing $400 or would have to cover it by 
selling something or borrowing money. The Americans’ Financial Security Pew survey 
also found that 83% of those worried about their finances are worried about their lack of 
savings and 69% feel they do not have enough money to retire.  
 These surveys identify a tension between experienced financial distress and actual 
growing income inequality. Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012) illustrate that economic 
inequality is possibly more unequally distributed now than at any point in several 
generations up to this point in U.S. history. Over the past thirty years, the U.S. income 
distribution has shifted toward the wealthy, leading it to be the most unequal among 
advanced democracies (Luttig 2013; Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006). Some have argued 
that American income inequality may be higher today than it has ever been, pointing to 
technological change and globalization as particularly responsible for widening the gap 
between skilled workers and less-educated workers (Guo 2016). Using the Survey of 
Consumer Finance, as well as estate and income tax returns, Saez and Zucman (2016) 
that wealth inequality has grown in in the last 30 years due to the upsurge of top incomes 
(the 0.1% of wealth share) and an increase in saving rate inequality. They also show that 
the top 0.1% of wealth share has risen from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012, which is 
                                                                                                                                            
the 2016 survey. For the full report, see: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2016-report-economic-well-being-us-
households-201705.pdf 
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commensurate with levels of income inequality in 1929 at the start of the Great 
Depression.  
 While it is clear that income inequality has grown, and previous chapters have 
emphasized the role of respondents’ income level, this chapter is most interested in 
perceptions of income inequality and their consequences for engagement in voting and 
protesting behavior. Page and Jacobs (2009) find that most Americans are at least aware 
of and unhappy about high and increasing economic inequality, and they support a range 
of government solutions when their well-being or opportunity is threatened. Along 
similar lines, Bartels (2008) shows that most people support economic equality, at least in 
the abstract, but that political ideology and attention to politics condition this support, 
such that highly aware conservatives are much less concerned, highly aware liberals are 
much more concerned about inequality. Harkening back to Converse (1964) and Zaller 
(1992), Bartels (2008) reinforces that people may or may not have crystalized attitudes 
about inequality, such that the uninformed are unlikely to grasp the political relevance of 
their beliefs and values, whereas informed people may distort the facts that are contrary 
to their beliefs. This may end up preserving a “false consistency between their beliefs 
about the causes, extent, and meaning of inequality in contemporary American society on 
one hand and their ideological or partisan predilections on the other” (Bartels 2008: 129).  
Tied to broader attitudes about economic inequality and insecurity, Hacker, 
Rehm, and Schlesinger (2013) argue that more work is needed in the post-Great 
Recession era to examine the sources of economic uncertainty and loss and how these 
experiences translate into politically relevant attitudes and behavior. Using the Survey of 
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Economic Risk Perceptions and Insecurity (SERPI) survey that they constructed to be 
administered as part of the 2008-2009 Panel Survey of the American National Election 
Study (ANES), they find evidence of widespread economic worries, ranging from 
concerns about employment, medical care, familial arrangements, and wealth. They 
conclude that Americans deeply value their economic security, particularly during times 
of economic shock and upheaval, and construct expectations based on their own 
experiences and the experiences of those around them. These expectations shape how 
people consider their own economic experiences, as well as about government’s role in 
making their economic experiences more secure (Hacker et al. 2013: 44).  
 The differences in experienced income and perceptions about income inequality 
are quite consequential. Inherent within the historical and contemporary U.S. democracy, 
with its competitive two-party system, there has been a clearly identified upper-class bias 
in regard to political involvement, influence, and representation (Gilens 2012; Leighley 
and Nagler 2014; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). While early work on participation 
(e.g., Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) concluded voters were representative of nonvoters 
on policy issues, consensus among scholars in the contemporary political environment is 
that this is no longer the case. Gilens (2012) suggests that adoption of policy outcomes 
favored by the affluent persisted for the affluent but disappeared for the middle class and 
the poor. This suggests that political representation functions reasonably well for the 
affluent, but leaves the middle-class and the poor unrepresented (unless they share the 
preferences of the well-off).  
   144 
 
In particular, Leighley and Nagler (2014) demonstrated voters hold different 
attitudes than nonvoters on economic and redistributive issues, and affluent citizens 
continue to turn out at considerably higher rates than poor citizens. This research has 
identified that voters tend to be from privileged groups regarding race, gender, education 
and income (i.e., voters are likely to be white, male, more educated, and affluent). And, 
racial and ethnic disparities in socioeconomic resources and rootedness in the community 
do not explain overall group differences in participation (Logan, Darrah, Oh 2012). To 
quote Schattschneider, “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings 
with a strong upper-class accent.” (1960, p. 35). This all has the potential to introduce 
considerable representational biases and blind spots among elected officials as a result 
from the participation of “some” and not “all” (Griffin and Newman 2005).  
These biases and blind spots among elected officials might be due to political 
inaction among the middle-class and poor. Levine (2015) points to the perceptions of 
economic insecurity issues at the “root political inaction” (Levine 2015: 161). Economic 
insecurity is classified in four forms: 1) threat of involuntary job loss, 2) health care 
costs, 3) retirement insecurity, and 4) college costs. This classification of economic 
insecurity goes beyond the broad set of concerns those at or near the poverty line face. 
Rather, economic insecurity has a broader reach throughout the U.S populace. For Levine 
(2015), political inaction is classified as not devoting time or money, e.g., attending 
political meetings, volunteering with campaigns or other political groups, or donating 
money to a campaign or political group, rather than more instrumental voting political 
behavior. This is justified with the argument that voting behavior only provides a blunt 
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communicative tool for the electorate, opportunities take place too infrequently, and 
voting often communicates little precise information (Levine 2015: 25). With similar 
reasoning provided in Chapter 2 in this dissertation, it is possible that concerns with 
economic insecurity may also influence engagement in more expressive political action, 
i.e., marching, rallying, and protesting behavior.  
Thus, this chapter turns to a discussion of the role context plays in shaping 
feelings of learned helplessness. Langer (1983) found that the perception of helplessness 
can be inferred from the environment, without direct experience of failure. In addition to 
the exploration of political polarization as an important political context that could shape 
learned helplessness discussed in Chapter 5, this chapter evaluates how salience of 
income inequality may shape feelings of learned helplessness and political behavior.  
While people want to regain control in their lives. Poverty, and arguably 
economic insecurity, can create a perpetual feedback loop of uncontrollability, as well as 
restrict or eliminate options for reasserting control. Having the repeated experience with 
the lack of control over one’s economic situation, or even being labeled as incompetent to 
make more money or save more for retirement, reinforces that they may not be able to be 
effective now or in later actions. Kane (1987) emphasizes the long term attitudinal and 
motivational implications of poverty tied to learned helplessness, such that regardless of 
how much someone may desire a particular outcome, the expectancy that one’s action 
can help attain it motivates the action or inaction. For example, “No matter how much an 
individual would like to work, he or she will not look for employment unless there is a 
reasonable expectation that a job can be found” (Kane 1987: 410). 
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American society has long promised the idea of equality of opportunity and social 
mobility. Yet:  
… the emphasis of American society on equality of opportunity and social 
mobility coexists well with income inequalities between different strata, which 
are as sharp in the United States as in other societies and which, in the view of 
some analysts, are by no means likely to decrease…income inequality between 
different educational and occupational strata, even between skilled and unskilled 
workers, functions as an incentive for achievement and high economic 
performance. When this happens, individuals at the bottom of the social hierarchy 
find themselves penalized by the system of incentives; moreover, they feel 
socially useless. (Di Palma 1970: 191) 
Further tied to income inequality, the American educational system, and political 
participation, Bruch and Soss (forthcoming) find that for youth who have negative 
school-authority experiences, e.g., suspension, being singled out for punishment, or 
perceptions of unfair treatment, are strongly associated with later patterns of political 
engagement through lower electoral participation, and less trusting perceptions of 
government. Of note, students who experience these negative school authority 
experiences are more likely to be lower SES, Black, and male. The authors conclude that 
American schools function as powerful sites of experiential learning, reinforcing early on 
that the system is unfair and unequal, which has a considerable impact on later 
engagement.  
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Growing economic inequality has been identified as relating to lower political 
participation and civic engagement (Levine 2015; Putnam 2000, 2015; Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady 2012). This chapter argues that learned helplessness can stem from 
experiences with inequality, particularly income inequality, which in turn has the ability 
to impact the ways in which people select different forms of exit and voice to support or 
oppose the political system within which they live. Learned helplessness scholars 
hypothesized that repeated experiences with uncontrollable outcomes interfere with the 
ability to seek out and recognize opportunities for exercising control. Kane (1987) 
identifies that being aware of being labeled as helpless, inferior, or incompetent may lead 
people to assume helpless behaviors even without experiencing failure first. 
Given this, and the issues presented by our current systems of economic 
inequality, the question must be considered: if we do not better understand the 
disaffected, how can we engage their voices to solve problems that disproportionally 
effects this segment of the population? Thus, this chapter seeks to experimentally 
manipulate perceptions of income inequality. The next section reviews the hypotheses 
tested and then moves to a discussion of the results and their implications.  
 
Hypotheses 
Considering the important role context may play in affecting feelings of 
uncontrollability through learned helplessness, this chapter tests three hypotheses 
regarding the role income inequality plays for exacerbating learned helplessness, and in 
turn, how that may impact engagement in voting and protesting behavior. Using a survey 
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experiment to manipulate perceptions of income inequality, H2, the inequality 
hypothesis, expects that when made salient, income inequality will exacerbate learned 
helplessness. Second, as a number of scholars have identified economic inequality as 
impacting engagement in voting behavior, (e.g., Levine 2015; Putnam 2000, 2015; 
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012), H2a expects that when made salient, income 
inequality will exacerbate respondents’ choice to exit and disengage from voting 
behavior. As the inequality survey experiment allows this chapter to test whether the 
reason context, i.e., income inequality, affects participation is because it causes learned 
helplessness, it also allows for an assessment of how political disaffection then, in turn, 
impacts political participation and civic disengagement. Thus, H2b expects that if learned 
helplessness is exacerbated experimentally, when made salient, high income inequality is 
likely to increase the tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior. 
 
Procedure 
Data 
The inequality survey experiment was only included Sample 3. Analyses below 
focus on the 2,230 respondents who participated in the control condition or one of the 
two conditions of the income inequality experiment.26 Additional information on the 
                                                
26 This data collection effort also included another survey experiment on political 
polarization discussed in Chapter 5. However, respondents were not assigned to 
overlapping survey conditions, so the second survey experiment does not have any 
bearing on the experimental results reported on the polarization experiment. 
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sample is available in Chapter 2, as well as in Appendix A. The experimental treatments, 
as discussed below, are available in Appendix C. 
 
Manipulation and Measures 
 Experimental Manipulation of Income Inequality Perceptions. While individual 
level of income will be measured, the dissertation work proposed here seeks to 
experimentally make income inequality and income distributions salient. To test the 
impact of income inequality salience, a three-condition, between-subjects, framing 
experiment was conducted, where respondents were randomly assigned to the control 
condition or to be exposed to one of two income inequality treatments. Subjects were 
presented with a table of information about income inequality and the U.S. income 
distribution. 
  The first condition had respondents enter their household income and then were 
asked to find what percentage of U.S. households make less than the value entered. They 
were then encouraged use the table to answer a few questions about other incomes to 
experience the income distribution information available. For example, subjects were 
asked to answer questions like, “What percentage of households earns less than 
$85,000?” The second condition had subjects interact with an information table in a 
similar way, but the values provided reflect what the U.S. income distribution would look 
like today if economic growth since 1980 had been evenly shared across the income 
distribution, i.e., had income inequality not grown since 1980. Of the 2,230 subjects used 
in these analyses, 731 were randomly assigned to the control condition. To the first 
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treatment condition that focuses on current income inequality, 754 were randomly 
assigned and, 745 were randomly assigned to the second treatment condition that focuses 
on the gap in current income inequality, compared to what the U.S. income distribution 
would look like if income inequality had not grown since 1980. 
To guarantee the manipulation of perceptions of economic inequality, these 
manipulations were modeled after those utilized in an online survey experiment by 
Kuziemko et al. (2013; 2015), first published by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. The authors found that the experimental conditions had large effects on views 
about income inequality in the U.S. Additionally, rather than use interactive sliders like 
Kuziemko et al. did in the original experiments, Sample 3 utilized a static information 
board so as to control more of the information to which subjects were exposed, as well as 
which questions they answered. However, Sample 3 still used what Kuziemko et al. call 
“omnibus information treatments,” in regard to the type of information provided to 
subjects (2015: 1484-1485).  
The information treatments sought to provide a simplified boost to individuals’ 
knowledge about inequality and the U.S. income distribution, rather than giving a long 
description of the underlying causes of inequality. While the information was presented 
in a static manner, rather than in an interactive format, the respondents were still asked to 
interact with the information to answer personal income questions so the treatments were 
both somewhat interactive and customized to each respondent. From these treatments, it 
is expected that people who interact with the treatment showing what the current U.S. 
income distribution would look like if inequality had not grown since 1980 will have a 
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greater impact on exacerbating learned helplessness than the treatment showing income 
inequality today. This reasoning stems from an expectation that the former treatment will 
induce greater feelings of uncontrollability over inequality than the latter treatment, and 
will thus will induce greater feelings of helplessness.  
 Manipulation Check. Since the goal of the income inequality experiment was to 
manipulate perceptions of inequality, Sample 3 utilized nine questions to evaluate 
whether perceptions of inequality increased as a result of the treatments. First, 
respondents were asked about whether they thought everyone in American society has an 
opportunity to succeed. On a 1-4 scale, response options ranged from 0 “Everyone does” 
to 4 “No one does.” The variable was reverse coded and scaled to range from 0-1, so that 
higher values correspond to attitudes that everyone has an opportunity to succeed. 
Second, respondents were asked whether over the last 5-10 years income inequality has 
increased. On a 1-5 scale, response options ranges from 1 “Increased a great deal” to 5 
“Decreased a great deal.” This variable was also reverse coded and scaled to range from 
0-1, so that higher values correspond to attitudes that income inequality has increased. 
Third, respondents were asked whether over the next 5 years, would income differences 
increase. Response options ranged from 1 “Increase a great deal” to 5 “Decrease a great 
deal.” This variable was reverse coded and scaled to range from 0-1 so that higher values 
reflected perceptions that income differences will increase. Fourth, respondents were 
asked about whether they thought income inequality currently was a serious problem. 
Response options ranges from 1 “Serious problem” to 4 “Not a problem at all” and the 
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variable was reverse coded and scaled 0-1 so that higher values reflect perceptions that 
income inequality is a more serious problem.  
 Beyond specific questions using language about income inequality, respondents 
were also asked about perceptions of upward mobility, and their personal economic 
situation. These questions were borrowed from the 2007 Maxwell Poll on Citizenship and 
Inequality. This poll is one of the few national surveys that focuses on income inequality, 
experiences with government programs, and political engagement.27 
First, respondents were asked about how much upward mobility (children doing 
better than the family they came from) do they think there is in America. The response 
options ranged from 1 “A great deal of upward mobility” to 5 “No upward mobility at 
all.” The responses were reverse coded and scaled to range from 0 to 1, so that higher 
values reflected perceptions of greater mobility. Second, respondents were asked whether 
over the last several years had their economic situation improved. Response options 
ranged from 1 “Greatly improved” to 7 “Greatly worsened.” Responses were reverse 
coded and scaled to range from 0 to 1. Higher values reflect perceptions of improvement. 
Third, respondents were asked if they thought their economic situation is likely to 
                                                
27 The Maxwell Poll on Citizenship and Inequality is directed by Professor Jeff 
Stonecash, through the Maxwell School in the Campbell Public Affairs Institute at 
Syracuse University.  The survey asks questions about engagement in political affairs and 
other aspects of civic life, as well as views on social and economic inequality in the 
United States. More information on the Maxwell Poll may be found at: 
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/programs/The_Maxwell_Poll/ 
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improve over the next several years, with response options ranging from 1 “Greatly 
improve” to 7 “Greatly worsen.” These responses were also reverse coded and scaled to 
range from 0 to 1 so that higher values reflect perceptions of improvement. Fourth, 
respondents were asked, compared to their parents, are they better off economically. The 
response options ranged from 1 “Much better off” to 5 “Much worse off” and were 
reverse coded and rescaled to range from 0 to 1 so that higher values correspond to 
perceptions of being better off. Lastly, respondents were asked about how their personal 
economic situation compared to how others are doing. Response options ranged from 1 
“Much better than average” to 5 “Much worse than average.” Responses were reverse 
coded and scaled to range from 0 to 1. Higher values reflect perceptions of doing better 
than average.  
Disaffection Measures: As with chapters 2 and 3, the same disaffection measures 
are utilized: learned helplessness, internal and external efficacy, trust, and political 
interest. All measures are coded to range from 0 to 1 with higher values corresponding to 
higher levels of that variable. The question wording of all measures is available in 
Appendix B and a more extensive discussion of the individual measures is in Chapter 2.  
Control Variables. The models presented in this chapter control for the following 
demographic and attitudinal variables (all coded to range from 0-1): education, income, 
gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as female 
(coded as 1) or male (coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy variable to represent 
whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic (coded as 1) or not 
(coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent 
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identified as White (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). The models also include Republican 
and Democratic dummy variables, political ideology (extremely liberal is coded as 0 and 
extremely conservative is coded as 1), as well as a dummy variable for whether 
respondents view themselves on the losing side of politics.  
Political Participation. The analyses below focus on two measures. The first is a 
measure of instrumental voting behavior, i.e. vote likelihood. The second is a measure of 
more expressive political behavior, i.e., marching, rallying, or protesting. 
 
Results 
Income Inequality: Does context play a role in exacerbating learned helplessness? 
 The inequality hypotheses seek to test whether context affects learned 
helplessness and political behavior. Before testing H2, which expects that when made 
salient, income inequality will exacerbate learned helplessness, it is important to evaluate 
whether the survey experiment manipulated the intended inequality perceptions. If 
inequality perceptions can be experimentally manipulated and this changes levels of 
learned helplessness, this may provide initial evidence of a possible causal relationship 
between income inequality and learned helplessness. 
 Did the manipulation Work? Since the goal of the income inequality experiment 
was to manipulate perceptions of inequality, Sample 3 utilized nine questions to evaluate 
whether perceptions of inequality increased as a result of the treatments. The expectation 
is that the treatment showing how the U.S. income distribution would have looked if 
inequality had not grown since 1980 will elicit greater perceptions of inequality than both 
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the control condition and the treatment showing the U.S. income distribution today. This 
expectation is supported in seven of the nine questions. Table 4.1 shows the mean 
differences on these nine questions between the conditions. 
 [Insert Table 4.1 Here] 
 To test the mean differences, three condition dummy variables were constructed. 
First, two dummy variables were created where the inequality treatment coded “1” and 
the control condition was coded “0.” Second, to compare the two experimental conditions 
directly with one another, a third dummy variable was created where the inequality since 
1980 was coded “1” and the inequality today condition was coded “0.”  
 The first of the nine questions asked about whether they thought everyone in 
American society has an opportunity to succeed. While the inequality since 1980 
condition was not significantly different from the control condition, the inequality today 
condition was significantly higher than both the control condition (diff= -.03, t= -2.18) 
and the inequality today condition (diff=.04, t= 2.89). Second, respondents were asked 
whether over the last 5-10 years, income inequality has increased. The inequality since 
1980 condition was significantly higher than the control condition (diff=-.08, t=-5.08) 
and the inequality today condition (diff=-.11, t= -6.95). Additionally, the inequality today 
condition was significantly lower than the control condition (diff=.03, t=1.82). The 
inequality today treatment decreased perceptions of recent income inequality, and 
importantly, the inequality since 1980 treatment increased the perception that income 
inequality has increased.  
   156 
 
Third, respondents were asked whether over the next 5 years, would income 
differences increase. There was not a significant difference between the income 
inequality today condition and the control condition (diff=.00, n.s.). However, the income 
inequality since 1980 condition was significantly higher than both the control condition 
(diff=-.06, t=-4.40) and the income inequality today condition (diff=-.06, t=-4.15). Again, 
the inequality since 1980 treatment increased perceptions of income inequality, 
particularly here that income inequality will increase over the next 5 years.  
Fourth, respondents were asked about whether they thought income inequality 
currently was a serious problem. The inequality since 1980 condition is significantly 
higher than both the control condition (diff=-.04, t=-3.08), and the inequality today 
condition (diff=-.06, t=-4.72). Additionally, the inequality today condition is significantly 
lower than the control condition (diff=.02, t=1.67). The inequality since 1980 condition 
increased perceptions that income inequality is a serious problem, but, the inequality 
today condition decreased perceptions that income inequality is a serious problem.  
Fifth, respondents were asked about how much upward mobility they think there 
is in America. The expectation here is that the inequality since 1980 condition will 
decrease perceptions of upward mobility. In fact, the inequality since 1980 condition is 
significantly lower than both the control condition (diff=.03, t= 2.25) and the inequality 
today condition (diff=.05, t=4.21). The inequality today condition was also significantly 
higher than the control condition, such that it raised perceptions of mobility (diff=-.02, 
t=-1.91).  
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Sixth, respondents were asked whether over the last several years had their 
economic situation improved. There were no differences between the conditions  
Additionally, respondents were asked if they thought their economic situation is likely to 
improve over the next several years. Again, there were no significant differences between 
the conditions. While the expectation was that the income inequality since 1980 condition 
would decrease perceptions of how economic situations have improved or will improve, 
the treatments did not affect these perceptions. 
Eighth, respondents were asked, compared to their parents, are they better off 
economically. The expectation here is that the income inequality since 1980 condition 
will decrease perceptions of how well off people are compared to their parents, and that 
the inequality today condition will increase these perceptions. While the inequality today 
condition is not significantly different from the control condition (diff=.00, n.s.), the 
inequality since 1980 condition is significantly lower than both the control condition 
(diff=.03, t=1.96) and the inequality today condition (diff=.04, t=2.18). 
Ninth, respondents were asked about how their personal economic situation fares 
compared to their perception of how others are doing, on average. The inequality today 
condition is significantly higher than both the control condition (diff=-.03, t=-2.28) and 
the inequality since 1980 condition (diff=.03, t=2.24). However, the inequality since 
1980 condition is not significantly different form the control condition (diff=.00, t=n.s.). 
Taken together, the condition exposing people to information about what the U.S. 
income distribution would look like if income inequality had not changed since 1980 
exacerbated perceptions of inequality, and the inequality today condition seemingly has 
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people feeling more hopeful and less concerned. Interestingly, however the treatments 
did more to affect attitudes about income inequality, and inequality more generally, but 
did less to affect perceptions of respondents’ own economic situation. This is something 
to which the discussion returns in the conclusion Now that the effectiveness of the 
treatments has been established, the next section turns to the more formal tests of the 
hypotheses.    
Testing Hypothesis 2. In order to evaluate whether income inequality salience 
exacerbates learned helplessness, the inequality survey experiment to manipulate 
perceptions of income inequality, and H2, the inequality hypothesis, expects that when 
made salient, income inequality will exacerbate learned helplessness. More specifically, 
it is expected that learned helplessness will be greater for respondents who were in the 
“income inequality since 1980” condition than it will be for those in the “income 
inequality today” condition or the control condition. To initially test whether the 
inequality treatments affected learned helplessness, difference of means tests were 
conducted. Table 4.2 shows the results of the difference of means tests between 
conditions for learned helplessness, as well as the measures of disaffection for 
comparison. 
[Insert Table 4.2 Here] 
Importantly, Table 4.2 shows that learned helplessness did not differ, on average, 
between the conditions. However, the inequality since 1980 condition did elicit higher 
average learned helplessness than both of the other two conditions, approaching marginal 
significance in the expected direction (diff=-.01, t=-1.10). While there were not 
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expectations for the measures of disaffection, the treatments did result in mean 
differences for internal efficacy and interest, but not for external efficacy or for trust.  
For internal efficacy, the treatment conditions were not significantly different 
from one another, but the inequality today condition was marginally significantly larger 
than the control condition (diff=-.01, t=-1.61). Additionally, the inequality since 1980 
condition was significantly larger than the control condition (diff=-.02, t=-2.19). The 
treatments’ effect on internal efficacy is a bit puzzling, as it appears that making income 
inequality salient, regardless of which treatment, increased respondents’ feelings of 
internal efficacy.  
As for interest, the inequality today condition was not significantly different from 
the control condition. However, the inequality since 1980 condition was significantly 
larger than the control condition (diff=-.02, t=-1.69), and marginally larger than the 
inequality today condition (diff=-.02, t=-1.50). As with internal efficacy, it is not entirely 
clear why the inequality since 1980 condition would have elicited greater average 
interest. It is possible that this could be less of an effect and more of an anomaly of the 
respondents in the conditions based on their level of interest. However, since the 
respondents were randomly assigned to the conditions, this should not be the case.  
The expectation of increased learned helplessness due to income inequality 
salience stems from prior work that people may acquire feelings of helplessness from 
observing the uncontrollability of an environment around them (Langer 1983) or from 
experiencing repeated failed attempts personally to improve one’s economic situation. As 
the income inequality treatments did not affect perceptions of respondents’ own 
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economic situations in two out of four questions, it is possible that the income inequality 
manipulations were not strong enough to induce feelings of personal uncontrollability. It 
might also be that respondents felt relatively like they were doing better than others, thus 
buffering against feelings of helplessness that may have arisen. Additionally, it is 
possible that respondents’ actual level of income impacted how they were effected, but 
again as respondents were randomly assigned to the conditions, levels of income should 
be nearly evenly distributed across the conditions. Table 4.3 demonstrates that 
respondents’ income is evenly distributed across the conditions.  
[Insert Table 4.3 Here] 
 While difference of means tests are a simple bivariate way to test H2, the impact 
of the conditions may also be tested in the regression format, controlling for the measures 
of disaffection, as well as demographic and attitudinal measures. Thus, Table 4.4 shows 
the results for an OLS regression model regressing learned helplessness on the measures 
of disaffection, and demographic and attitudinal controls. To run this model, two 
additional condition dummy variables were constructed. For the first, the inequality since 
1980 condition was coded as “1” and the control and inequality today conditions were 
coded as “0.” For the second, the inequality today condition was coded as “1” and the 
control and inequality since 1980 conditions were coded as “0,” so that when included in 
the model, the reference category is the control condition.  
[Insert Table 4.4 Here] 
From this model, when controls and the measures of disaffection are included, it 
is clear that the inequality since 1980 treatment did have a marginally significant effect 
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on feelings of uncontrollability through learned helplessness (b=.011, p<.10), relative to 
the control condition. This model provides support, albeit weak support, that the salience 
of income inequality may influence feelings of helplessness, above and beyond the 
predictors discussed in the previous chapter (see Table 2.19). Given this slight support for 
H2, the chapter turns to questions of whether income inequality salience impacts 
engagement in political behavior, as well as possibly of a mediational relationship.  
Testing Hypothesis 2a. Moving to the second hypothesis, since economic 
inequality and their concerns have been identified as decreasing engagement in voting 
behavior, (e.g., Levine 2015; Putnam 2000, 2015; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012), 
H2a expects that when made salient, income inequality will exacerbate respondents’ 
choice to exit and disengage from voting behavior. Specifically, it is expected that being 
exposed to the experimental treatment showing what the U.S. income distribution would 
look like today if income inequality had not changed since 1980 will exacerbate 
respondents’ choice to exit, and be less likely to engage in voting behavior, e.g., 
likelihood of voting.  
To test H2a, the dichotomous measure of vote likelihood was regressed on the 
condition dummy variables and the measures of disaffection, as well as the demographic 
and attitudinal controls. Additionally, as there were not overwhelmingly strong 
experimental effects on the measures of disaffection, the condition dummy variables were 
interacted with learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection to determine 
whether their effect on voting behavior is moderated by inequality salience. Table 4.5 
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shows the effects of the inequality conditions on the measures of disaffection for vote 
likelihood.  
[Insert Table 4.5 Here] 
 Model 1 in Table 4.5 shows the main effects of the inequality conditions. As 
expected, the inequality since 1980 condition is marginally significant (b=-.23, p<.10). 
This means that the inequality since 1980 condition, relative to the control condition, 
changes the odds of being extremely likely to vote by .79. Alternatively stated, the 
salience of what the U.S. income distribution would look like today if income inequality 
had not changed since 1980 decreases the probability of being extremely likely to vote by 
21%. While the models for internal efficacy, external efficacy, trust, and interest do not 
show a conditional relationship between the income inequality conditions and 
disaffection for vote likelihood, Model 2 in Table 4.5 does show that there is a marginally 
significant interaction between learned helplessness and the income inequality since 1980 
condition. Figure 4.1 shows the effects of learned helplessness on vote likelihood by 
experimental condition.  
 [Insert Figure 4.1 Here] 
 When we look at the marginal effects of learned helplessness by condition on vote 
likelihood, we see that the effect of learned helplessness has a significant effect on 
decreasing the probability of being extremely likely to vote in the control condition (b= -
.45, p<.001) and in the income inequality since 1980 condition (b=-.38, p<.001), but not 
in the income inequality today condition. The strongest effects of learned helplessness on 
the probability of being extremely likely to turn out are still in the control condition, 
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however. Taken together, these results present evidence that when income inequality is 
made salient, specifically the extent of what the U.S. income distribution would be had 
income inequality not increased, engagement in voting behavior declines.  
 While not directly hypothesized, it is possible that the experimental conditions 
had an effect on reported retrospective, expressive political behavior. To test whether this 
is the case, the dichotomous measure of having participated in rallying or protesting 
behavior was regressed on the condition dummy variables, learned helplessness, the 
measures of disaffection, and the demographic and attitudinal controls. Table 4.6 shows 
the main effects and interactive models predicting the probability of having reported as 
participating in rallying or protesting behavior.  
[Insert Table 4.6 Here] 
 Examining retrospective behavioral measures in the experimental context can be 
difficult. Retrospective behavioral measures are largely subject to social desirability bias. 
However, it is still possible that the experimental conditions affected how people reported 
whether or not they had participated in a rally in support or opposition of a particular 
issue or candidate in the previous 3 months. Looking first at Model 1 in Table 4.6, there 
are no evident main effects of the experimental conditions on the probability of having 
engaged in protesting or rallying. Models 2 through 6 in Table 4.6 show the interactive 
models between the condition dummy variables, learned helplessness, and the measures 
of disaffection. In Models 4-6 do not show any conditional effects of external efficacy, 
trust, or interest on the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior. However, 
Models 2 and 3 show significant conditional effects of learned helplessness and internal 
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efficacy. Looking at the marginal effects of learned helplessness by condition in Model 2, 
the effect of learned helplessness has a significant effect on increasing the probability of 
reporting as having engaged in protesting behavior in the income inequality today 
condition only (b=.36, p<.001). Figure 4.2 illustrates this interactive relationship.  
[Insert Figure 4.2 Here] 
 The marginal effects of internal efficacy by condition in Model 3 show that 
internal efficacy only has a significant effect on increasing the probability of reporting as 
having engaged in protesting behavior in the control condition (b=.35, p<.001), as well as 
in the income inequality since 1980 condition (b=.45, p<.001). Figure 4.3 shows the 
effects of internal efficacy by condition. While the effects are significant, the confidence 
intervals do overlap, indicating that the conditions are not significantly different from one 
another.  
[Insert Figure 4.3 Here] 
 Setting the retrospective protesting models aside, the vote likelihood models 
provide some evidence in support of H2a, such that income inequality salience 
suppresses the probability of being extremely likely to vote. Additionally, H2 showed 
that income inequality salience exacerbated feelings of helplessness. Thus, if the results 
from H2 and H2a are brought together, it is possible, then, that learned helplessness may 
mediate the relationship between income inequality salience and voting behavior. 
Hypothesis 2b turns to testing whether there is any evidence in support of this potential 
mediational relationship. 
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Testing Hypothesis 2b. The income inequality survey experiment provides an 
opportunity to test, experimentally, whether the reason context, i.e., income inequality 
affects participation is because it causes learned helplessness, which then affects people’s 
choice of exit and voice. Specifically, H2b expects that if learned helplessness is 
exacerbated experimentally, when made salient, high income inequality is likely to 
increase the tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior. 
To test this hypothesis, the medeff package in Stata 14 was used to evaluate 
whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between the income inequality 
since 1980 and vote likelihood. With models that include the measures of disaffection, as 
well as demographic and attitudinal controls, learned helplessness does partially mediate 
the relationship between the income inequality salience induced in the income inequality 
since 1980 condition and vote likelihood. However, learned helplessness mediates only 
7% of the total effect (95% CI 3-40% mediated). The measures of disaffection, internal 
and external efficacy, trust, and interest, do not partially mediate the relationship. Thus, 
this provides only weak evidence in support of H2b.  
Furthermore, the weak partial mediation raises an important distinction between 
the experimental conditions’ inducement of income inequality compared to people’s 
experienced, actual level of income. It is important not to conflate perceptions about 
income inequality and experienced level of income. This distinction brings the discussion 
of mediation models back to the mediation models presented in Chapter 3, which 
illustrated the robust partial mediation of learned helplessness between level of income 
and voting behavior, i.e., vote likelihood and turnout. Thus, the more powerful of the 
   166 
 
mediated effects are those stemming from personal experience and personal concern of 
income level and economic security, rather than broader perceptions of income 
inequality. And, the income inequality conditions only moved two out of the four 
questions that measured respondents’ perceptions of their own economic wellbeing, 
overall and in reference to others, on average.  
This raises an additional question of what role perceived personal economic 
wellbeing might play for predicting learned helplessness and voting behavior. Using the 
two questions about respondents’ economic wellbeing that were not moved by the 
income inequality treatments, Table 4.7 illustrates that in the control condition, 
perceptions that one’s own economic situation has improved (Model 1, b=-.04, p<.05) or 
will improve over the next several years (Model 2, b=-.10, p<.01), learned helplessness is 
significantly decreased.  These results follow what would be expected from the learned 
helplessness literature, such that feelings of uncontrollability about one’s economic 
situation would largely induce helplessness. However, if the economic situation has 
improved or one believes that the economic situation will improve, this perception serves 
as a buffer against feelings of helplessness.  
[Insert Table 4.7 Here] 
Further, it is possible that the perceptions of one’s own economic situation may 
impact vote likelihood. Using logistic regression, Table 4.8 demonstrates that while the 
perception that one’s economic situation has improved is not significant in predicting the 
probability of being extremely likely to vote (b=.33, n.s.), the perception that one’s 
economic situation will improve is marginally significant (b=.88, p<.10). Perceiving that 
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one’s economic situation will improve changes the odds of being extremely likely to vote 
by 2.41. A one-unit increase in belief that one’s economic situation will improve 
increases the probability of being extremely likely to vote by 141%.  
[Insert Table 4.8 Here] 
As beliefs about the future shape feelings of helplessness, and helplessness 
impacts likelihood of voting, it is possible to evaluate whether learned helplessness 
mediates the relationship between perceptions that one’s future economic situation and 
engagement in voting behavior. Again, using the medeff package in Stata 14, as well as 
full models with the measures of disaffection, and demographic and attitudinal controls, 
learned helplessness partially mediates 31% of the total effect (95% CI 18%-100%). 
Thus, taking the mediation models from Chapter 3 and the mediation model using 
perceptions of one’s future economic situation, experiences and personal beliefs, rather 
than perception of income inequality, have the greatest effects on learned helplessness 
and impact on voice and exit in regard to voting behavior.  
 
Discussion 
 With the pervasiveness of concern about financial security among American 
households, it is important for scholars to continue to seek to better understand how these 
concerns affect the ways in which they engage in their communities, beyond consumer 
engagement. There is a growing literature speaking to the impact that income inequality 
and economic insecurity have on political attitudes and political participation. This 
chapter sought to go beyond observational evidence to experimentally manipulate the 
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salience of income inequality to assess the role income inequality plays for exacerbating 
learned helplessness, and in turn, how that may impact engagement in instrumental 
voting and expressive protesting political behavior. 
The first hypothesis, H2, expected that when made salient, income inequality 
would exacerbate learned helplessness. Through the use of difference of means tests, the 
income inequality treatments did not appear to have a significant effect on perceptions of 
learned helplessness. However, when placed in a regression format, controlling for the 
measures of disaffection, as well as demographics, the income inequality did marginally 
affect learned helplessness. Specifically, in the condition that made income inequality 
salient by showing how current income inequality fairs compared to what the U.S. 
income distribution would look like if income inequality had not grown since 1980. This 
condition marginally increased learned helplessness.  
The second hypothesis, H2a expected that when made salient, income inequality 
will exacerbate respondents’ choice to exit and disengage from voting behavior. In 
support of the hypothesis, the income inequality since 1980 condition significantly 
decreased the probability of engaging in voting behavior, i.e., vote likelihood. The 
income inequality since 1980 condition did significantly moderate the effect of learned 
helplessness on the probability of being extremely likely to vote. Additionally, the 
inequality today condition did significantly moderate the effect of learned helplessness on 
the probability of having engaged in protesting or rallying behavior. Yet, the 
experimental effects, when significant, were not overwhelming, and they did not affect 
the probability of having engaged in expressive political action, e.g., protesting. 
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Since there was at least some weak evidence in support of both H2 and H2a, 
expected that if learned helplessness is exacerbated experimentally, when made salient, 
income inequality (the income inequality since 1980 condition) is likely to increase the 
tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior and this relationship will be 
mediated by learned helplessness. The mediation model using the experimental 
conditions, found that learned helplessness does partially mediate the relationship 
between income inequality salience and voting behavior. However, this partial mediation, 
while statistically significant, is quite small.  
Consequently, the chapter evaluated whether perceptions of one’s economic 
situation in the past and perceptions of it in the future would shape both learned 
helplessness and vote likelihood. Perceptions of one’s economic situation in the past and 
for the future did significantly predict feelings of learned helplessness, and perceptions of 
future improvements significantly predicted the probability of being extremely likely to 
vote. Taking these significant results, the chapter also tested whether learned helplessness 
mediated the relationship between perceptions of one’s future economic situation and 
vote likelihood. This mediation model demonstrated that learned helplessness does 
partially mediate this relationship.  
 This last set of analyses raises a few notes of caution regarding the findings. First, 
these results are from only one convenience sample. While the condition sizes were fairly 
large, approximately 700+ respondents in each condition, the sampling procedure was not 
nationally representative and survey weights were not used in these analyses. Second, the 
experimental manipulations impacted perceptions about income inequality in the 
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expected directions, as intended. However, they did less to manipulate perceptions of 
respondents’ personal economic situation.  
 Moreover, additional questions arose from this investigation, which call for 
extensions of the findings within this chapter. For example, based on differences in 
perceptions of inequality identified by Bartels (2008) across ideology and political 
knowledge, it is possible that highly aware conservatives may be less concerned (and less 
easily experimentally manipulated), whereas highly aware liberals may be more 
concerned about inequality (and thus, more sensitive to the experimental manipulations). 
Thus, future work must reconcile the differences in perceptions about income inequality, 
perceptions of one’s economic situation, and personal experiences with inequality and 
level of income. Additionally, income inequality is not the only context within which the 
U.S. populace functions. The next chapter turns to questions concerning the role of 
political context, e.g., elite polarization, plays in impacting feelings of learned 
helplessness, as well as how people utilize exit and voice through instrumental and 
expressive political action.  
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Chapter 5  
Helplessness and Disaffection in a Polarized Context: Does Polarization Matter? 
 
 Previous chapters have focused on the causes and consequences of learned 
helplessness and disaffection and the impact disaffection has for political exit and voice. 
Yet, the dimensions of political disaffection may be shaped not only by the demographic 
and attitudinal factors already discussed, but by additional factors. Scholars have posited 
that disaffection may be shaped by inherited cultural bias and ideological political 
identities exogenous to the current political context or by “endogenously primed-reaction 
to current political events and to the actual behaviour of political elites and parties” 
(Segatti 2006: 267).28 Thus, it is possible that in the U.S. context, the various aspects of 
disaffection may be shaped by the polarized political environment, reinforced by critical 
evaluations of political institutions, representatives, and the political process.  
This chapter is the second to explore whether context effects feelings of learned 
helplessness as a measure of disaffection and how that impacts the ways in which people 
engage in political activities. In the contemporary U.S. political environment, polarization 
has come to overwhelm both elite and mass politics. This chapter examines the role 
perceived elite polarization may play for feelings of learned helplessness. As such, it is 
expected that contexts of high elite polarization may exacerbate people’s perceptions of 
                                                
28 Segatti (2006) argues that at least in the Italian case, political disaffection is shaped by 
strong cultural bias and in particular circumstances, the bias can be disproved or 
confirmed depending on political context. 
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uncontrollability, and possibly impact the ways in which they engage in their political 
environment through instrumental and expressive political action.  
As it is difficult to survey respondents in a political environment that is not highly 
polarized, the following analyses evaluate perceived elite polarization, as well as 
experimentally manipulated elite polarization, where high or low elite polarization is 
made salient. Particularly, when high polarization is made salient, this chapter tests 
whether learned helplessness is exacerbated and how that may impact how they exit or 
voice in regard to instrumental political behavior, i.e. voting behavior, or more expressive 
political action, i.e. rallying and protest. 
 While the least-engaged or disengaged are likely to be the least polarized 
themselves, they still experience politics in a polarized environment. For many, 
witnessing elite polarization may turn them away from politics. Polarization presents a 
unique context in which decision-makers are gridlocked and unwilling to change or 
compromise. Consequently, polarization is likely to reinforce the uncontrollability of the 
political system and potentially increase feelings of helplessness, and may be likely to 
discourage them from being politically engaged in voting behavior, but may encourage 
them to engage in more expressive forms of political behavior like protesting or even 
violence. For example, following the shooting in Virginia during a baseball practice for a 
group of Republican members of Congress, “It seems likely that a sense of political 
frustration or helplessness also contributes to a political situation in which people talk, 
joke, and even act on the idea of solving political differences with violence” (Azari 
2017). This raises questions about the benefits and drawbacks of a political environment 
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where its elites are affectively and ideologically polarized, and the public is responding to 
the polarization. 
As scholars continue to debate the relative extremity and consistency of 
Americans’ policy preferences and party affiliations, they generally agree that relations 
between America’s two major political camps have become increasingly acrimonious. At 
the elite level, polarization is evidenced by greater ideological homogeneity among 
partisans, increased divisions on major policy dimensions in politics, and less competitive 
elections (Abramowitz et al. 2006; Hetherington 2001; Layman and Carsey 2002; 
McCarty et al. 2006; see Webster and Abramowitz 2017 for a discussion of affective and 
ideological polarization alignment related to social welfare). Scholars have identified that 
elite polarization in the U.S. is at an all-time high since the American Civil War (Hare, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2015; McCarty 2015).  
Where elite polarization serves to clarify where the parties stand on important 
issues and to allow voters to adopt more consistent attitudes between their ideological 
and partisan preferences (Levendusky 2010), it can also increase interest and motivation 
of members of the active public to vote and participate in other political activities, 
thereby increasing the size of the engaged public (Abramowitz 2010). While the 
ideological divisions are not limited to party activists, the deepest ideological divisions 
have been found among the most interested, informed, and active citizens (Abramowitz 
and Saunders 2008). Yet, in considering those who experience the greatest learned 
helplessness, it is less clear what impact polarization has on learned helplessness, and 
whether polarization helps or hinders political engagement for these individuals.  
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The parties have played an active role in demobilizing the electorate, flying in the 
face of the usual view that party competition inevitably leads to the expansion of electoral 
participation e.g., Schattschneider (1960). However, demobilizing parties have an 
incentive to collaborate in the construction of legal and procedural obstructions which 
narrow the electorate (Piven and Cloward 2000), which is reinforced by political 
extremity and polarization. The composition of the electorate, and those who are 
mobilized, is an important distinction.  
Considering the way in which loyalty attachments may function through 
attachment to a political party, it would follow that when independents are reminded that 
they have less in common with or are further away from the Republican and Democratic 
political parties in the high polarization conditions, they are likely to feel greater learned 
helplessness. It is expected that independents will be less attached to the political parties, 
potentially experiencing greater learned helplessness and less likely to engage in 
instrumental voting behavior.  
Harkening back to early voting behavior work, independents have long been 
expected to be the least likely to turn out (Campbell et al. 1960). However, in the 
contemporary political context, Klar and Krupnikov (2016) have begun to elucidate the 
complexity behind identifying as an independent and what that may mean for 
engagement and American politics more broadly. Beyond true independents, as a result 
of partisan disagreement and negative traits associated with the Republican and 
Democratic parties, many partisans are going “undercover,” so to speak and identifying 
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as independents rather than with their preferred parties (Klar and Krupnikov 2016).29 
They authors show that while independents may prefer compromise and dislike partisan 
disagreement, they also dislike when their preferred party gives up ground to the opposite 
party for the sake of compromise. As the acrimony and disagreement between the parties 
grows, independents are identifying less with their preferred parties. The hesitancy to 
express partisanship may also carry implications for feelings of uncontrollability to 
influence the parties, their policies, and the political system at large. This chapter begins 
to explore how party identification (or the lack thereof) may influence feelings of loss of 
control and attachment to the political system through learned helplessness, with the 
expectation that independents may experience greater learned helplessness than partisans.  
Learned helplessness has not been applied to explain political behavior, let alone 
in a polarized political context. Additionally, only a few of the indicators of disaffection 
(e.g., interest and political trust) have been studied in the polarized context. Polarization 
has been shown to make politics less appealing, particularly decreasing interest among 
independents (McClurg et al. 2015). As affective polarization (i.e., mutual dislike, 
distrust, and disrespect between America’s major political parties), makes politics more 
contentious and intense, trust also declines (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 1995). Further, in a political system dominated by affective 
                                                
29 The term “undercover partisan” was utilized in The American Voter originally to 
describe political independents who have clear partisan preferences but choose to hide 
them. Klar and Krupnikov (2016) also utilize this term. 
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polarization, political trust started to decline in the late 1960s and has reached a record 
60-year low (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015).  
As political elites have polarized and the extreme views of activists and primary 
voters have led the major parties to take up more extreme issue positions, many 
Americans feel left out and let down (King 2000). “It is not simply a question of which 
politicians are closer to you as much as how far away they are from your basic concerns” 
(King 1997: 174). Rather, the public’s mistrust of government is unlikely to be reversed 
unless and until politicians and their parties stage a concerted return to the sensible 
center. The politics of polarization is the politics of mistrust” (King 1997: 156). As 
depressed trust levels have been shown to be at least partially due to political 
polarization, it is possible then that polarization has impacted the measures of 
disaffection in the mass public. However, there is something unique about learned 
helplessness in the polarized context as it is tied to partisanship and feelings of 
attachment and control and may exacerbate how which people utilize exit or voice 
through instrumental and expressive political behavior. Thus, examining helplessness in a 
polarized context may help to shed light on the pervasiveness of disengagement.  
 
Hypotheses 
This chapter sets out to test five hypotheses. As elite polarization has led many to 
feel left out, let down, or disgusted with the acrimony between the political parties, it is 
worth investigating the potential role context may play in influencing feelings of 
disaffection, particularly feelings of uncontrollability. Thus, H3, the polarization 
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hypothesis expects that when made salient, high elite polarization will exacerbate learned 
helplessness.  
However, Klar and Krupnikov (2016) have demonstrated that many people have 
become “undercover partisans” because they do not want to identify with the negative 
traits now associated with the major political parties and do not seek to participate in 
support of their preferred party. Accordingly, it is possible that the salience of high 
polarization may affect those who identify as partisans differently than it does for those 
who identify as independents. Since partisanship can serve as a form of loyalty, 
impacting the way in which people utilize exit or voice, H3a expects that when made 
salient, high elite polarization may reduce learned helplessness for partisans, as they will 
be able to clearly identify with the parties, the policy positions presented, and thus, may 
feel more certainty or control. However, for independents, learned helplessness is 
expected to be greater than for partisans, as they are less clearly connected to the parties, 
the policy positions presented, and may be less certain or feel like they have less control 
over their own influence. For H3b, on the other hand, it is expected that when presented 
with low polarized context, learned helplessness should not differ significantly between 
partisans and independents.  
Making polarization salient may also impact the ways in which people engage in 
politics. H3c expects that when made salient, high polarization is likely to increase the 
tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior. Lastly, with the expectation that 
polarization may exacerbate learned helplessness, and may impact the ways in which 
people engage in political behavior, it is possible that learned helplessness may actually 
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mediate the relationship between polarization and participation. As such, H3d 
hypothesizes that when high polarization is made salient or when perceived polarization 
is high, helplessness will be exacerbated and voting behavior will decrease.  
 
Procedure 
Data 
The polarization experiment was conducted across three of the dissertation 
samples (Samples 2, 3, and 4). Additional information about these samples may be found 
in Chapter 2, as well as Appendix A. The analyses from Sample 2 focus on the 600 
respondents surveyed. Respondents participated in a survey experiment and then were 
asked the various variables of interest and control questions discussed below.30 Of the 
600 respondents who did not participate in the learned helplessness experiment (816 were 
collected in this sample), 191 were randomly assigned to the low polarization condition, 
308 were assigned to the high polarization condition, and 201 were randomly assigned to 
the control condition. The analyses for Sample 3 focus on the 731 respondents randomly 
assigned to the control condition, 736 assigned to the low polarization condition, and 730 
                                                
30 Respondents in Samples 2 and 4 were also randomly assigned to an experimental 
manipulation of learned helplessness. Analyses discussed below are limited to only 
respondents who did not participate in the experimental manipulation of learned 
helplessness. Hypothesis H3c tests the impact of experimentally manipulating learned 
helplessness and making it salient on perceptions of polarization.  
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assigned to the high polarization condition.31 The analyses for Sample 4 focus on the 
wave two respondents not randomly assigned to the learned helplessness experiment, 
where 179 respondents in were randomly assigned to the control condition, 168 were 
assigned to the low polarization condition, and 168 were assigned to the high polarization 
condition. 
Respondents who participated in Sample 2 were prevented from participating in 
subsequent MTurk surveys and thus, were not allowed to participate in the pre-election 
survey, Sample 3. It is important to note that the polarization experiment on wave 2 of 
Sample 4 was one of multiple experiments to which the respondents were exposed. 
Where appropriate, the analyses below do control for the conditions of the other 
experimental manipulations. All three samples discussed here include the same 
polarization experiment described below (see Appendix D for the polarization 
manipulations used across the three samples). 
 
Manipulation and Measures 
Experimental Manipulation of Elite Polarization. To test the causal impact of the 
salience of elite polarization on learned helplessness, a three-condition, between-subjects, 
framing experiment was conducted, where respondents were randomly assigned to the 
                                                
31 This data collection effort also included a second survey experiment on income 
inequality discussed in Chapter 4. However, respondents were not assigned to 
overlapping survey conditions, so the second survey experiment does not have any 
bearing on the experimental results reported on the polarization experiment. 
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control condition or to be exposed to either a high or low polarized condition. Through 
hypothesis 3, it was posited that high polarization will exacerbate learned helplessness, 
and by extension, disaffection. Respondents in the control condition did not receive 
additional information about political elites, or polarization. For the sake of this 
experiment, frames are defined as alternative conceptualizations of an issue or event. The 
use of frames in experimental work has been shown to subtly or substantially influence 
individuals’ attitudes (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 
2013) and framing effects can take place when individuals “arrive at different positions 
on the issue, depending on the priority given to various considerations” within the frame 
(Druckman and Nelson 2003: 730). The experiment seeks to examine the framing effect 
that takes place when respondents are presented with a high or low polarized frame.  
 As with any experimental design, it is necessary to address concerns about 
external validity. As that applies to this experiment, the goal was to provide information 
that would make elite polarization salient. In a political environment where it would be 
difficult to find naturally occurring low polarized political contexts, this study 
manipulated the information respondents received about elite polarization. The 
manipulations are modeled after those used in Levendusky (2010) and Luttig (2016), as 
well as Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013), which have demonstrated effective 
perception induction of elite polarization. Levendusky (2010) illustrated elite 
polarization, providing respondents with a picture of the positions of members of 
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Congress distributed on issue positions as being either polarized or not.32 Alternatively, 
Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) utilized verbal descriptions of elite polarization 
on issues for the purpose of more accurately mimicking the type of information 
respondents receive via media and internet. Luttig (2016), as well as the current project, 
combine both the picture illustrating high or moderate elite polarization and verbal 
descriptions of members of Congress’ positions on particular issues to more closely 
reflect the respondents’ typical information environment.  
As Levendusky (2010) explains, the difference between the moderate (his low 
polarized condition) and polarized conditions is represented by the degree of elite 
polarization depicted, illustrating both the ideological distance between the parties and 
the ideological homogeneity of each party.33 Subjects are presented with descriptions of 
                                                
32 The manipulations from Levendusky (2010) are inspired by and modeled after Mutz’s 
(2005) study of social trust. The depictions of low and high polarization modeled after 
Levendusky (2010). As both Levendusky and Mutz acknowledge, there are a number of 
factors beyond the manipulation that could alter the target of the experiment. Here, there 
are other factors that could have influenced respondents’ perceptions of polarization. 
However, even though the manipulations do not mimic real world polarization, the 
manipulations here do change perceived levels of elite polarization. See Anderson and 
Bushman (1997), Berkowitz and Donnerstein (1982), and Carlsmith, Ellsworth, and 
Aronson (1989) for further discussion of experimental realism and external validity.  
33 “In the polarized elites condition, the parties are both ideologically distinct from one 
another and relatively internally ideologically homogeneous (e.g., Democrats are liberals, 
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four policy proposals being considered by members of congress. These descriptions were 
paired with images of elite polarization on each issue. The same four policy areas used in 
Luttig (2016) were presented and described in either a high or low polarized context. The 
issues are: 1) mining, 2) Medicaid, 3) affirmative action in college admissions, and 4) 
global warming. Following each issue frame and image, subjects are asked about their 
support or opposition for the proposal discussed. However, these issue-specific questions 
are not utilized within this dissertation. Additionally, after respondents completed 
viewing the full manipulation with all four issues, they received a manipulation check 
question to assess perceived polarization. See Figure 5.1 for image examples and 
Appendix D for the full manipulations.  
[Insert Figure 5.1 Here] 
In using experimental manipulations of elite polarization, Levendusky (2010) 
finds that elite polarization allows people to adopt more consistent attitudes, and 
Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) find that elite polarization changes the way in 
which people form opinions, such that polarization intensifies the impact of party 
                                                                                                                                            
Republicans are conservatives, and there is essentially no overlap between the two). Elites 
in this polarized elites condition mimic the elites of the 1990s and 2000s. In the moderate 
elites condition, elites look more like they did in the 1960s and 1970s. The parties are more 
heterogeneous (e.g., some Democrats are conservative, some Republicans are liberal), and 
the parties’ positions are less ideologically distinct from one another. Comparing subjects’ 
behavior in these two conditions will allow me to draw inferences about the effect of elite 
polarization on citizens’ attitudes” (Levendusky 2010: 117). 
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endorsements on opinions, decreasing the impact of substantive information. Thus, it is 
expected that when high elite polarization is made salient in the current study, 
polarization will intensify feelings of learned helplessness and disaffection, particularly 
for independents who may not have strong attachments to a particular party or to the 
broader political system.  
Manipulation Check. A manipulation check was included following the 
manipulation which asked, “On a scale of 1-7, with 1 being least polarized and 7 being 
most polarized, how polarized would you say the parties are in America today?” The 
perceptions of polarization were thus coded accordingly, with 1 coded as “least 
polarized” and 7 being coded as “most polarized.” 
Disaffection Measures: As with previous chapters, the same disaffection measures 
are utilized: learned helplessness, internal and external efficacy, trust, and political 
interest. All measures are coded to range from 0 to 1 with higher values corresponding to 
higher levels of that variable. The question wording of all measures is available in 
Appendix B and a more extensive discussion of the individual measures is available in 
Chapter 2. The average scores on these disaffection measures are shown in Figure 5.2, 
illustrating that the distribution of these measures was quite consistent across the three 
samples of interest in this chapter. 
[Insert Figure 5.2 Here] 
Control Variables. As in other chapters, the models presented in this chapter also 
control for the following (all coded to range from 0-1): education, income, gender (with a 
dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as female (coded as 1) or 
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male (coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy variable to represent whether the 
respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0), 
and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as White 
(coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). The models also include Republican and Democratic 
dummy variables, political ideology (extremely liberal is coded as 0 and extremely 
conservative is coded as 1), as well as a dummy variable for whether respondents view 
themselves on the losing side of politics.  
Political Participation. The analyses below focus on two measures. The first is a 
measure of instrumental voting behavior, i.e. vote likelihood. The second is a measure of 
more expressive political action, i.e., marching, rallying, or protesting. 
 
Results 
Elite Polarization: Does context play a role in exacerbating learned helplessness?  
The polarization hypotheses grapple with the question of whether context affects 
disaffection and political behavior. Before moving to test the impact on behavior, H3 
expects that when made salient, high elite polarization will exacerbate learned 
helplessness. In order to test whether context has the expected effects, a survey 
experiment manipulating perceptions of elite polarization was conducted across Samples 
2, 3 and 4. If perceptions of elite polarization can be manipulated and this changes levels 
of learned helplessness, it may be possible to point to a causal relationship between 
polarization and learned helplessness.  
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Did the manipulation work? Before getting into the formal test of the hypothesis, 
it is necessary to illustrate that the polarization manipulations had the intended effect on 
perceptions of polarization. Using the manipulation check question about perceived 
polarization, we can evaluate whether the manipulations change perceptions of elite 
polarization in the expected directions. Figure 5.3 shows the average perception of 
polarization, on a scale from 1 “Not at all polarized” to 7 “Extremely polarized,” for each 
condition by sample. The high polarization manipulation consistently garnered the 
highest means of perceived polarization within the three samples (Sample 2 mean = 5.8; 
Sample 3 mean = 5.6; and Sample 4 mean = 5.1), whereas the low polarization 
manipulation garnered the lowest means of perceived polarization within the three 
samples (Sample 2 mean = 5.2; Sample 3 mean = 5.3; Sample 4 mean = 4.7). Further, the 
mean differences between the three conditions are all statistically significant at the p<.05 
level for Samples 2 and 3.34 However, for Sample 4, the low and high conditions are not 
significantly different from the control condition, but are significantly different from each 
other.  With any framing experiment, this may indicate that while the differences are 
statistically significantly different each other, the differences are not overwhelmingly 
                                                
34 The mean differences for the conditions across the three samples are as follows: Sample 
2: low vs. control .26 (t= 1.86, p<.05); high vs. control -.29 (t= 2.06, p<.05); low vs. high 
-.55 (t= 4.05, p<.001); Sample 3: low vs. control .17 (t= 2.38, p<.01); high vs. control -.15 
(t= 1.98, p<.05); low vs. high -.32 (t= 4.44, p<.001); and Sample 4 (unweighted): low vs. 
control .22 (t= .98, n.s.); high vs. control -.22 (t= 1.01, n.s.); low vs. high -.43 (t= 1.93, 
p<.05). 
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large, substantively. This may tie to the external validity of the manipulation, which is 
further addressed at the end of the chapter.  
[Insert Figure 5.3 Here] 
Another question as to whether the manipulations worked is whether the 
manipulations affected perceived polarization of partisans and independents differently. 
Using difference of means tests for each condition to test the average mean of perceived 
polarization between partisans and independents, we see some interesting effects. In the 
control conditions, there is no difference in perceived polarization between partisans and 
independents (Sample 2, diff=.36, n.s.; Sample 3, diff=.12, n.s., Sample 4, diff=-.12, n.s.). 
In the low polarization conditions, partisans score higher on perceived polarization than 
independents in Samples 2 and 3 (Sample 2, diff=.39, t=1.33; Sample 3, dif=.45, 3.03; 
Sample 4, diff=.08, n.s.). In the high polarization conditions, partisans also score higher 
than independents on perceived polarization, but in Samples 2 and 4 (Sample 2, diff=.47, 
t=1.83; Sample 3, diff=.10, n.s.; Sample 4, diff=.78, t=1.69). Overall, partisans seemingly 
perceive greater perceived polarization than independents in both of the polarization 
conditions.  
Testing Hypothesis 3. To test the polarization hypothesis, and whether 
polarization increases learned helplessness, two dummy variables were created where the 
low or high polarization condition was coded as “1” and the control condition was coded 
as “0.” To compare the two experimental conditions directly with one another, a third 
dummy variable was created where the high polarization condition was coded as “1” and 
the low polarization condition was coded as “0.” 
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 To evaluate whether polarization exacerbates learned helplessness and 
disaffection, multiple Tukey-Kramer tests were conducted to evaluate post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons between conditions.  Multiple difference of means tests were also 
conducted. The significance tests showed that learned helplessness did not significantly 
differ between conditions, with the exception of the difference between the high 
polarization and control conditions in Sample 3. This marginally significant mean 
difference indicates that making high elite polarization salient increased average learned 
helplessness, compared to the control condition (diff= -.01, t=-1.43). However, Samples 2 
and 4 do not provide consistent evidence of this effect. Figure 5.4 illustrates the lack of 
mean differences between conditions across the three samples.  
[Insert Figure 5.4 Here] 
As learned helplessness has been shown to operate differently than the measures 
of disaffection, it is possible that the polarization manipulations affected internal efficacy, 
external efficacy, trust, and interest. To test whether this was the case, additional Tukey-
Kramer and formal difference of means tests were conducted. These significance tests of 
the mean differences between conditions showed that the measures of disaffection did not 
consistently significantly differ between conditions across the three samples in a 
consistent manner. Table 5.1 shows the mean differences for the measures of disaffection 
across the three samples.  
However, there were a few exceptions where the mean differences were 
significant in two of the three samples. Regarding internal efficacy, the differences 
between the low polarization and control conditions, as well as the differences between 
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the high polarization and control condition were statistically significant in Samples 2 and 
3. However, the results from Sample 2 are reversed from Sample 3, such that in Sample 
2, average internal efficacy for the low polarization condition was lower than the control 
condition (diff=0.04, t=1.99), but average internal efficacy was higher than the control 
condition in Sample 3 (diff=-0.02, t=-2.19). Similarly, in Sample 2, average internal 
efficacy for the high polarization condition was lower than the control condition 
(diff=0.03, t=1.46), yet average internal efficacy was higher than the control condition in 
Sample 3 (diff=-0.01, t=-1.46). 
As for external efficacy, there were inconsistent difference of means tests in 
Samples 3 and 4 between low polarization and control conditions, as well as the high and 
low polarization conditions. First, in Sample 3, the mean difference between the low 
polarization condition and the control condition was marginally statistically significant, 
such that average external efficacy was significantly lower in the low polarization 
condition than the control condition (diff=0.02, t=1.46). Second, in Sample 3, average 
external efficacy was lower in the low polarization condition than in the high polarization 
condition (diff=-0.02, t=-1.91). However, in Sample 4, average external efficacy was 
statistically higher in the high polarization condition than the low polarization condition 
(diff=0.05, t=2.05). Again, there is a reversal of the results across Samples 3 and 4.35   
                                                
35 The lack of mean differences in Sample 4 wave 2 could be due to the multiple survey 
experiments to which respondents were exposed prior to encountering the polarization 
experiment. The other experiments could have created noise or diluted the experimental 
effects of the polarization conditions.  
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[Insert Table 5.1 Here] 
The lack of a consistent experimental effect on learned helplessness or 
disaffection could be due to three possibilities. First, related to the small, but significant, 
effects of the manipulations on perceived polarization, the manipulations may not have 
fully induced contextual salience of low and high polarization or there may have been 
differential effects on partisans and independents. Second, this could be due to the 
samples being high in political knowledge.36 Third, it is possible that learned helplessness 
and disaffection are not moved by a polarized elite context. Thus, support for H3 that 
polarization exacerbated learned helplessness was not found. 
Testing Hypotheses 3a and 3b. As noted above, attachment to one party over the 
other, or lack of an identified party attachment, may affect the way in which people 
experience learned helplessness. As there were not strong main effects of the 
manipulations on learned helplessness, or even on the measures of disaffection, 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b posit that the effects of the manipulations will differ for 
independents and partisans. Despite the evidence that the measures of disaffection are all 
distinct, as Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) found that political trust polarizes along 
                                                
36 The samples were quite politically knowledgeable. Respondents in these samples were 
asked a range of questions about U.S. politics and institutions, as well as current 
international affairs. First, in Sample 2, half of the sample got 80% or 12 or more 
questions correct out of 15 asked. In Sample 3, 49% of the sample got 77% or 10 or more 
questions correct out of 13. Lastly, in Sample 4, 60% of the sample got three or four 
questions correct out of the 4 questions asked. 
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partisan lines, it is possible that the salience of high polarization may affect helplessness 
and disaffection differently for partisans than it does for independents. Particularly 
related to party attachment and learned helplessness, as “undercover partisans” may not 
want to identify with negative traits now associated with the major political parties and 
do not seek to participate in support of their preferred party (Klar and Krupnikov 2016), it 
is possible that the salience of high polarization may affect those who identify as 
partisans differently than it does for those who identify as independents.  
Thus, H3a expects that when made salient, high elite polarization may reduce 
learned helplessness for partisans, as they will be able to clearly identify with the parties, 
the policy positions presented, and thus, may feel more certainty or control. However, for 
independents, learned helplessness is expected to be greater than for partisans, as they are 
less clearly connected to the parties, the policy positions presented, and may be less 
certain or feel like they have less control over their own influence. For H3b, on the other 
hand, it is expected that when presented with low polarized context, learned helplessness 
should not differ significantly between partisans and independents.  
To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, an additional difference of means tests were 
conducted to compare the means for partisans and independents within the experimental 
conditions. In the three datasets, a dummy variable was created from the party 
identification measure such that independents were coded as “1” and partisans, including 
party leaners, were coded as “0.” Table 5.2 shows the mean differences between partisans 
and independents within the three conditions for each sample across the disaffection 
measures. In the control and low polarization conditions, there are not statistically 
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significant differences in average learned helplessness between partisans and 
independents, which provides evidence in support of H3b. However, in the high 
polarization conditions, across Samples 2 and 3, independents demonstrate statistically 
significantly higher average learned helplessness than partisans do, as expected from H3a 
(Sample 2 diff=-0.06, t=-2.48; Sample 3 diff=-0.02, t=-1.40).37 If we conduct a more 
stringent test in the regression format, we find that in Sample 2, the interaction between 
independents and the experimental control condition is statistically significant (b=.09, 
p<.05).  
Figure 5.5 demonstrates that independents in the high polarization condition are 
significantly higher in learned helplessness than independents in the low polarization and 
control conditions. However, these interactions were not significant in Samples 3 and 4, 
which were collected at the height of the contentious Presidential campaign. Given the 
results for Sample 2, there is at least initial evidence that making high polarization salient 
may exacerbate learned helplessness for independents, in support of H3a. Further, there is 
some evidence that the salience of low polarization does not exacerbate learned 
helplessness for independents or partisans, in support of H3b. Considering the possibility 
that loyalty, as conceptualized by Hirschman (1970), may function through attachment to 
a political party, it would follow that when independents are reminded that they have less 
                                                
37 In the high polarization condition in Sample 4, independents did show greater average 
learned helplessness than partisans, but the difference was not statistically significant at 
p<.05. 
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control over, have less in common with, or are further away from the major political 
parties in the high polarization conditions, they feel greater learned helplessness.  
[Insert Table 5.2 Here] 
[Insert Figure 5.5 Here] 
 Table 5.2 also demonstrates that the polarization experiment may have also 
impacted feelings of helplessness and disaffection for partisans and independents 
differently. For each of the four measures of disaffection, independents present 
significantly lower average internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest, in the 
control condition of at least one of the samples, and across the three conditions. What this 
suggests is that partisans are generally more likely to feel greater internal and external 
efficacy, trust, and interest, whereas independents, on average, experience less internal 
and external efficacy, trust, and interest that partisans, regardless of polarized condition.  
However, we can also assess whether the conditions affected partisans and 
independents by testing the mean differences between conditions for partisans and 
independents separately. In further support of both H3a and H3b, in Sample 2, 
independents had significantly higher learned helplessness in the high polarization 
condition than in the control condition (diff=-0.08, t=-2.31) or the low polarization 
condition (diff=-0.06, t=-1.83) at p<.05.  
In conducting the same type of difference of means test for the measures of 
disaffection, there were not consistent mean difference for independents or for partisans 
between the conditions across the three samples. For example, in Sample 3, partisans 
scored higher external efficacy in the high polarization condition than in the low 
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polarization condition (diff=-0.02, t=-1.77), but in Sample 4, partisans scored lower 
external efficacy in the high polarization condition, compared to the low polarization 
condition (diff=0.05, t=1.84). What this may suggest, is that the polarization conditions 
did not have a particularly unique effect on partisans scoring generally higher on internal 
and external efficacy, trust, and interest than independents.  
Testing Hypothesis 3c. Making polarization salient may also impact the ways in 
which people engage in politics. H3c expects that when made salient, high polarization is 
likely to increase the tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior. To test this 
hypothesis, dichotomous measure of vote likelihood was regressed on, using logistic 
regression, the condition dummy variables, the measures of disaffection, and the 
demographic and attitudinal controls. Additionally, the condition dummy variables were 
interacted with learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection for comparison to 
determine whether their effect on voting behavior is moderated by polarization salience.  
As the focus for Hypothesis 3c is on political behavior, Tables 5.3-5.5 reports 
logistic regression models testing whether polarization moderates the effect of learned 
helplessness on reported vote likelihood in Samples 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Vote 
likelihood is used here as the measure of interest because it is the only measure of 
participation consistent across the three samples. In the three tables, Model 1 shows the 
main effects for the polarization conditions. Notably, there are no consistent significant 
main effects of the manipulations on vote likelihood. From these models, only the low 
polarization condition, relative to the control condition, significantly affected the 
probability of being extremely likely to vote. The salience of low polarization in Sample 
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4 changed the odds of being extremely likely to vote by 2.29. Alternatively stated, the 
having low polarization made salient compared to being in the control condition, 
corresponds to a 129% in being extremely likely to vote. From these models, there is no 
evidence that high polarization salience decreases engagement in voting behavior.   
Models 2-6 in Tables 5.3-5.5 tested whether polarization salience might moderate 
the effect of learned helplessness, internal efficacy, external efficacy, trust and interest on 
vote likelihood. For the condition interactions with learned helplessness, in Samples 3 
and 4, the interaction between the high polarization condition, relative to the control 
condition, is marginally statistically significant, indicating that learned helplessness has 
different effects on reported vote likelihood in the high polarization condition than it does 
in the control condition (log-likelihood coefficients: Table 5.4, Model 2, b=2.07, p<.10; 
Table 5.5, Model 3, b= 5.26, p<.10). Figure 5.6 demonstrates this interaction graphically. 
Notably, the control conditions demonstrate the same results observed under the first set 
of hypotheses in Chapter 3. The strongest effects of learned helplessness on the 
probability of being extremely likely to turn out are in the control condition (Sample 3, 
b= -.45, p<.001; Sample 4, b=-.91, p<.001). However, there were no significant effects of 
learned helplessness in the low and high polarization conditions (Sample 3, low: b= -.15, 
n.s., high: b=-.13, n.s.; Sample 4, low: b=-.22, n.s., high: b=-.23, n.s.).  Both the low and 
high polarization treatments have seemingly mitigating effects on learned helplessness’s 
effect on vote likelihood. It is unclear why the treatments may have had this moderating 
effect on learned helplessness for vote likelihood. 
[Insert Table 5.3 Here] 
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[Insert Table 5.4 Here] 
[Insert Table 5.5 Here] 
[Insert Figure 5.6 Here] 
Interactions between the polarization conditions and the measures of disaffection, 
i.e., internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest were also conducted (Models 3-6, 
Tables 5.3-5.5). Most of the interactions were not significant, and none of the interactions 
with internal efficacy were significant across the three samples. However, there were a 
few examples. The high polarization condition, relative to the control, significantly 
interacted with external efficacy in Sample 2 (Table 5.3, Model 4, b=2.27 p<.10), trust in 
Sample 2 (Table 5.3, Model 5, b=3.19, p<.10), and interest in Sample 4 (Table 5.5, 
Model 6, b= -2.50, p<.10).  In Sample 2, there was no significant effect of external 
efficacy for the control condition or for the low polarization condition (b=-.01, n.s.; 
b=.01, n.s., respectively). However, for the high polarization condition, external efficacy 
significantly increased the probability of being extremely likely to vote (b=.35, p<.01). 
Similarly, for trust in Sample 2, there was no significant effect of trust for the control 
condition or for the low polarization condition (b=-.16, n.s.; b=-.05, n.s., respectively). 
For the high polarization condition, however, trust marginally significantly increased the 
probability of being extremely likely to vote (b=.36, p<.10). Lastly, in Sample 4, interest 
had a significant effect across all three conditions (control: b= .63, p<.01; low: b=.48, 
p<.01; high: b=.37, p<.01), with the greatest effect in the control condition, and the 
smallest effect on the probability of being extremely likely to vote in the high 
polarization condition.  
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 One last possibility for H3c is that the since the polarization treatments affected 
perceived polarization differently for partisans and independents, that engagement in vote 
confidence or vote likelihood may differ for partisans and independents by condition. 
Figure 5.7 shows the effect of the experimental conditions on vote confidence and Figure 
5.8 shows the effect on vote likelihood separately for independents and partisans.38 First 
for Figure 5.7, notably in the high polarization condition, when high elite polarization is 
made salient in Sample 3, independents are significantly less confident in their vote 
choice than partisans. Alternatively, in Figure 5.8, in the high polarization condition for 
Sample 2, when high elite polarization is made salient, independents are not more likely 
to vote than partisans. However, they are more likely to say they plan on turning out in 
both the low and high polarization conditions than in the control condition. There is no 
difference in the probability of being extremely likely to vote for partisans across the 
conditions. The high polarization results from these models and figures do not provide 
further evidence for H3c, such that it would be expected that independents would be 
more likely to engage in voting behavior when low polarization is made salient (which is 
evident in the figure), but would be expected to be less likely to engage in voting 
behavior when high polarization is made salient. Yet, Figure 5.8 shows that at least in 
Sample 2, this is not the case.   
                                                
38 Vote confidence is not used in the other models because it is only measures in Sample 
3 in relation to the survey experiment. Vote confidence was measured in Sample 4, but 
during wave 1, which preceded the survey experiment in wave 2 and is thus, not subject 
to experimental effects.  
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[Insert Figure 5.7 Here] 
[Insert Figure 5.8 Here] 
As there continues to be a lack of strong manipulation effects, the next step is to 
examine whether perceived polarization, rather than manipulated polarization, affects 
reported political behavior. the effects of perceived polarization, learned helplessness, 
and the measures of disaffection, on instrumental voting behavior, using the manipulation 
check question of perceived polarization that is consistent across the three samples. 
Tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 show main effects for perceived polarization and interactive 
logistic regression models predicting vote likelihood.39 As the manipulations did 
significantly affect perceived polarization, these analyses only focus on the control 
conditions, so as to not introduce false results.  
First, Model 1 in Tables 5.6-5.8 report the main effect of perceived polarization 
and the disaffection measures on the probability of being extremely likely to vote. 
Perceived polarization did not have a direct effect of the probability of being extremely 
likely to vote in Samples 2 or 4. However, it did impact the probability of being 
                                                
39 Table 5.8 includes a control dummy for one of the treatment conditions from one of the 
other experimental conditions conducted by a colleague, Brianna Smith, on wave 2 of 
Sample 4. Models controlling for the other conditions from the other experiments were 
conducted and are available upon request. However, only one condition was significant in 
previous vote likelihood models. This condition presented respondents with a vignette 
discussing an inevitable immigration threat. Thus, a dummy variable for this condition 
has been included.  
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extremely likely to vote in Sample 3 (Model 1, Table 5.7), such that higher perceived 
polarization changes the odds of being extremely likely to vote by 1.23, and for a one unit 
increase in perceived polarization, increases the probability of being extremely likely to 
vote by 23%. 
Second, to evaluate whether the effects of the disaffection measures were 
moderated by perceived polarization, Models 2-6 in Tables 5.6-5.8 demonstrate the 
interactive relationships between the measures of disaffection and perceived polarization. 
Across the three samples, the measures of disaffection were not moderated by perceived 
polarization. However, in Sample 4 wave 2 (Model 6 in Table 5.10) the effect of interest 
on vote likelihood was moderated by perceived polarization (b= -1.37, p<.05). Broken 
down, at the lower levels of perceived polarization, interest significantly increases the 
probability of being extremely likely to vote. However, at the higher levels of perceived 
polarization, interest does not have a significant effect on the probability of being 
extremely likely to vote.   
[Insert Table 5.6 Here] 
[Insert Table 5.7 Here] 
[Insert Table 5.8 Here] 
In previous chapters, we have also discussed engagement in expressive political 
action, such as rallying or protesting behavior. While it is unlikely that the experimental 
manipulations would affect reported retrospective behavior, it is possible to evaluate 
whether perceived polarization may impact engagement in protesting behavior. 
Additionally, expressive political behavior in Sample 4 was measured in wave 3, and is 
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not subject to lasting experimental effects. As such, the analyses below from Sample 4 
focus on perceived polarization and protesting behavior measures from the third wave, 
not the wave that experienced the experimental treatments.  
Table 5.9 reports the main effects models for the three samples with perceived 
polarization, learned helplessness, and the measures of disaffection predicting protesting 
behavior. As in previous chapters evaluating protesting behavior, the dependent variable 
in Table 5.9 is coded 1 where respondents indicated they had participated in a rally in 
support or opposition of a political candidate or issue in the last three months and coded 0 
for respondents who indicated that they had not. Models 1 and 2 for Samples 2 and 3 
reflect only the control conditions, since perceived polarization was impacted by the 
experimental treatments. As noted above, the dependent variable in Model 3, for Sample 
4, was measured November 2016, prior to the presidential election (wave 3), 
approximately 6 weeks following Sample 2 and the polarization experiment.   
[Insert Table 5.9 Here] 
Table 5.9 shows the main effects in Samples 3 and 4, where higher perceived 
polarization decreases likelihood of engaging in protesting or rallying behavior. The same 
main effects models appear as Model 1 in Tables 5.10-5.12 for their respective samples. 
Again, to evaluate whether the effects of the disaffection measures were moderated by 
perceived polarization, Models 2-6 in Tables 5.10-5.12 demonstrate the interactive 
relationships between the measures of disaffection and perceived polarization. Across the 
three samples, most of the measures of disaffection were not moderated by perceived 
polarization, and none were in a consistent manner. However, there were a few 
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exceptions. First, in Sample 2, the perceived polarization x external efficacy interaction 
was marginally statistically significant (Table 5.10, Model 4: b= 4.47, p<.10). At the 
lower levels of perceived polarization, external efficacy significantly increased the 
probability of having engaged in protesting, but at the highest levels of perceived 
polarization, external efficacy did not have an effect on probability of having protested.  
[Insert Table 5.10 Here] 
 [Insert Table 5.11 Here] 
[Insert Table 5.12 Here] 
 Additionally, in Sample 4, the interactions between learned helplessness and 
perceived polarization, as well as between internal efficacy and perceived polarization 
were both marginally significant (Table 5.12: Model 2, b=2.71, p<.10, Model 3, b=-.36, 
p<.10, respectively). For learned helplessness, at the lower levels of perceived 
polarization, learned helplessness decreased the probability of having engaged in 
protesting. However, at the higher levels of perceived polarization, learned helplessness 
increased the probability of having engaged in protesting. For internal efficacy, only at 
the lowest levels of perceived polarization does internal efficacy have an effect. At the 
higher levels of perceived polarization, internal efficacy does not have a significant effect 
on the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior.  
Further, in Sample 4, the interaction between trust and perceived polarization was 
statistically significant (Table 5.12: Model 5, b=-3.04, p<.01). Again, at the lowest levels 
of perceived polarization, trust has a significant effect in increasing the probability of 
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having engaged in protesting behavior. However, at the highest levels of perceived 
polarization, trust has no significant effect on the probability of having protested.  
Overall, the marginal effects of perceived polarization are mostly only significant 
at the lowest values of perceived polarization. Interestingly, however, for the learned 
helplessness interaction visualized in Figure 5.9, for those who perceive low polarization 
and experience low learned helplessness, they have a greater probability of engaging in 
protesting behavior than those who experience high learned helplessness and perceive 
low polarization. Yet, on the other hand, those who perceive high polarization and 
experience high learned helplessness, they have a greater probability of engaging in 
protesting behavior than those who perceive low polarization and experience high learned 
helplessness. Thus, perceiving greater polarization and experiencing greater learned 
helplessness may actually increase the probability of voicing ones’ opinions and 
grievances through rallying or protesting behavior.  
[Insert Figure 5.9 Here] 
To summarize, Hypothesis 3c set out to test whether making polarization salient 
would impact prospective political behavior. The hypothesis expected that if learned 
helplessness is exacerbated experimentally in a polarized context, high polarization 
would increase the likelihood people would exit through lower prospective voting 
behavior. In regard to the experimentally manipulated polarization conditions, the 
polarization treatments did not impact engagement in vote likelihood. However, high 
polarization did moderate the effect of learned helplessness vote likelihood in Samples 3 
and 4, as well as interest in Sample 4, and external efficacy and trust in Sample 2.  
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Since there were not strong manipulation effects consistent across the samples, 
H3c also tested the impact of perceived polarization on vote likelihood, and retrospective 
rallying and protesting behavior. First, perceived polarization did impact vote likelihood, 
such that higher perceived polarization was found to increase the probability of being 
extremely likely to vote. Second, while not directly hypothesized, it was expected that 
perceived polarization might increase the probability of engaging in more expressive 
political behavior, i.e., rallying and protesting. For protesting behavior, higher perceived 
polarization was found to decrease the likelihood of engaging in this form of voice in 
Samples 3 and 4. Additionally, perceive polarization moderated the effect of learned 
helplessness on the probability of having protested, such that for those who perceive low 
polarization, learned helplessness decreased the probability of having protested, but for 
those who perceive high polarization, learned helplessness increased the probability of 
having engaged in protesting behavior. Taken together, there is at least partial support 
that a polarized political context impacts how people utilize exit and voice.   
Testing Hypothesis H3d. Lastly, with the expectation that polarization may 
exacerbate learned helplessness, rather than moderate its effects, and may impact the 
ways in which people engage in political behavior, it is possible that learned helplessness 
may actually mediate the relationship between polarization and participation. As such, 
H3d hypothesizes that when high polarization is made salient or when perceived 
polarization is high, learned helplessness will be exacerbated and engagement in voting 
behavior will decrease. To test this hypothesis, the medeff package in Stata 14 was used 
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to evaluate whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between high 
polarization and vote likelihood in the three samples.  
Regarding vote likelihood in Samples 2-4, helplessness does not significantly 
mediate the relationship between experimentally manipulated polarization and vote 
likelihood. However, using perceived polarization, learned helplessness does 
significantly partially mediate the relationship between polarization and vote likelihood. 
The mediation models are limited to the control conditions. Learned helplessness 
mediates 14% of the total effect in Sample 2, 8% of the total effect in Sample 3, and 10% 
of the total effect in Sample 4. Thus, there is some preliminary support across these three 
samples that learned helplessness may partially mediate the relationship between 
perceived polarization and voting behavior.  
It is also possible that similar to the vote likelihood models conducted in Chapter 
3 that the measures of disaffection could potentially partially mediate the relationship 
between polarization and voting behavior. To evaluate if that is the case, the same 
mediation models using the medeff package in Stata 14 were conducted across the three 
samples for each of the measures of disaffection. External efficacy and trust did not 
partially mediate in any of the samples. Internal efficacy, partially mediated the 
relationship between perceived polarization and vote likelihood in Samples 3 and 4. 
Internal efficacy mediates 21% of the total direct effect in Sample 3 and 18% in Sample 
4. Interest also partially mediated the relationship. In Sample 3, interest mediates 40% of 
the direct effect, and in Sample 4, interest mediates 28%.  
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 These mediation models do not include the evaluation of a manipulated mediator, 
since the brief analyses of H1d showed in Chapter 3 that the learned helplessness 
manipulation did not have strong effects. Scholars in the field have raised concerns about 
threats to inference in mediation analysis, particularly related to experiments, such that 
mediation analyses with unmanipulated mediators may be prone to bias (Bullock, Green, 
and Ha 2010). Future evaluation of the role disaffection might play in mediating the 
relationship between political context, such as polarization, and voting behavior. This 
should allow for the analyses to take advantage of the mediation best practices outlined 
by Imai, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2013) for the evaluation of experimental designs and 
causal mechanisms (see also Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010). 
 
Discussion 
This chapter sought to evaluate whether the political context of high elite 
polarization impacts feelings of learned helplessness, as well as the ways in which people 
engage in instrumental and expressive political activities. As the samples were all 
collected in 2016, largely at the height of the contentious 2016 presidential election 
campaign, it was extremely difficult to identify a political environment not considered as 
politically polarized. Thus, this chapter examined the effects of elite polarization, both 
experimentally and observationally. It was expected that when high polarization is made 
salient, feelings of disaffection, particularly learned helplessness, would be exacerbated, 
and would directly impact the ways in which respondents engaged in exit or voice, 
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disengaging from instrumental behavior or voicing their opinions and grievances through 
expressive political action. 
 Beginning with H3, the polarization hypothesis, which expected that when made 
salient, high elite polarization would exacerbate learned helplessness, the significance 
tests showed that learned helplessness did not consistently differ between conditions, nor 
did the measures of disaffection. Yet, considering how the polarization conditions may 
have been interpreted differently by partisans and independents, H3a and H3b tested 
whether learned helplessness differed for partisans and independents within polarization 
conditions. H3a expected that high elite polarization would reduce learned helplessness 
for partisans but increase it for independents; whereas H3b expected that there would not 
be any differences when low elite polarization is made salient. In support of both 
hypotheses, in the high polarization condition, independents demonstrate statistically 
significantly higher average learned helplessness than partisans do, and in the control and 
low polarization conditions, there are no significant mean differences between partisans 
and independents.    
Before evaluating whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between 
polarization and voting behavior, H3c tested whether polarization impacted political 
behavior. H3c tested both whether experimentally manipulated elite polarization or 
perceived polarization negatively impacted people’s tendency to exit through lower 
reported voting behavior. First, in regard to the polarization experiment and vote 
likelihood, there were no consistent significant main effects of the manipulations on vote 
likelihood. However, the high polarization condition did moderate the effect of learned 
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helplessness (Samples 3 and 4), external efficacy (Sample 2), trust (Sample 2), and 
interest (Sample 4). With the focus on learned helplessness, the polarization conditions 
seemingly mitigated the effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood, which is a 
puzzling result.  
Second, since there were not strong manipulation effects, perceived polarization 
between the Republican and Democratic parties was used rather than manipulated elite 
polarization. Perceived polarization did demonstrate a direct effect on vote likelihood, 
such that higher perceived polarization increased the likelihood of voting in Sample 3 
only. Additionally, perceived polarization did not moderate the effects of any of the 
disaffection measures in any of the samples. Further, in testing how perceived 
polarization impacts people’s engagement in expressive methods of voicing their 
opinions and grievances, the main effect of perceived polarization decreased the 
likelihood of engaging in protesting or rallying behavior. However, perceived 
polarization did moderate the effects of learned helplessness in Sample 4, such that for 
those lower in perceived polarization, learned helplessness decreased the probability of 
having engaged in protesting, but for those higher in perceived polarization, learned 
helplessness increased the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior.  
Last, it was expected that context actually might exacerbate feelings of learned 
helplessness, such that high polarization might exacerbate learned helplessness, which 
might drive engagement in instrumental political participation down. Thus, learned 
helplessness might partially mediate the relationship between context and voting 
behavior. Across the three samples, learned helplessness was shown to partially mediate 
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the relationship between polarization and voting behavior. However, this was only the 
case for perceived polarization, not for the experimentally manipulated polarization.  
These tests did not provide support for H3, and only partial support for H3c. 
Stronger support was found for H3a, H3b, and H3d, but despite some significant effects, 
these tests are far from conclusive. Further, given that the experimental manipulations 
worked to manipulate perceived polarization, there remains concern that the experimental 
effects were not strong enough, particularly to cause strong experimental effects on 
learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection in the expected directions.  This 
could be due to a number of possibilities. First, it is important to consider the 
implications of the validity of the manipulations. It is possible, that the manipulations 
were not strong enough or realistic enough to get respondents to consider that political 
elites are not polarized under the current political environment.  In regard to the small, 
but significant, effects of the manipulations on perceived polarization, the manipulations 
may not have fully induced contextual salience of low and high polarization. Second, the 
samples utilized here are convenience samples and fairly high in political knowledge, 
which may have made it more difficult to manipulate perceived polarization. Third, it is 
possible that learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection are not actually moved 
by a polarized context. Fourth, these samples were all collected during and immediately 
following the 2016 presidential election, which was particularly negative and polarized, 
making the inducement of a low polarized context more difficult.  
 By examining the role of context, experimentally and observationally, this chapter 
sought to grapple with the relationship between elite polarization and learned 
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helplessness in an attempt to explain why disengagement from voting behavior is as 
pervasive as it is and why it is so difficult to get the civically disengaged to engage. 
Given the experimental and observational results, it is clear that more work is needed.  
While it is considered to be fundamental to the workings of democracy for citizens to 
participate in the political process and engage in their communities, Easton (1965) 
stressed that when voting and civic engagement falls below a certain minimum, the 
persistence of the entire system will be endangered (see also Finifter 1970). This chapter, 
and the dissertation more broadly, seeks to benefit society by expanding our 
understanding the effects that learned helplessness, disaffection, and polarization have on 
political behavior in the U.S.  
Growing political disaffection has contributed to the widening of the gap between 
citizens and their representatives, growing political inequalities, and increasing political 
apathy, leading to lower levels of political and community involvement. Polarization has 
led to acrimony between the political parties, increased divisions on major policy 
dimensions, and created less competitive elections. Thus, it is possible that disaffection 
has been exacerbated by political polarization (and growing economic inequality, 
explored within the broader dissertation, but not in the current project). If political 
disaffection is at the root of the low participation rates and decline in social capital in the 
U.S., it is possible that it also carries implications for the electoral system and 
representational biases, which is often a consequence of low civic engagement. Yet, 
income inequality from Chapter 4, and elite polarization discussed here, are not the only 
two contexts within which the U.S. democracy is functioning. The conclusion turns 
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briefly to discuss other important contexts that may be affecting feelings of helplessness 
and disaffection in the contemporary political environment.  
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion  
Helplessness and Disaffection in the Contemporary U.S. Context 
 
The experience of being a member of the American populace in today’s political 
environment is complex, and multilayered. Consequently, there is no one single 
experience, historically, or in the contemporary context. Experiences of repeated political 
losses, of feeling as if one’s side is consistently playing from behind, of feeling that 
elected officials do not listen, care, or represent one’s preferences, of negative 
experiences with the justice system or government services, or experiences of being 
politically historically and systemically marginalized and excluded, all contribute to 
broader feelings of disaffection and malaise with the contemporary political system. 
These experiences also impact the ways in which the public engages with the broader 
political system through instrumental and expressive political participation.  
The extant literature on disaffection, or negative attitudes toward democracy, has 
centered on attitudes of lack of trust and confidence in political authorities and 
institutions to address the concerns of the people (Di Palma 1970; Pharr and Putnam 
2000; Torcal and Montero 2006), as well as how interested and effectual people believe 
they are to involve themselves with political authorities and institutions. However, the 
disaffection literature is overly focused on attitudes about institutions, and not attentive 
enough to how personal experiences shape perceptions of uncontrollability and resulting 
behavior. Thus, conceptually and methodologically, this dissertation has argued and 
sought to demonstrate that the existing work on disaffection neglects an additional 
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dimension tied to repeated or consistent feelings of inability, failure, and loss of control, 
which in turn shapes the ways in which people utilize political exit and voice, engaging 
through instrumental and expressive political actions.  
Thus, the chapters herein have applied the concept of learned helplessness to 
explain the deeper feelings of disaffection associated with feelings of uncontrollability in 
regard to the political system. Utilizing the exit, voice, and loyalty framework from 
Hirschman (1970), the dissertation has used learned helplessness to illustrate how people 
feeling helpless and disaffected are attached to the conventional U.S. democratic system 
and how these have feelings become incorporated into people’s identity and 
ability/willingness to engage in (or disengage from) political behavior, specifically 
instrumental or expressive political action, i.e. voting behavior or protest behavior, 
respectively.  
The dissertation has largely taken the lead from learned helplessness scholars in 
psychology to explain political passivity, or exiting behavior from voting behavior. It was 
posited that the passivity exhibited in people’s removal from voting is part of learned 
helplessness, as reflective of the passivity resulting from feelings of not being able to 
control, influence, or get what is needed from the conventional, institutionalized political 
system. However, where this dissertation separates itself from the existing learned 
helplessness literature is that the dissertation also posits that feelings of helplessness may 
also contribute to engagement in political action outside of the conventional, 
institutionalized political system. Particularly for those who feel un- or under-
represented, marginalized by, or underserved by the conventional political system, they 
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may seek out action beyond the conventional, institutionalized system to voice their 
opinions and grievances in a manner that would help them reassert control over their 
helplessness or to deal with events and situations that are difficult to deal with or 
understand. Thus, for people who are helpless, and not getting what they need from the 
existing conventional, institutionalized political system, they may choose to engage in 
more expressive political action to reassert power or status, rectify injustices, or to restore 
a desired state of affairs. 
 As this dissertation is the first to explore learned helplessness in the political 
context, it only begins to scratch the surface of the ways in which the concept is related 
conceptually and methodologically to measures of disaffection, as well as how general 
learned helplessness is politically consequential and may further our understanding of the 
lasting effects of lived experiences with the conventional political system and 
government institutions. Chapter 2 sought to illustrate how learned helplessness, using 
the learned helplessness scale from Quinless and McDermott Nelson (1988), is 
conceptually and methodologically distinct from measures that have been used to study 
disaffection, i.e., internal and external efficacy, trust, and political interest. Theoretically, 
it is expected that learned helplessness occurs prior to disaffection. However, the 
dissertation samples are unable to assess causality without longitudinal panel data. Across 
the five survey samples utilized in the dissertation, the results suggest that helplessness is 
empirically linked to, but distinct from the measures of disaffection.   
 Importantly, there are likely numerous potential explanations for what causes 
learned helplessness. Chapter 2 delved into some of the expected main demographic, 
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attitudinal, and experiential predictors of learned helplessness. Across the five samples, 
the most robust and consistent predictors of learned helplessness were income and age. 
Learned helplessness is higher for youths or for those at the lower end of the income 
distribution. It is expected that earning potential, employment, ability to save for 
retirement, and other aspects of class have a lasting impact on feelings of economic 
security and ability to improve one’s situation. As learned helplessness stems from 
experiences with uncontrollable situations, Chapter 2 also demonstrated that not only 
does being low income impact feelings of helplessness, being from a historically or 
systemically marginalized and subordinated group, or experiencing repeated political 
losses could also affect learned helplessness. Moreover, in Sample 3, experiences with 
government institutions, such as negative experiences with law enforcement and 
experiences with government assistance programs, like means-tested welfare programs, 
also shape feelings of learned helplessness.  
 Chapters 3, 4, and 5 turned to questions of not only how context might shape 
learned helplessness, but how feelings of helplessness impact engagement with 
instrumental and expressive political participation. Political participation provides the 
mechanism by which citizens communicate information about their interests, preferences, 
and needs and generate pressure to respond, and choices to participate have been shown 
to stem from the motivation and capacity to take part politically (Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995). However, this dissertation illustrates that the motivation and capacity to 
participate may be more complicated than originally conceived, as they both relate to 
feelings of helplessness.  
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 First, the analyses in Chapter 3 illustrated that those who experience greater 
learned helplessness are less likely to engage in instrumental political activities (i.e., vote 
likelihood, vote confidence, and reported turnout), but are more likely to engage in more 
expressive political activities (i.e., reported rallying and protesting). The chapter explored 
both mediational and conditional effects of income and learned helplessness on 
instrumental and expressive political behavior, the results of the mediational models are 
stronger than the moderation results. Across the five samples, for multiple measures of 
instrumental voting behavior, i.e., vote likelihood and turnout, learned helplessness 
consistently mediated the relationship between income and voting behavior, such that as 
decreases in level of income increased feelings of learned helplessness, which in turn 
decreased the probability of engaging in voting behavior.  
While Chapter 3 provided evidence that learned helplessness is a consistent 
predictor of both exit, through disengagement from voting behavior, and voice, through 
engagement with protesting, the effect of learned helplessness on exit and voice was 
shown to be conditional upon particular marginalized identities, some of which were 
unexpected and opposite from what was expected. First, unexpectedly, there was no 
effect of learned helplessness on voting or protesting behavior for those who felt that they 
were on the losing side of politics. Rather, in Sample 4, only for those who felt that they 
were on the winning side of politics, did learned helplessness drive down the probability 
of being extremely likely to vote, as well as the probability of turning out.  
Second, opposite from what was hypothesized, in Sample 4, the effect of learned 
helplessness on vote likelihood for Black and African American respondents actually 
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increased the probability of engaging in voting behavior, and, for White respondents, 
learned helplessness decreased the probability of engaging in voting behavior, but 
increased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior. Third, for respondents who 
identify ethnically as Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish, the effect of learned helplessness 
decreases the probability of engaging in voting behavior and increases the probability of 
engaging in protesting or rallying. However, learned helplessness also decreases the 
probability exiting from voting behavior.  
Fourth, the effects for gender were mixed, and not quite as expected.  While in 
Samples 1 and 3, the effect of learned helplessness for females did decrease vote 
likelihood and turnout, the effect of learned helplessness also decreased vote likelihood 
for males. Additionally, in Sample 5, while the effect of learned helplessness did not 
increase the probability of protest for females, it did increase the probability of protest, 
unexpectedly, for males.  
Lastly, for income, the effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood was not 
moderated by income. However, for low income respondents, learned helplessness 
increased the probability of having reported participating in protesting and rallying 
behavior before the election, but after the election, learned helplessness decreased the 
probability of having reported participating in protesting or rallying behavior. The exact 
opposite pattern was found for high income respondents before and following the 2016 
presidential election. These results, as well as the gender results, could be in part due to 
the timing of when the questions were asked in relation to the presidential election and 
advertisement of political marches following the 2016 presidential election in response to 
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the election outcome. These findings clearly call for greater investigation, particularly 
into the ways in which intersectionality across race, gender, ethnicity, class, immigration 
status and other subordinated identities lead to further exclusion, marginalization, 
subordination, and disenfranchisement. 
Given the results in Chapter 3, Chapters 4 and 5 sought to address questions about 
political context and how the surrounding contextual environment might contribute to 
learned helplessness. To evaluate two important contexts, Chapters 4 and 5 utilized 
experimental methods, with the goal of inducing the salience of two important contexts 
within which contemporary U.S. politics operates. Chapter 4 investigated the first context 
of income inequality and Chapter 5 explored the context of elite polarization.  
With Chapter 4’s focus on income inequality, a tension arose with the findings 
between manipulated perceived income inequality, and personal perceptions about one’s 
own economic situation. While both were shown to increase learned helplessness, and the 
probability of exiting, the more powerful measure was the un-manipulated measure of 
respondents’ economic situation, particularly perceptions that respondents’ economic 
situation will improve. For respondents who perceive that their economic situation will 
not improve, they experience greater learned helplessness and are less likely to engage in 
voting behavior.  
Further in Chapter 4, learned helplessness was shown to partially mediate the 
relationship between uncontrollable income inequality and voting behavior. Learned 
helplessness was also shown to partially mediate the relationship between perceived 
economic improvement and voting behavior, such that as perceptions of improvement 
   217 
 
increased, learned helplessness declined and increased the probability of being likely to 
turnout to vote. A key takeaway from this chapter is the reinforcement of the influence 
uncontrollable situations, regardless of whether respondents are reminded experimentally 
of the uncontrollability of the drastic income inequality growth since 1980, or whether 
respondents feel a lack of control over improving their economic situation. A second 
takeaway is a reminder of the impact of experience on learned helplessness and how that 
influences resulting behavior. This was expected from the learned helplessness literature, 
but had yet to be demonstrated in regard to political behavior. However, Chapter 4 
utilized data from only one convenience sample, Sample 3, so greater investigation into 
these effects is needed.  
Yet, income inequality and financial security are not the only contexts within 
which the American populace experiences politics. In the contemporary U.S. political 
environment, polarization largely occupies both elite and mass politics. Chapter 5 
examined the role elite polarization may play for inducing feelings of learned 
helplessness, and whether that would impact how people utilize exit and voice. Since it is 
difficult to find a political context in U.S. politics that is not polarized, this chapter 
utilized an experiment to manipulate the salience of high and low elite polarization in 
three samples, Samples 2-4.  
Experimentally, there was a lack of strong evidence that high polarization 
exacerbated learned helplessness. However, considering attachment to political parties 
and feelings of ability to influence the political system, high polarization affected 
partisans and independents differently, such that high polarization decreased helplessness 
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for partisans, but increased these feelings for independents. As Klar and Krupnikov 
(2016) demonstrate, many undercover partisans are identifying as independents because 
they do not want to identify with the negative traits now associated with the major 
political parties, exacerbated by polarization. Since party identification may serve as a 
form of loyalty, it is possible that partisans in the high polarization condition felt more 
able to more clearly identify with the manipulation, the policy positions presented, and 
were thus felt more certainty and control. On the flip side, however, for independents 
who are less clearly connected to the parties and the policy positions presented, and 
possibly even adversely so, they may have felt less certain or as if they had less control. 
As for polarization’s impact on exit and voice, the experimental conditions did 
not present any main effects for voting behavior. There were some conditional effects, 
however. The high polarization condition moderated the effect of learned helplessness 
(Samples 3 and 4), external efficacy (Sample 2), trust (Sample 2), and interest (Sample 4) 
on voting behavior. Specifically regarding helplessness, the polarization conditions 
unexpectedly mitigated the effect of helplessness on vote likelihood, which is puzzling. 
Since there were not strong experimental effects, Chapter 5 also investigated the 
effects of perceived polarization, which did demonstrate a direct effect on vote 
likelihood, such that higher perceived polarization increased the likelihood of voting in 
Sample 3 only. Perceived polarization decreased the likelihood of engaging in protesting 
or rallying behavior. Perceived polarization also demonstrated some conditional effects, 
such that it moderated the effects of learned helplessness in Sample 4, such that for those 
lower in perceived polarization, learned helplessness decreased the probability of having 
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engaged in protesting behavior, but for those higher in perceived polarization, learned 
helplessness increased the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior. 
Lastly, across the three samples, learned helplessness was shown to partially mediate the 
relationship between polarization and voting behavior. However, this was only the case 
for perceived polarization, not for experimentally manipulated polarization. 
 Taking these chapters together, there is evidence that experiences with 
uncontrollability and repeated losses increase learned helplessness. This evidence also 
points to some clear implications for how people utilize exit and voice. Specifically, 
helplessness increases the utilization of exit, disengagement from the conventional, 
institutionalized political system, and decreases in voting behavior, such as being likely 
to vote or actually turning out to vote. Further, as a mechanism of coping with 
helplessness, by reasserting power or status, rectifying injustices, or restoring a desired 
state of affairs, people utilize voice outside of the conventional, institutionalized system 
through more expressive political action, like engaging in marches, rallies, or protests. 
This duality carries implications, as well, for broader political consequences. 
 
Broader Implications of Political Helplessness 
 First, in regard to voting behavior and its goal for selecting and informing elected 
officials, if those who feel helpless are not participating, and they are more likely from 
disadvantaged groups, their preferences and interests will likely continue to be un- or 
underrepresented. Second, one alternative to getting all who are eligible to actually vote 
is to change election administration laws to force a compulsory voting system. This 
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change would require eligible citizens to register for and participate in federal elections. 
While this may require people to participate, if any penalties are incurred financially for 
not participating, it would be expected to disproportionately impact those who feel 
helpless and as if their participation will not affect an uncontrollable system. 
Additionally, making participation involuntary may actually worsen the loss of control, 
rather than grant greater control to those who feel politically helpless, and may make 
participating less desirable overall. 
 Additionally, the broader narrative within this dissertation continued to circle 
back to experience and the way in which different experiences affect helplessness. As for 
political helplessness’ implications for social policy, more attention, by scholars and 
policymakers, should be paid to the experiences that shape helplessness. Many scholars 
have concerned themselves with studying and proposing solutions alleviating feelings of 
injustice, systemic marginalization, perpetual poverty, and feelings of economic 
insecurity and instability. Some policymakers have concerned themselves, similarly, with 
solutions, however, in a polarized context, parties rarely agree on interventions and 
programs, particularly when helplessness serves to demobilize electoral opposition. 
Regardless, much more work is necessary to further the investigation of the political 
causes and consequences of helplessness and disaffection.  
 
Future Work 
 As with many dissertations, the investigations within these chapters raised nearly 
as many questions as they answered. Extensions of the dissertation include the collection 
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of more representative data, investigation of the psychological complexity behind 
helplessness, additional important contextual effects, and implications for the reduction 
of learned helplessness.  
 
Who Doesn’t Want More Data? 
First, through additional data collection, the observational findings should be 
replicated. Only two of the dissertation samples utilized raked survey weights so that the 
results would be approximately nationally representative. Additionally, one of these two 
samples, the CCES module, was only able to include a brief measure of learned 
helplessness, rather than the full scale. The other three samples were online convenience 
samples collected through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). While MTurk is 
considered to be more representative of U.S. adults than a college student sample, it is 
still a convenience sample. More representative samples that include full measures of 
learned helplessness, and the measures of disaffection, are greatly needed to further this 
work, as helplessness measures are not included on any of the representative national 
surveys, such as the American National Election Study or the General Social Survey. 
 Beyond representativeness, the data collected for this dissertation was obtained 
leading up to and immediately following the 2016 presidential election. This presidential 
election was particularly contentious, which may have affected not only the observational 
effects, but also may have affected the survey experiments. None of the survey 
experiments provided strong evidence in favor of any causal arguments. However, 
helplessness scholars acknowledge the difficulty with causal ambiguity behind 
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uncontrollable events (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993), so further experimental 
investigations are needed to determine whether some causal clarity may be gained.  
Particularly, further experimentation is necessary to test the potential causal effects of 
income inequality, economic insecurity, and polarization. Additionally, while strong 
experimental evidence for learned helplessness was not found, future work plans to 
investigate alternative experimental tests of learned helplessness, e.g., making repeated 
losses salient through repeatedly losing or winning at a game with financial incentives. 
Moreover, additional data that is not collected cross-sectionally or during a single 
election season are needed to assess the more complex relationships behind helplessness 
and the measures of disaffection. Additional datasets, particularly longitudinal datasets, 
are needed in the survey context. It is also important to note that learned helplessness 
assessed through a battery of survey items is only one method of evaluating learned 
helplessness. Accordingly, in-depth interviews and focus groups are needed to get at the 
deeper experiences at the root of political helplessness and effects of intersectionality, 
particularly as those who are the most helpless are exceedingly difficult to access through 
online surveys. Further, the nuances and richness of people’s personal experiences with 
governmental policy, policing, and the criminal justice system, in addition to their 
broader life histories are not easily captured through survey work. 
 
Psychological Complexity 
 While there is still some debate behind whether learned helplessness has more 
state or trait characteristics, there is no question that more investigation into how learned 
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helplessness is causally prior to disaffection. First, more work across additional samples 
is needed to assess the underlying concepts of helplessness and political disaffection. 
More specifically, additional work is needed to assess whether the disaffection measures 
used in this dissertation consistently load on a single disaffection factor beyond the five 
samples studied here.  
Second, the dissertation raises questions about the individual relationships and 
temporal ordering of learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection, particularly 
internal efficacy. As it is theoretically posited that general helplessness occurs prior to 
disaffection, more longitudinal panel data is necessary to test the causal relationship 
between helplessness and disaffection. Overall, internal efficacy, is the closest measure to 
learned helplessness. While it behaved similarly to learned helplessness to predict vote 
confidence and protesting behavior, it did not consistently predict vote likelihood or 
turnout. Yet, it is conceivable that these two measures are related, where learned 
helplessness is a broader feeling of ability and knowledge, and internal efficacy is a more 
specific feeling of ability and knowledge related to participation. Thus, extensions of this 
hypothesis should be tested with additional data, particularly in a panel dataset over a 
longer period of time, to determine whether internal efficacy may actually mediate the 
relationship between learned helplessness and exit and voice. Initial mediation models 
from the dissertation samples show evidence that internal efficacy may partially mediate 
between 21% and 45% of the total effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood, and 
between 20 and 35% of the total effect of learned helplessness on turnout. However, 
because these measures were largely collected in the same wave, panel data with these 
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measures collected at multiple waves over a longer period of time are needed before 
making further conclusions about these results.   
 
Contextual Effects 
 Social problems do not occur singularly or in isolation. Rather, they co-occur, and 
when they do, “it may well be the result of one problem exacerbating another, as opposed 
to learned helplessness being at the root of all of them individually” (Peterson, Maier, and 
Seligman 1993: 262). As noted above, additional experimental investigations are needed 
to test the contextual effects of income inequality, economic insecurity, and polarization 
discussed within the chapters of this dissertation. However, there are other contemporary 
contexts that might exacerbate or mitigate learned helplessness. Particularly, there are 
implications of learned helplessness for social and political networks.  
 Learned helplessness scholars have identified a number of factors of learned 
helplessness that do not have parallels among animal learned helplessness. One of these 
factors has been identified by Simkin, Lederer, and Seligman (1983), who found that 
small groups can be made helpless by asking the group as a whole to work at unsolvable 
problems. The group helplessness carries over to later tasks, where they fail to solve 
problems readily mastered by other groups that were not previously exposed to 
uncontrollability and failure. Similarly, Peterson and Stunkard (1989) have developed a 
theory of collective control versus collective helplessness. Collective control is conceived 
as a norm about the way that a group works, what it is that the group can and cannot 
accomplish. Putting these two together, considering how helplessness may affect a 
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particular social network or broader community, there are implications for potential 
diffusion of disengagement. This could be assessed at both the individual level and at the 
network level.  
 First in regard to community level variables, this line of work will seek to tie 
helplessness to work on the politics of resentment, particularly rural resentment. Either 
feelings of personal or community helplessness would be expected to predict engagement 
in particular communities, e.g., communities that have experienced declines in unions, 
loss of jobs due to loss of industries or technology, areas deeply affected with racial 
tensions, or overwhelming challenges with the opioid epidemic. Follow-up studies are 
planed with a fellow University of Minnesota graduate, Geoff Sheagley, who has 
constructed survey items to measure rural resentment, to get at concerns with 
redistributive injustices and other issues of rural resentment discussed by Cramer (2016), 
Additional community-level will be collected to assess contextual variables of different 
community experiences, inspired by Hochschild (2016) and Vance (2016). 
 Further, scholars of political behavior have long investigated the social influences 
of participation and political attitudes. From early work, e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet (1944) and Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) which emphasizes that 
sociological factors, particularly family, shape the political interests and preferences 
individuals hold, to later mobilization models emphasizing mobilization by contact from 
candidates/campaigns and political organizations (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; 2003; 
Uhlaner 1989), scholars have both directly and indirectly addressed social pressures 
underlying political behavior. Later mobilization models have focused on ways to boost 
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turnout through Get Out the Vote (GOTV) field experiments that either induce social 
pressure to overcome low interest in elections and increase turnout by using direct mail 
GOTV campaigns sharing neighbors’ voting records (Green and Gerber 2008; Gerber, 
Green, and Larimer 2008) or by matching GOTV canvassers’ race and ethnicity with the 
demographic background of potential voters (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012). 
Building on this area of work, models have turned to incorporate, more formally, the 
ways in which social networks impact political behavior in the mass public (McClurg 
2003; Sinclair 2012; Sokhey and McClurg 2012), evaluating how social networks 
condition mobilization effects and resulting turnout in high vs. low salience elections 
(Rolfe 2012). 
 As some of the latest work on social networks and political participation has 
demonstrated, people tend to conform to the social norms of their networks. Sinclair 
(2012) illustrates through field experiments and survey work that there is a significant 
social component of voting. Specifically, explicit behaviors such as turning out to vote or 
donating money to a campaign are driven by social norms and can succumb to social 
pressure. She finds that individuals are more likely to turnout when a local canvasser 
delivers a mobilization message, and are more likely to turnout when the recipient lives 
with others who vote consistently, which carries implications for the role of social 
pressure within one’s network as a mechanism of influence. Further, Sokhey and 
McClurg (2012) find that networks facilitate connections between individuals’ vote 
decisions and underlying preferences when networks communicate clear signals 
regarding the candidates, assisting voters in making correct voting decisions. Thus, 
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people are influenced by their discussion networks, and those who are directly contacted 
by candidates or political parties are more likely to turnout, particularly if subjected to 
social pressures. However, these findings do not highlight the more specific differences 
among those who may feel disaffected and helpless or those who live in a disaffected and 
helpless social network.  
Sinclair (2012) demonstrates that voters do not select their networks for 
ideological similarity, but by other factors, e.g., age, gender, race, education level, or 
religion. Thus, considering some of the findings regarding collective helplessness, how 
might networks made up of highly disaffected or highly helpless individuals engage in 
voting behavior? Alternatively stated, how might negative network structures create 
social pressure for individuals to exit and disengage from voting behavior, or potentially 
create social pressure to voice opinions and grievances through more expressive political 
action. These studies could be conducted observationally and experimentally.  
 
Helplessness Reduction and Resilience 
 Lastly, given the effects learned helplessness has on engagement in voting 
behavior, it may be important to determine whether political helplessness can be 
mitigated. Additional studies examining the mitigation of learned helplessness could 
include the use of self-affirmation studies (e.g. Steele 1988), which may boost subjects’ 
self-esteem and helping them to deal with the feelings of uncontrollability and potentially 
lessening the effect of learned helplessness. However, self-affirmation studies are not 
known for lasting effects of the boosts to self-esteem.  
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Alternatively, (Seligman 1981) suggests potential preventive or ameliorative 
interventions for helplessness and resulting depression, that may be able to be adapted to 
address political helplessness. Some of these effects stem from the role of emotions in 
dealing with anger and threat as coping mechanisms to reduce feelings of helplessness 
(Mikulincer 1994). Other coping mechanisms found to be effective for reducing feelings 
of helplessness in the laboratory context include retroactive reevaluation of the 
helplessness experience, or additional processing of the feelings of uncontrollability and 
failure (Cemalcilar et al. 2010). However, many of the coping mechanisms found to be 
effective have only been conducted in the laboratory environment. Additional 
investigation into whether potential interventions and social programs that may mitigate 
the experiences from which helplessness stems may be a more practical place to test 
helplessness mitigation.  
Lastly, there is tension between temporary helplessness and more permanent 
helplessness.  For individuals who experience situations that induce perpetual 
uncontrollability, but happen to be more resilient, are expected to be less likely to 
experience permanent or long-term helplessness. Thus, future work also plans to test the 
relationship between helplessness and resilience. A re-contact study of the control 
condition of Sample 3 is currently underway to assess two questions. First, what is the 
impact of actually winning or losing an election on learned helplessness (as opposed to 
just the perception of being on the winning or losing side of politics), as learned 
helplessness will be measured before and after the presidential election. Second, does 
resilience serve as a buffer against prior feelings of helplessness and uncontrollability. 
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Resilience will be measured using the brief resilience scale (BRS), which was created to 
assess people’s ability to bounce back or recover from stress (Smith et al. 2008). I posit 
that those who lost the election, but show less helplessness may be more resilient and 
able to bounce back from loss and uncontrollability.  
The potential directions and applications for learned helplessness in the political 
context abound. The work within this dissertation is timely as the U.S. public is 
exhibiting malaise and frustration with the current political system, and only one step 
toward gaining greater understanding of American disaffection. While this may have 
been exacerbated by a particularly contentious presidential election year, only time, and 
additional work, will tell whether these feelings of disaffection and dissatisfaction are 
here to stay or if they are just a blip on the U.S. democratic timeline.  
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Chapter 2 
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Figure 2.2 Kernel Density of Learned Helplessness Across Samples  
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Figure 2.3 Sample Averages for Disaffection Measures 
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Table 2.1 Weighted Overtime Disaffection Averages (ANES Time Series 1960-2016) 
Measure of Disaffection Average (0-100) 
External Efficacy 50.7 
Internal Efficacy 32.7 
Trust in Government 47.6 
Interest in Elections/Campaigns 58.0 
Interest in Public Affairs/Politics 59.0 
 
 
Table 2.2 Disaffection Measure Sample Means 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.36 
Internal Efficacy 0.60 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.59 
External Efficacy 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.40 -- 
Generalized Trust 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.44 
Political Interest 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.75 
N  717 201 726 3529 972 
Note: Means included above reflect unweighted means from control conditions for 
Samples 1-3 and Wave 1 or pre-election weighted means for Samples 4 and 5. Ns reflect 
the smallest sample size for the measures from each sample. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Internal Consistency of Multi-Item Measures Across Samples 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.88 
Internal Efficacy 0.84 0.88 0.81 0.37 -- 
External Efficacy 0.80 0.81 0.84 0.66 -- 
Generalized Trust 0.58 0.50 0.62 0.70 0.61 
Political Interest -- -- -- -- -- 
Note: Missing values reflect single-item measures for political interest across the 
samples, and a single-item measure of internal efficacy and no measure of external 
efficacy in Sample 5.  
 
Table 2.4 Disaffection Correlates with Learned Helplessness Scale 
Correlation of LHS with: Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
Internal Efficacy -0.19 -0.30 -0.18 -0.33 -0.13 
External Efficacy -0.18 -0.16 -0.26 -0.03 -- 
Generalized Trust -0.12 -0.20 -0.23 0.01 0.04 
Political Interest -0.13 -0.14 -0.18 -0.24 -0.23 
N 718 201 726 3515 972 
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Table 2.5 Common Predictors of Learned Helplessness Across Samples 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
Income 0.08** 0.08* 0.10** 0.06** 0.12** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
            
Education -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03** 0.06+ 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
            
Female -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01+ -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
            
Age 0.05+ 0.11** 0.02 0.09** 0.15** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
            
Latino 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
            
White -0.00 0.03 0.02* -0.00 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
            
Constant 0.59** 0.51** 0.55** 0.54** 0.48** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
N 705 189 708 3422 913 
R2 0.035 0.096 0.073 0.062 0.082 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.6 Common Predictors of Internal Efficacy Across Samples 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
Income 0.05+ 0.08 0.00 0.04* 0.04 
  (0.03) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
            
Education 0.13** 0.30+ 0.07** 0.06** 0.26** 
  (0.03) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
            
Female -0.10** -0.26** -0.05** -0.05** -0.15** 
  (0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
            
Age 0.20** 1.01** 0.03 0.10** 0.14** 
  (0.05) (0.20) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
            
Latino 0.03 0.06 -0.04+ -0.01 -0.13* 
  (0.03) (0.15) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) 
            
White 0.03+ 0.13 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
            
Constant 0.49** 2.41** 0.58** 0.52** 0.52** 
  (0.03) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
N 705 189 708 3428 912 
R2 0.116 0.179 0.064 0.054 0.192 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.7 Common Predictors of External Efficacy Across Samples 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
Income 0.03 0.11 0.06* 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.03) 
          
Education 0.08* 0.14 0.07* 0.09** 
  (0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.02) 
          
Female -0.01 0.25* -0.01 -0.05** 
  (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) 
          
Age 0.01 0.21 0.03 -0.21** 
  (0.05) (0.22) (0.05) (0.03) 
          
Latino 0.05+ 0.04 -0.05 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.16) (0.03) (0.02) 
          
White -0.08** -0.22+ -0.02 -0.03 
  (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) 
          
Constant 0.46** 2.15** 0.38** 0.46** 
  (0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.03) 
N 705 189 708 3429 
R2 0.044 0.060 0.026 0.068 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.8 Common Predictors of Generalized Trust Across Samples 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
Income 0.03 0.05 0.06** 0.06** -0.00 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
            
Education 0.07** 0.02 0.06** 0.04** 0.04+ 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
            
Female 0.00 0.05* 0.02+ -0.04** -0.03 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
            
Age 0.08* 0.05 0.13** -0.04 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
            
Latino 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
            
White 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04** 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
            
Constant 0.32** 0.34** 0.28** 0.40** 0.42** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
N 705 189 708 3422 913 
R2 0.034 0.051 0.066 0.047 0.019 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.9 Common Predictors of Political Interest Across Samples 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
Income 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.08** 0.06 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
            
Education 0.09** 0.05 0.08* 0.11** 0.17** 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
            
Female -0.02 -0.03 -0.06** -0.08** -0.09** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
            
Age 0.15** 0.28** 0.24** 0.10** 0.51** 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
            
Latino 0.04 0.10+ -0.04 0.02 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) 
            
White 0.01 -0.03 0.06* 0.02 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
            
Constant 0.49** 0.55** 0.53** 0.55** 0.49** 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
N 705 189 708 3420 889 
R2 0.037 0.099 0.062 0.076 0.238 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.10 Summary of Common Predictors of Disaffection  
  
Learned 
Helplessness 
Internal 
Efficacy 
External 
Efficacy Trust Interest 
Income + +   +   
Education + + + + + 
Female -     - 
Age + +   + + 
Latino   -       
White   -     
Note: The summary reflects where the predictor presented a positive (+) or negative (-)  
relationship predicting the measure of disaffection across two or more samples. 
 
 
Table 2.11 Cynicism Sample Means 
  
Sample 
1 
Sample 
2  
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
Politicians lie  0.67 0.57 0.66 -- 
Politicians are crooked 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.77 
Elections make government pay attention 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 
N 714 201 725 3,528 
Note: Means included above reflect unweighted means from control conditions for 
Samples 1-3 and Wave 1, pre-election weighted means for Sample 4. Ns reflect the 
smallest sample size for the measures from each sample. 
 
 
Table 2.12 Democratic Satisfaction Sample Means 
  Sample 1 Sample 2  Sample 3 Sample 4 
Democratic Satisfaction 0.45 0.44 0.47 -- 
N 714 201 725 -- 
Note: Means included above reflect unweighted means from control conditions for 
Samples 1-3. Ns reflect the smallest sample size for the measures from each sample. 
 
 
Table 2.13 Federal Government Feeling Thermometer Sample Means 
  Sample 1 Sample 2  Sample 3 Sample 4 
Federal Government Attitudes 38.28 37.23 39.83 -- 
N 684 199 698 -- 
Note: Means included above reflect unweighted means from control conditions for 
Samples 1-3. Ns reflect the smallest sample size for the measures from each sample. 
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Table 2.14 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of How Often Politicians Lie 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Learned 
Helplessness 0.06 0.11 0.17** 
  (0.05) (0.14) (0.06) 
        
Income -0.03 0.03 -0.05* 
  (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
        
Education -0.07* -0.16** -0.07** 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) 
        
Female -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
        
Age -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
  (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
        
Latino 0.05* -0.04 0.03 
  (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
        
White -0.00 -0.03 -0.05** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
        
Constant 0.71** 0.65** 0.71** 
  (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) 
N 705 189 708 
R2 0.033 0.056 0.073 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.15 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of How Crooked Are Politicians  
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
Learned 
Helplessness 0.14+ 0.11 0.21* -0.07 
  (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) (0.06) 
          
Income -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) 
          
Education -0.15** -0.03 -0.15** -0.06* 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) 
          
Female 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.04** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
          
Age 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.02 
  (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) 
          
Latino -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04* 
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) 
          
White 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
          
Constant 0.73** 0.67** 0.69** 0.81** 
  (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) 
N 705 189 708 3414 
R2 0.033 0.009 0.039 0.015 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.16 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of Whether Elections Make Politicians 
Pay Attention to the People 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
Learned 
Helplessness -0.18** -0.18 -0.22** -0.12* 
  (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) 
          
Income -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) 
          
Education 0.09* 0.05 0.02 0.05* 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) 
          
Female -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
          
Age -0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.06 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) 
          
Latino 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.00 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) 
          
White -0.08** -0.08+ -0.05* -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
          
Constant 0.67** 0.61** 0.65** 0.63** 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) 
N 703 189 708 3414 
R2 0.042 0.045 0.033 0.015 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.17 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of Democratic Satisfaction 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Learned 
Helplessness -0.06 -0.31* -0.23** 
  (0.07) (0.16) (0.08) 
        
Income 0.06+ 0.14+ 0.10** 
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) 
        
Education 0.05 0.02 0.03 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) 
        
Female -0.00 0.06 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
        
Age 0.09+ -0.11 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) 
        
Latino 0.01 0.01 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) 
        
White -0.06* -0.05 -0.00 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
        
Constant 0.44** 0.51** 0.47** 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) 
N 704 189 708 
R2 0.025 0.068 0.033 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.18 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of Feelings Toward the Federal 
Government   
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Learned 
Helplessness -4.44 -5.33 -17.73* 
  (6.81) (14.67) (7.98) 
        
Income -0.02 1.02 -1.77 
  (3.20) (6.90) (3.58) 
        
Education 8.48* -1.69 10.08** 
  (3.53) (6.69) (3.36) 
        
Female 0.76 8.13* 7.79** 
  (1.85) (3.72) (1.94) 
        
Age -10.70* -8.81 1.46 
  (5.23) (8.52) (5.32) 
        
Latino -1.09 -0.55 0.47 
  (2.99) (6.20) (3.85) 
        
White -6.21** -2.19 -0.71 
  (2.31) (4.38) (2.44) 
        
Constant 42.85** 40.34** 37.52** 
  (4.28) (9.87) (4.96) 
N 663 187 686 
R2 0.028 0.033 0.043 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.19 Common Predictors of Learned Helplessness Across Samples 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  
Sample 
1 
Sample 
2 
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
Sample 
5 
Sample 
1 
Sample 
2 
Sample 
3 
Sample 
4 
Sample 
5 
Income -0.07** -0.08* -0.10** -0.06** -0.11** -0.06** -0.06+ -0.09** -0.05** -0.12** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
                      
Education 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03* -0.04 0.03+ 0.02 0.01 -0.02+ -0.03 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
                      
Age -0.07* -0.12** -0.02 -0.10** -0.15** -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.07** -0.09+ 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
                      
White 0.00 -0.05* -0.03* 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04+ -0.03* 0.00 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
                      
Latino -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
                      
Female 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.02* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02** -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
                      
Authoritarianism -0.01 0.02 0.02+ 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
                      
Republican -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
                      
Democrat -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
                      
Ideology -0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.10* -0.04 -0.01 0.06 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
                      
Religiosity 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03* -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
                      
Loser  0.00 0.01 0.03** 0.02* 0.04+ -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02** 0.05* 
Perception (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
           
Internal      -0.06** -0.08** -0.08+ -0.19** -0.00 
Efficacy      (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
           
External      -0.02* -0.01 -0.08** 0.02 -- 
Efficacy      (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) -- 
                      
Trust           -0.05 -0.12+ -0.08** 0.06** 0.11 
            (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) 
                      
Interest           0.03 0.09 -0.04+ -0.03* -0.13** 
            (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) 
                      
Constant 0.42** 0.50** 0.44** 0.45** 0.41** 0.62** 0.70** 0.56** 0.53** 0.44** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) 
N 681 177 678 3337 837 681 177 678 3329 825 
R2 0.043 0.155 0.092 0.064 0.082 0.116 0.258 0.162 0.172 0.109 
Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 are weighted to approximate national representativeness. + 
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 2.4 The Effect of Income Across Values of Learned Helplessness Income 
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Figure 2.5 The Effect of Age Across Values of Learned Helplessness 
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Figure 2.6 The Effect of Identifying as White vs. Non-White Across Values of Learned 
Helplessness 
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Figure 2.7 The Effect of Identifying as Being on the Losing Side of Politics vs. the 
Winning Side of Politics Across Values of Learned Helplessness  
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Table 2.20 Negative Experiences Being Pulled Over Predicting Learned Helplessness  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Negativity 0.06** 0.05** 0.04** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Education   -0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Income   -0.10** -0.09** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Female   0.00 -0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Age   -0.06** -0.04** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Latino   0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
White   -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Republican   -0.00 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Democrat   -0.00 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Ideology   -0.03* -0.04** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Loser Perception 0.02** 0.01* 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Internal Efficacy   -0.16** 
      (0.02) 
        
External Efficacy   -0.07** 
      (0.01) 
        
Trust     -0.01 
      (0.01) 
        
Interest     -0.01 
      (0.01) 
        
Constant 0.34** 0.43** 0.57** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
N 3356 3116 3115 
R2 0.012 0.087 0.150 
Standard errors in parentheses [Sample 3] + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01   
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Table 2.21 Consideration from Government Officials Predicting Learned Helplessness  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Consideration -0.12** -0.10** -0.07** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Education   -0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Income   -0.09** -0.09** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Female   0.00 -0.01 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Age   -0.06** -0.04** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Latino   0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
White   -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Republican   -0.00 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Democrat   0.00 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Ideology   -0.03** -0.03** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Loser Perception 0.02** 0.01* 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Internal Efficacy   -0.15** 
      (0.02) 
        
External Efficacy   -0.07** 
      (0.01) 
        
Trust     -0.01 
      (0.01) 
        
Interest     -0.01 
      (0.01) 
        
Constant 0.45** 0.51** 0.61** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 3626 3365 3364 
R2 0.045 0.106 0.155 
Standard errors in parentheses [Sample 3] + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01   
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Table 2.22 Experience with Welfare Predicting Learned Helplessness  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Welfare 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Education   -0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Income   -0.09** -0.09** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Female   -0.00 -0.01+ 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Age   -0.06** -0.04** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Latino   0.01 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
White   -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Republican   -0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Democrat   -0.00 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Ideology   -0.03** -0.04** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Loser Perception 0.02** 0.01* 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Internal Efficacy   -0.16** 
      (0.02) 
        
External Efficacy   -0.08** 
      (0.01) 
        
Trust     -0.02 
      (0.01) 
        
Interest     -0.01 
      (0.01) 
        
Constant 0.37** 0.46** 0.59** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 3615 3355 3354 
R2 0.004 0.081 0.147 
Standard errors in parentheses [Sample 3] + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01   
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Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Effect of Disaffection Measures on Vote Likelihood or Vote Intent 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness -1.46* -3.48* -2.86** -7.18** 0.15 
  (0.71) (1.73) (0.89) (2.66) (0.85) 
            
Internal Efficacy 0.41* 0.09 2.17* -1.55 2.15** 
  (0.19) (0.49) (0.93) (1.89) (0.63) 
            
External Efficacy 0.22 0.13 -0.28 0.25 -- 
  (0.16) (0.39) (0.52) (1.41) -- 
            
Trust -0.06 -1.59 0.42 1.13 0.14 
  (0.65) (1.44) (0.69) (1.74) (0.94) 
            
Interest 3.28** 4.98** 2.67** 6.09** 1.34* 
  (0.53) (1.52) (0.48) (1.42) (0.57) 
            
Education 0.58+ 1.43+ 0.94* 1.56 0.97 
  (0.32) (0.79) (0.37) (1.00) (0.63) 
            
Income 0.76* 0.79 0.75* 1.00 0.74 
  (0.36) (0.74) (0.37) (1.57) (0.61) 
            
Female 0.43 0.26 1.23* 2.92+ 2.50** 
  (0.55) (0.94) (0.60) (1.75) (0.69) 
            
Age 0.20 0.96+ 0.60* -1.26 -0.18 
  (0.23) (0.50) (0.25) (0.83) (0.44) 
            
Latino 0.23 -0.52 0.37 -0.29 -0.93+ 
  (0.29) (0.69) (0.40) (0.85) (0.49) 
            
White 0.64** 0.70 0.09 0.61 -0.31 
  (0.19) (0.44) (0.21) (0.59) (0.36) 
            
Republican 1.42** 3.36** 0.69* 1.97 0.55 
  (0.36) (0.88) (0.34) (1.43) (0.53) 
            
Democrat 0.95** 2.92** 0.53 1.84 1.06* 
  (0.34) (0.82) (0.34) (1.34) (0.54) 
            
Ideology -0.73 -1.65 -0.33 -0.32 -0.06 
  (0.50) (1.06) (0.54) (1.08) (0.67) 
            
Loser Perception -0.12 0.27 -0.13 0.68 0.24 
  (0.19) (0.42) (0.21) (0.78) (0.34) 
            
Constant -4.90** -5.92** -3.06** -3.58 -2.98** 
  (0.87) (2.08) (0.85) (2.64) (1.14) 
N 681 177 677 171 826 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 3.1 Impact of Learned Helplessness on Predicted Probability of Vote Likelihood  
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Table 3.2 Effect of Disaffection Measures on Vote Confidence 
  Sample 3 Sample 4 Wave 1 Sample 4 Wave 4 
Learned Helplessness -1.26+ -1.95** -1.70** 
  (0.75) (0.44) (0.62) 
        
Internal Efficacy 2.03* 0.81* 0.95* 
  (0.82) (0.34) (0.44) 
        
External Efficacy -0.60 0.41 0.61 
  (0.44) (0.27) (0.39) 
        
Trust 0.32 -0.09 -0.28 
  (0.61) (0.37) (0.50) 
        
Interest 1.41** 1.28** 0.29 
  (0.43) (0.27) (0.33) 
        
Education 0.36 -0.43* -0.18 
  (0.31) (0.18) (0.24) 
        
Income 0.36 0.06 0.38 
  (0.33) (0.26) (0.36) 
        
Female -0.00 -0.02 0.03 
  (0.18) (0.11) (0.15) 
        
Age 0.32 1.34** 0.86* 
  (0.50) (0.26) (0.39) 
        
Latino -0.04 -0.07 -0.56* 
  (0.36) (0.16) (0.25) 
        
White 0.09 -0.26+ 0.22 
  (0.23) (0.14) (0.21) 
        
Republican -0.09 0.68** 0.21 
  (0.32) (0.20) (0.25) 
        
Democrat 0.09 0.97** 0.49* 
  (0.32) (0.20) (0.25) 
        
Ideology 0.12 -0.17 -0.11 
  (0.47) (0.24) (0.34) 
        
Loser Perception -0.19 -0.45** -0.37* 
  (0.18) (0.12) (0.17) 
        
Constant -2.45** -1.57** -0.32 
  (0.76) (0.47) (0.61) 
N 655 3281 1602 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 3.2 Impact of Learned Helplessness on Predicted Probability of Vote Confidence 
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Table 3.3 Effect of Disaffection Measures on Reported Turnout 
  Sample 4 Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness -7.70* -2.60* 
  (3.50) (1.10) 
      
Internal Efficacy -1.77 0.99 
  (1.57) (1.00) 
      
External Efficacy 0.73 -- 
  (1.28) -- 
      
Trust -5.10** -0.86 
  (1.89) (1.29) 
      
Interest 3.09* 1.76* 
  (1.39) (0.79) 
      
Education 0.31 -0.68 
  (1.15) (0.61) 
      
Income 0.91 1.57+ 
  (1.04) (0.90) 
      
Female -0.94 -0.43 
  (0.58) (0.54) 
      
Age 1.31 0.33 
  (1.63) (1.21) 
      
Latino 0.23 1.01 
  (0.76) (0.76) 
      
White 0.19 0.61 
  (0.67) (0.52) 
      
Republican 1.23 -0.18 
  (1.01) (0.78) 
      
Democrat 0.50 -0.58 
  (0.90) (0.68) 
      
Ideology -4.00** -1.38 
  (1.37) (0.89) 
      
Loser Perception 0.36 0.35 
  (0.63) (0.56) 
      
Constant 7.55** 2.63* 
  (2.89) (1.15) 
N 310 662 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
   257 
 
Figure 3.3 Impact of Learned Helplessness on Predicted Probability of Reported Turnout 
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Table 3.4 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Loser Perception on Vote Likelihood 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness -2.72* -1.42 -3.38* -16.67** -0.18 
  (1.34) (2.18) (1.37) (5.28) (1.06) 
            
Loser Perception -0.85 2.22 -0.47 -4.50+ 0.02 
  (0.67) (1.36) (0.71) (2.38) (0.62) 
            
Learned Helplessness  1.77 -5.23 0.88 13.72* 0.57 
X Loser Perception (1.73) (3.44) (1.75) (6.14) (1.58) 
            
Internal Efficacy 1.77** -0.19 2.17* -2.57 2.13** 
  (0.61) (1.52) (0.93) (2.03) (0.63) 
            
External Efficacy 0.61 0.55 -0.29 0.82 -- 
  (0.56) (1.20) (0.52) (1.54) -- 
            
Trust -0.14 -1.53 0.41 1.46 0.16 
  (0.72) (1.44) (0.69) (1.82) (0.96) 
            
Interest 2.77** 4.98** 2.67** 7.06** 1.34* 
  (0.58) (1.54) (0.48) (1.64) (0.58) 
            
Education 0.70+ 0.71 0.76* 2.13* 0.75 
  (0.41) (0.74) (0.37) (1.01) (0.61) 
            
Income 0.77* 1.39+ 0.94* 0.30 0.97 
  (0.36) (0.79) (0.37) (1.16) (0.63) 
            
Female 0.74** 0.69 0.09 0.51 -0.33 
  (0.21) (0.44) (0.21) (0.60) (0.36) 
            
Age 0.03 0.40 1.24* 2.98+ 2.49** 
  (0.61) (0.96) (0.60) (1.68) (0.70) 
            
Latino 0.33 -0.50 0.36 -0.29 -0.95* 
  (0.32) (0.68) (0.40) (0.95) (0.48) 
            
White 0.22 1.05* 0.60* -1.59+ -0.18 
  (0.26) (0.51) (0.25) (0.85) (0.44) 
            
Republican 1.26** 3.54** 0.69* 2.03 0.56 
  (0.40) (0.93) (0.34) (1.30) (0.53) 
            
Democrat 1.17** 3.00** 0.54 1.75 1.04+ 
  (0.38) (0.86) (0.34) (1.22) (0.54) 
            
Ideology -0.25 -1.97+ -0.32 0.10 -0.08 
  (0.56) (1.10) (0.54) (1.11) (0.68) 
            
Constant -4.03** -6.29** -2.87** -0.19 -2.85* 
  (0.93) (1.96) (0.93) (3.15) (1.12) 
N 551 177 677 171 826 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.5 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Race on Vote Likelihood 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 0.66 -4.24 -4.50* -2.27 0.94 
  (1.72) (3.59) (2.00) (7.30) (1.29) 
            
White 1.36+ 0.58 -0.21 1.42 0.28 
  (0.77) (1.65) (0.91) (3.32) (0.73) 
            
Learned Helplessness  -3.12 0.95 2.04 -6.38 -1.14 
X White (1.98) (3.91) (2.21) (7.63) (1.64) 
            
Internal Efficacy 1.79** 0.26 2.22* -1.55 2.10** 
  (0.61) (1.47) (0.93) (1.92) (0.63) 
            
External Efficacy 0.65 0.32 -0.30 0.60 -- 
  (0.56) (1.22) (0.52) (1.48) -- 
            
Trust -0.24 -1.57 0.48 0.95 0.11 
  (0.72) (1.45) (0.70) (1.79) (0.95) 
            
Interest 2.83** 5.02** 2.66** 5.97** 1.39* 
  (0.58) (1.53) (0.48) (1.44) (0.59) 
            
Education 0.68+ 0.83 0.76* 1.68+ 0.72 
  (0.41) (0.76) (0.37) (1.00) (0.62) 
            
Income 0.75* 1.43+ 0.92* 0.53 0.99 
  (0.36) (0.79) (0.37) (1.14) (0.63) 
            
Female 0.76** 0.71 0.08 0.61 -0.32 
  (0.22) (0.44) (0.21) (0.58) (0.37) 
            
Age 0.09 0.25 1.21* 3.04+ 2.48** 
  (0.62) (0.94) (0.60) (1.78) (0.69) 
            
Latino 0.37 -0.51 0.38 -0.26 -0.93+ 
  (0.32) (0.69) (0.41) (0.93) (0.48) 
            
Republican 1.23** 3.37** 0.68* 1.66 0.54 
  (0.40) (0.88) (0.34) (1.51) (0.54) 
            
Democrat 1.20** 2.92** 0.53 1.57 1.05+ 
  (0.38) (0.82) (0.34) (1.35) (0.54) 
            
Ideology -0.19 -1.67 -0.28 -0.08 -0.05 
  (0.56) (1.06) (0.54) (1.11) (0.67) 
            
Loser Perception -0.22 0.25 -0.13 0.70 0.20 
  (0.21) (0.43) (0.21) (0.79) (0.34) 
            
Constant -5.32** -5.39* -2.44* -5.44 -3.29** 
  (1.03) (2.28) (1.09) (3.79) (1.17) 
N 551 177 677 171 826 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.6 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Ethnicity on Vote Likelihood 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness -1.79+ -3.17+ -2.55** -6.05* -0.29 
  (0.94) (1.73) (0.91) (2.69) (0.98) 
            
Latino 0.11 11.84+ 2.86 8.88 -1.95* 
  (0.92) (7.18) (1.87) (6.74) (0.80) 
            
Learned Helplessness  0.59 -29.75+ -6.00 -22.80 2.57 
X Latino (2.42) (16.87) (4.31) (15.40) (1.68) 
            
Internal Efficacy 1.79** -0.03 2.19* -1.68 2.15** 
  (0.61) (1.50) (0.93) (1.85) (0.63) 
            
External Efficacy 0.62 0.69 -0.23 0.85 -- 
  (0.56) (1.22) (0.52) (1.45) -- 
            
Trust -0.17 -1.48 0.36 0.74 0.22 
  (0.72) (1.47) (0.70) (1.88) (0.96) 
            
Interest 2.80** 5.29** 2.74** 6.20** 1.41* 
  (0.58) (1.57) (0.49) (1.45) (0.57) 
            
Education 0.70+ 1.02 0.73* 1.85* 0.71 
  (0.41) (0.77) (0.37) (0.91) (0.62) 
            
Income 0.79* 1.16 0.97** 0.19 1.00 
  (0.36) (0.81) (0.37) (1.07) (0.63) 
            
Female 0.75** 0.56 0.09 0.58 -0.28 
  (0.21) (0.45) (0.21) (0.59) (0.36) 
            
Age 0.03 -0.01 1.20* 3.19+ 2.47** 
  (0.61) (0.97) (0.60) (1.79) (0.69) 
            
White 0.21 0.94+ 0.59* -1.23 -0.20 
  (0.26) (0.51) (0.25) (0.82) (0.44) 
            
Republican 1.22** 3.41** 0.69* 1.83 0.51 
  (0.40) (0.89) (0.34) (1.30) (0.54) 
            
Democrat 1.15** 2.82** 0.51 1.87 1.05+ 
  (0.38) (0.82) (0.34) (1.24) (0.54) 
            
Ideology -0.25 -2.01+ -0.38 -0.43 -0.01 
  (0.56) (1.14) (0.54) (1.14) (0.67) 
            
Loser Perception -0.20 0.34 -0.12 0.88 0.19 
  (0.21) (0.44) (0.21) (0.83) (0.33) 
            
Constant -4.38** -5.63** -3.18** -3.93 -2.89* 
  (0.87) (1.92) (0.86) (2.58) (1.14) 
N 551 177 677 171 826 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.7 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Gender on Vote Likelihood 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 0.34 -5.53* -5.77** -9.01+ -0.08 
  (1.30) (2.66) (1.70) (4.56) (1.09) 
            
Female 2.05** -0.61 -1.51+ -0.96 -0.46 
  (0.67) (1.28) (0.80) (2.16) (0.64) 
            
Learned Helplessness  -3.56* 3.63 4.09* 3.73 0.46 
X Female (1.72) (3.36) (1.97) (5.38) (1.57) 
            
Internal Efficacy 1.84** 0.32 2.35* -1.68 2.14** 
  (0.61) (1.48) (0.94) (1.98) (0.63) 
            
External Efficacy 0.57 0.35 -0.22 0.28 -- 
  (0.56) (1.19) (0.52) (1.40) -- 
            
Trust -0.14 -1.37 0.38 0.89 0.17 
  (0.72) (1.46) (0.69) (1.75) (0.95) 
            
Interest 2.83** 5.12** 2.67** 6.04** 1.36* 
  (0.58) (1.53) (0.49) (1.40) (0.56) 
            
Education 0.68+ 0.77 0.72+ 1.51 0.74 
  (0.41) (0.74) (0.37) (1.02) (0.62) 
            
Income 0.80* 1.36+ 0.94* 0.65 0.96 
  (0.36) (0.80) (0.37) (1.14) (0.63) 
            
Age 0.10 0.18 1.18+ 2.78 2.50** 
  (0.62) (0.95) (0.61) (1.71) (0.69) 
            
Latino 0.31 -0.38 0.38 -0.30 -0.92+ 
  (0.32) (0.70) (0.40) (0.84) (0.49) 
            
White 0.22 0.92+ 0.59* -1.27 -0.16 
  (0.26) (0.51) (0.25) (0.85) (0.46) 
            
Republican 1.22** 3.38** 0.70* 1.98 0.54 
  (0.40) (0.90) (0.34) (1.42) (0.53) 
            
Democrat 1.14** 2.93** 0.51 1.87 1.07* 
  (0.38) (0.85) (0.34) (1.31) (0.53) 
            
Ideology -0.26 -1.57 -0.37 -0.24 -0.04 
  (0.56) (1.06) (0.55) (1.06) (0.68) 
            
Loser Perception -0.19 0.23 -0.11 0.62 0.23 
  (0.21) (0.43) (0.21) (0.78) (0.34) 
            
Constant -5.19** -5.11* -1.97+ -2.45 -2.94* 
  (0.93) (2.00) (1.01) (3.25) (1.16) 
N 551 177 677 171 826 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
   262 
 
Table 3.8 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Income on Vote Likelihood 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness -1.15 -4.07 -2.83 1.47 0.79 
  (1.72) (3.18) (1.94) (5.73) (1.24) 
            
Income 1.15 0.94 0.96 6.41 1.46 
  (1.05) (2.34) (1.30) (3.88) (1.01) 
            
Learned Helplessness  -0.99 1.27 -0.06 -14.91 -1.28 
X Income (2.65) (5.72) (3.11) (9.76) (2.10) 
            
Internal Efficacy 1.80** 0.32 2.17* -2.24 2.13** 
  (0.61) (1.49) (0.93) (2.06) (0.62) 
            
External Efficacy 0.61 0.39 -0.28 0.61 -- 
  (0.56) (1.18) (0.52) (1.36) -- 
            
Trust -0.14 -1.58 0.42 0.58 0.14 
  (0.72) (1.44) (0.70) (1.85) (0.93) 
            
Interest 2.80** 5.00** 2.67** 6.05** 1.35* 
  (0.58) (1.52) (0.48) (1.44) (0.57) 
            
Education 0.70+ 0.81 0.75* 1.68+ 0.76 
  (0.41) (0.75) (0.37) (1.01) (0.62) 
            
Female 0.75** 0.70 0.09 0.48 -0.31 
  (0.21) (0.44) (0.21) (0.61) (0.37) 
            
Age 0.04 0.24 1.23* 3.04+ 2.49** 
  (0.61) (0.94) (0.60) (1.77) (0.69) 
            
Latino 0.31 -0.51 0.37 -0.37 -0.93+ 
  (0.32) (0.69) (0.40) (0.85) (0.48) 
            
White 0.20 0.96+ 0.60* -1.22 -0.17 
  (0.26) (0.50) (0.25) (0.87) (0.44) 
            
Republican 1.22** 3.37** 0.69* 2.20 0.54 
  (0.40) (0.88) (0.34) (1.46) (0.53) 
            
Democrat 1.16** 2.92** 0.53 2.15 1.04+ 
  (0.38) (0.82) (0.34) (1.37) (0.54) 
            
Ideology -0.24 -1.63 -0.33 -0.18 -0.07 
  (0.56) (1.06) (0.54) (1.08) (0.67) 
            
Loser Perception -0.20 0.27 -0.13 0.70 0.22 
  (0.21) (0.42) (0.21) (0.77) (0.34) 
            
Constant -4.64** -5.53** -3.07** -6.74* -3.23* 
  (1.04) (2.05) (1.09) (3.19) (1.33) 
N 551 177 677 171 826 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.9 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness on Reported Turnout 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 4 Sample 5 
LH X 22.76** 3.08                 
Loser Percept. (8.57) (1.99)                 
                      
LH     0.20 6.76*             
X White     (4.83) (3.01)             
                      
LH         9.35 -9.38         
X Latino         (5.95) (7.13)         
                      
LH             -5.77 -1.82     
X Female             (5.96) (1.79)     
                      
LH                 -24.34+ -5.27* 
X Income                 (12.57) (2.67) 
                      
LH -25.01** -4.32** -7.85+ -8.05** -9.12* -2.29* -4.98 -1.41 6.48 -0.41 
  (7.50) (1.61) (4.23) (2.86) (3.96) (1.11) (5.16) (1.19) (8.62) (1.18) 
                      
Internal  -2.43 0.82 -1.78 1.40 -1.60 1.08 -1.90 1.03 -1.68 1.05 
Efficacy (1.71) (0.97) (1.56) (1.05) (1.55) (1.02) (1.61) (1.00) (1.55) (0.99) 
                      
External 0.38 -- 0.73 -- 0.60 -- 0.84 -- 1.19 -- 
Efficacy (1.30) -- (1.29) -- (1.24) -- (1.25) -- (1.25) -- 
                      
Trust -6.18** -0.86 -5.10** -0.12 -5.16** -0.71 -5.11** -0.99 -4.82* -0.72 
  (1.97) (1.24) (1.91) (1.33) (1.87) (1.29) (1.88) (1.31) (1.87) (1.29) 
                      
Interest 4.05** 1.83* 3.09* 1.74* 2.92* 1.75* 3.22* 1.79* 2.82* 1.66* 
  (1.41) (0.79) (1.39) (0.81) (1.38) (0.78) (1.40) (0.80) (1.41) (0.83) 
                      
Education 0.61 -0.60 0.30 -0.56 0.34 -0.63 0.30 -0.70 0.13 -0.63 
  (1.27) (0.64) (1.14) (0.64) (1.14) (0.62) (1.16) (0.61) (1.11) (0.62) 
                      
Income 0.60 1.58+ 0.91 1.76* 0.98 1.61+ 0.86 1.65+ 11.81* 4.02* 
  (1.17) (0.91) (1.04) (0.90) (1.05) (0.91) (1.04) (0.92) (5.66) (1.60) 
                      
Female -0.50 -0.52 -0.94+ -0.36 -0.91 -0.43 1.61 0.43 -1.02+ -0.36 
  (0.61) (0.54) (0.56) (0.53) (0.57) (0.55) (2.77) (0.98) (0.57) (0.54) 
                      
Age 0.54 0.19 1.31 0.33 1.40 0.45 0.98 0.36 1.22 0.18 
  (1.58) (1.30) (1.63) (1.16) (1.63) (1.21) (1.59) (1.20) (1.66) (1.18) 
                      
Latino 0.18 0.97 0.23 1.52+ -3.95 6.95 0.11 0.96 0.16 1.01 
  (0.84) (0.75) (0.76) (0.85) (2.63) (5.02) (0.76) (0.72) (0.76) (0.79) 
                      
White 0.11 0.67 0.10 -2.71+ 0.22 0.59 0.34 0.59 0.22 0.54 
  (0.65) (0.54) (2.24) (1.53) (0.67) (0.50) (0.67) (0.53) (0.68) (0.51) 
                      
Republican 1.61 -0.03 1.24 0.00 1.21 -0.18 1.27 -0.18 1.69+ -0.44 
  (1.12) (0.71) (1.01) (0.72) (1.00) (0.78) (0.97) (0.78) (0.98) (0.81) 
                      
Democrat 0.57 -0.55 0.51 -0.37 0.50 -0.69 0.54 -0.61 0.87 -0.87 
  (0.98) (0.65) (0.90) (0.63) (0.91) (0.70) (0.89) (0.71) (0.90) (0.70) 
                      
Ideology -3.91** -1.42 -4.00** -1.66+ -3.98** -1.51+ -3.97** -1.44 -4.19** -1.16 
  (1.34) (0.88) (1.36) (0.87) (1.33) (0.86) (1.36) (0.90) (1.40) (0.89) 
                      
Loser  -9.74* -1.12 0.36 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.47 0.30 
Perception (3.86) (1.01) (0.63) (0.58) (0.62) (0.58) (0.66) (0.55) (0.63) (0.55) 
                      
Constant 15.72** 3.50** 7.63** 4.49** 8.13** 2.47* 6.36+ 2.10+ 0.87 1.77 
  (4.33) (1.29) (2.79) (1.64) (3.06) (1.17) (3.41) (1.18) (4.89) (1.12) 
N 310 662 310 662 310 662 310 662 310 662 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients for logistic regression models, not odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Samples 4 and 5 are weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.10 Effect of Disaffection Measures on Protesting and Rallying 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 2.28* 5.81+ 0.45 2.26+ 0.92 
  (1.15) (3.59) (1.27) (1.22) (0.87) 
            
Internal Efficacy 2.08* 8.65* 4.10** -0.58 4.28** 
  (0.82) (3.77) (1.45) (0.87) (0.91) 
            
External Efficacy 1.86* -2.63 1.86* 0.61 -- 
  (0.75) (2.37) (0.76) (0.75) -- 
            
Trust -2.05* -3.42 -0.19 0.06 2.44* 
  (0.98) (3.21) (0.97) (0.90) (1.24) 
            
Interest 2.43** -3.46 0.81 2.44** 3.49** 
  (0.76) (3.07) (0.73) (0.80) (1.13) 
            
Education 0.49 0.58 0.49 -0.34 0.84 
  (0.52) (1.51) (0.54) (0.43) (0.54) 
            
Income -0.34 0.94 -0.51 0.59 0.83 
  (0.45) (1.65) (0.57) (0.54) (0.73) 
            
Female 0.07 1.56 -0.50+ -0.05 0.23 
  (0.27) (0.97) (0.29) (0.26) (0.36) 
            
Age -2.02* -4.79+ -2.32* -1.65+ -0.02 
  (0.84) (2.89) (0.94) (0.85) (0.75) 
            
Latino -0.05 0.00 0.75 0.14 0.70 
  (0.41) (0.00) (0.51) (0.57) (0.66) 
            
White -1.07** 0.97 -0.29 -0.25 0.17 
  (0.31) (1.53) (0.36) (0.37) (0.55) 
            
Republican 1.73* 15.10 0.08 -0.40 0.05 
  (0.67) (3564.65) (0.59) (0.47) (0.66) 
            
Democrat 0.65 16.38 0.33 -0.08 1.07+ 
  (0.62) (3564.65) (0.57) (0.51) (0.63) 
            
Ideology -1.81* -0.72 0.55 0.29 0.91 
  (0.74) (2.61) (0.75) (0.59) (0.76) 
            
Loser Perception -0.13 -0.16 0.26 0.48 0.72+ 
  (0.27) (0.97) (0.31) (0.32) (0.43) 
            
Constant -4.56** -23.08 -5.98** -4.21** -13.23** 
  (1.18) (3564.65) (1.35) (1.17) (1.68) 
N 530 155 678 1152 698 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.11 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Loser Perception on Protesting 
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 2.83+ 5.35 1.46 1.22 -0.27 
  (1.51) (4.32) (1.77) (5.99) (1.35) 
            
Loser Perception 0.55 -0.45 0.95 0.96 0.18 
  (0.80) (2.98) (0.89) (2.17) (0.65) 
            
Learned Helplessness  -1.82 0.65 -1.92 3.28 1.90 
X Loser Perception (2.07) (7.19) (2.34) (6.13) (1.73) 
            
Internal Efficacy 2.26** 8.31* 4.15** 1.14 4.32** 
  (0.80) (3.62) (1.46) (2.21) (0.92) 
            
External Efficacy 1.78* -2.74 1.89* 1.16 -- 
  (0.73) (2.39) (0.77) (1.82) -- 
            
Trust -1.85* -3.45 -0.21 1.93 2.72* 
  (0.95) (3.25) (0.97) (1.54) (1.27) 
            
Interest 2.30** -3.03 0.83 3.10 3.57** 
  (0.74) (2.90) (0.73) (2.30) (1.12) 
            
Education 0.40 0.62 0.49 -1.96 0.85 
  (0.51) (1.53) (0.54) (1.30) (0.54) 
            
Income -0.39 0.93 -0.53 3.60* 0.94 
  (0.44) (1.66) (0.57) (1.58) (0.76) 
            
Female 0.15 1.52 -0.50+ -0.05 0.20 
  (0.26) (0.95) (0.29) (0.58) (0.37) 
            
Age -2.14** -4.75+ -2.31* -3.58+ 0.01 
  (0.83) (2.88) (0.94) (2.13) (0.73) 
            
Latino -0.17 0.00 0.78 0.08 0.76 
  (0.39) (0.00) (0.51) (0.95) (0.63) 
            
White -1.10** 0.95 -0.29 3.02* 0.17 
  (0.30) (1.57) (0.36) (1.50) (0.54) 
            
Republican 1.63* 14.81 0.03 0.39 0.08 
  (0.66) (3621.67) (0.59) (1.99) (0.67) 
            
Democrat 0.70 16.39 0.31 0.26 1.04+ 
  (0.61) (3621.67) (0.57) (1.78) (0.63) 
            
Ideology -1.66* -0.40 0.54 -0.18 0.96 
  (0.72) (2.73) (0.76) (6.87) (0.78) 
            
Constant -4.78** -22.94 -6.34** -10.37** -13.27** 
  (1.23) (3621.68) (1.43) (3.59) (1.72) 
N 549 160 678 149 698 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.12 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Race on Protesting  
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 3.11 0.63 3.43 -8.03 2.68 
  (1.90) (5.77) (2.83) (4.97) (1.80) 
            
White -0.44 -2.38 1.14 -1.30 1.00 
  (0.89) (3.21) (1.28) (2.37) (1.08) 
            
Learned Helplessness  -1.72 7.39 -3.65 12.64* -2.41 
X White (2.24) (7.04) (3.05) (5.25) (2.03) 
            
Internal Efficacy 2.20** 8.35* 3.92** 1.26 4.23** 
  (0.81) (3.64) (1.45) (2.12) (0.92) 
            
External Efficacy 1.82* -3.45 1.88* 0.82 -- 
  (0.73) (2.59) (0.77) (1.75) -- 
            
Trust -1.95* -3.93 -0.28 2.59 2.22+ 
  (0.95) (3.26) (0.98) (1.64) (1.23) 
            
Interest 2.30** -2.97 0.86 3.15 3.80** 
  (0.74) (2.86) (0.74) (2.30) (1.10) 
            
Education 0.39 0.93 0.49 -2.07 0.80 
  (0.51) (1.59) (0.54) (1.34) (0.54) 
            
Income -0.44 1.12 -0.48 3.97* 0.87 
  (0.44) (1.65) (0.57) (1.67) (0.75) 
            
Female 0.16 1.66+ -0.50+ -0.16 0.20 
  (0.26) (0.99) (0.29) (0.63) (0.36) 
            
Age -2.09* -4.81+ -2.27* -3.89+ 0.01 
  (0.83) (2.90) (0.95) (2.32) (0.74) 
            
Latino -0.13 0.00 0.76 0.12 0.72 
  (0.40) (0.00) (0.51) (0.96) (0.65) 
            
Republican 1.68* 14.16 0.11 0.32 0.03 
  (0.66) (2220.21) (0.59) (1.98) (0.66) 
            
Democrat 0.75 16.16 0.33 0.21 1.12+ 
  (0.61) (2220.21) (0.57) (1.82) (0.63) 
            
Ideology -1.66* 0.07 0.43 -1.88 1.04 
  (0.72) (2.44) (0.76) (1.75) (0.78) 
            
Loser Perception -0.13 -0.37 0.24 2.20** 0.69 
  (0.26) (1.02) (0.31) (0.82) (0.43) 
            
Constant -4.88** -20.38 -7.05** -7.57* -14.11** 
  (1.29) (2220.21) (1.67) (3.39) (1.84) 
N 549 160 678 149 698 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.13 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Ethnicity on Protesting  
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 1.66 5.57 0.93 3.22 0.17 
  (1.18) (3.55) (1.31) (3.63) (1.02) 
            
Latino -0.75 0.00 3.20+ -3.93 -2.41* 
  (1.06) (0.00) (1.68) (2.48) (1.22) 
            
Learned Helplessness  1.66 0.00 -6.52 11.54+ 7.62** 
X Latino (2.77) (0.00) (4.39) (6.02) (2.40) 
            
Internal Efficacy 2.24** 8.31* 4.15** 2.09 4.32** 
  (0.81) (3.63) (1.46) (2.39) (0.96) 
            
External Efficacy 1.82* -2.72 1.85* 1.23 -- 
  (0.73) (2.38) (0.77) (1.82) -- 
            
Trust -1.93* -3.51 -0.19 1.40 2.11 
  (0.95) (3.20) (0.98) (1.69) (1.35) 
            
Interest 2.26** -3.09 0.80 2.79 4.33** 
  (0.74) (2.83) (0.73) (2.36) (1.36) 
            
Education 0.38 0.64 0.37 -2.10 0.80 
  (0.51) (1.51) (0.54) (1.28) (0.55) 
            
Income -0.41 0.93 -0.50 4.28* 0.85 
  (0.44) (1.66) (0.57) (1.77) (0.74) 
            
Female 0.15 1.51 -0.50+ -0.32 0.28 
  (0.26) (0.95) (0.30) (0.63) (0.37) 
            
Age -2.16** -4.70+ -2.33* -3.25 -0.18 
  (0.83) (2.83) (0.94) (2.13) (0.79) 
            
White -1.09** 0.99 -0.28 2.94* 0.12 
  (0.30) (1.52) (0.36) (1.33) (0.60) 
            
Republican 1.68* 14.95 0.08 0.24 -0.01 
  (0.66) (4310.40) (0.59) (1.94) (0.66) 
            
Democrat 0.73 16.51 0.32 -0.16 1.21+ 
  (0.61) (4310.40) (0.57) (1.81) (0.63) 
            
Ideology -1.67* -0.50 0.48 -2.32 1.15 
  (0.72) (2.55) (0.76) (1.70) (0.78) 
            
Loser Perception -0.11 -0.20 0.28 2.38** 0.78+ 
  (0.26) (0.97) (0.31) (0.88) (0.45) 
            
Constant -4.32** -23.12 -6.10** -11.23** -13.83** 
  (1.17) (4310.41) (1.35) (3.55) (1.84) 
N 549 160 678 149 698 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.14 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Gender on Protesting  
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 0.89 1.93 0.13 7.16* 2.52* 
  (1.63) (5.43) (1.80) (3.55) (1.20) 
            
Female -0.50 -0.73 -0.70 2.58 1.34* 
  (0.79) (2.55) (0.88) (2.32) (0.67) 
            
Learned Helplessness  1.78 6.30 0.58 -7.25 -3.75* 
X Female (2.06) (6.83) (2.31) (6.64) (1.69) 
            
Internal Efficacy 2.21** 9.40* 4.10** 2.11 4.35** 
  (0.81) (4.06) (1.45) (2.56) (0.88) 
            
External Efficacy 1.74* -3.03 1.88* 1.41 -- 
  (0.72) (2.55) (0.77) (2.06) -- 
            
Trust -1.86+ -3.64 -0.21 2.15 2.45* 
  (0.95) (3.24) (0.98) (1.60) (1.19) 
            
Interest 2.27** -3.32 0.80 3.21 3.79** 
  (0.74) (2.90) (0.73) (2.50) (1.16) 
            
Education 0.41 0.58 0.47 -2.00+ 0.84 
  (0.51) (1.53) (0.54) (1.16) (0.55) 
            
Income -0.42 0.82 -0.51 4.36** 0.84 
  (0.44) (1.69) (0.57) (1.60) (0.74) 
            
Age -2.20** -4.59 -2.32* -4.82+ 0.09 
  (0.83) (2.80) (0.94) (2.84) (0.74) 
            
Latino -0.18 0.00 0.75 0.16 0.68 
  (0.40) (0.00) (0.51) (0.92) (0.61) 
            
White -1.09** 1.30 -0.29 3.36* 0.08 
  (0.30) (1.76) (0.36) (1.62) (0.54) 
            
Republican 1.67* 13.55 0.08 -0.76 0.21 
  (0.66) (1943.30) (0.59) (1.87) (0.68) 
            
Democrat 0.72 15.33 0.33 -0.85 1.26+ 
  (0.61) (1943.30) (0.57) (1.78) (0.68) 
            
Ideology -1.66* -0.24 0.54 -1.46 1.02 
  (0.72) (2.68) (0.75) (1.74) (0.80) 
            
Loser Perception -0.11 -0.16 0.26 2.34* 0.79+ 
  (0.26) (0.97) (0.31) (0.97) (0.43) 
            
Constant -4.02** -21.47 -5.85** -12.94** -14.35** 
  (1.25) (1943.30) (1.44) (3.35) (1.97) 
N 549 160 678 149 698 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3.15 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Income on Protesting  
  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4  Sample 5 
Learned Helplessness 4.15* 8.51 3.55 28.90** -3.00 
  (1.95) (6.55) (2.74) (7.47) (2.39) 
            
Income 1.09 3.32 1.54 18.68** -0.98 
  (1.20) (4.88) (1.71) (4.85) (1.40) 
            
Learned Helplessness  -4.01 -5.74 -5.36 -36.82** 5.34+ 
X Income (2.95) (10.84) (4.17) (10.87) (3.24) 
            
Internal Efficacy 2.21** 8.50* 4.13** -0.40 4.32** 
  (0.80) (3.70) (1.43) (2.13) (0.95) 
            
External Efficacy 1.76* -2.79 1.80* 0.07 -- 
  (0.73) (2.38) (0.77) (1.82) -- 
            
Trust -1.82+ -4.25 -0.08 3.37+ 2.44+ 
  (0.95) (3.54) (0.97) (1.82) (1.25) 
            
Interest 2.33** -3.48 0.85 3.67 3.60** 
  (0.74) (2.99) (0.73) (2.61) (1.13) 
            
Education 0.41 0.80 0.43 -2.24+ 0.85 
  (0.51) (1.55) (0.54) (1.29) (0.54) 
            
Female 0.15 1.60 -0.50+ 0.71 0.19 
  (0.26) (0.98) (0.29) (0.66) (0.37) 
            
Age -2.17** -4.32 -2.40* -4.04+ -0.10 
  (0.84) (2.89) (0.95) (2.36) (0.75) 
            
Latino -0.21 0.00 0.74 -1.03 0.72 
  (0.40) (0.00) (0.51) (1.30) (0.65) 
            
White -1.12** 0.98 -0.27 2.89* 0.14 
  (0.30) (1.50) (0.37) (1.42) (0.55) 
            
Republican 1.74** 13.55 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 
  (0.67) (1610.56) (0.59) (1.57) (0.66) 
            
Democrat 0.77 15.30 0.28 -0.31 1.16+ 
  (0.62) (1610.56) (0.57) (1.45) (0.64) 
            
Ideology -1.71* -0.78 0.63 -1.43 1.09 
  (0.72) (2.62) (0.76) (1.71) (0.77) 
            
Loser Perception -0.08 -0.26 0.23 2.38* 0.83+ 
  (0.26) (0.98) (0.31) (1.00) (0.45) 
            
Constant -5.34** -22.86 -7.20** -21.59** -12.14** 
  (1.34) (1610.56) (1.69) (4.26) (1.81) 
N 549 160 678 149 698 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 
weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 3.4 Conditional Effect of Loser Perceptions and Learned Helplessness on Voting 
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Figure 3.5 Conditional Effect of Race and Learned Helplessness on Vote Likelihood 
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Figure 3.6 Conditional Effect of Race and Learned Helplessness on Turnout 
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Figure 3.7 Conditional Effect of Ethnicity and Learned Helplessness on Vote Likelihood 
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Figure 3.8 Conditional Effect of Gender and Learned Helplessness on Vote Likelihood 
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Figure 3.9 Average Marginal Effects of Income on Learned Helplessness for Turnout 
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Figure 3.10 Mediation Path Diagrams for Learned Helplessness, Income, and Vote 
Likelihood 
 
Sample	1
Learned	Helplessness
Income Vote	Likelihood
-.62	(.16)-.07 (.02)
.29	(.07)
When	mediated:	.24	(.07)
15.6%	of	total	effect	mediated	by	learned	helplessness
Sample	2
Learned	Helplessness
Income Vote	Likelihood
-.69	(.27)-.10	(.03)
.26	(.13)
When	mediated:	.19	(.13)
25.2%	of	total	effect	mediated	by	learned	helplessness
 
Sample	3
Learned	Helplessness
Income Vote	Likelihood
-.69	(.14)-.11	(.02)
.30	(.06)
When	mediated:	.23	(.06)
24.0%	of	total	effect	mediated	by	learned	helplessness
Sample	4	Wave	3
Learned	Helplessness
Income Vote	Likelihood
-.51	(.11)-.10	(.02)
.25	(.06)
When	mediated:	.20	(.06)
19.8%	of	total	effect	mediated	by	learned	helplessness
 
Sample	5
Learned	Helplessness
Income Vote	Intent
-.24	(.10)-.16	(.03)
.36	(.07)
When	mediated:	.32	(.07)
10.1%	of	total	effect	mediated	by	learned	helplessness
 
   274 
 
Figure 3.11 Mediation Path Diagrams for Learned Helplessness, Income, and Reported 
Turnout 
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Figure 3.12 Conditional Effect of Race and Learned Helplessness on Protesting Behavior 
-.5
0
.5
1
1.5
Pr
(P
ro
te
st)
Low High
Learned Helplessness
Non-White White
Sample 4
 
 
   275 
 
Figure 3.13 Conditional Effect of Ethnicity and Learned Helplessness on Protesting  
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Figure 3.14 Conditional Effect of Gender and Learned Helplessness on Protesting  
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Figure 3.15 Average Marginal Effects of Learned Helplessness on Income for Protesting  
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Table 3.16 Effect of Experimental Learned Helplessness Manipulation on Behavior 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Vote Likelihood Vote Likelihood Protest/Rally Protest/Rally 
Treatment 0.07 -1.24 0.12 -0.63 
  (0.39) (1.41) (0.76) (2.88) 
          
Treatment X   3.52   1.92 
Learned Helplessness  (3.66)  (7.08) 
          
Learned Helplessness -2.33 -2.98+ 5.05+ 4.66 
  (1.49) (1.65) (2.96) (3.29) 
          
Internal Efficacy 0.49 0.48 2.54** 2.54** 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.98) (0.98) 
          
External Efficacy -0.11 -0.16 -0.40 -0.45 
  (0.31) (0.32) (0.61) (0.64) 
          
Trust -1.00 -0.94 -1.74 -1.64 
  (1.14) (1.15) (2.47) (2.49) 
          
Interest 3.75** 3.86** -1.27 -1.23 
  (1.15) (1.15) (2.30) (2.30) 
          
Income 0.56 0.56 0.31 0.33 
  (0.64) (0.64) (1.30) (1.30) 
          
Education 1.09+ 1.11+ -0.67 -0.69 
  (0.62) (0.63) (1.28) (1.28) 
          
Age 0.83 0.84 -3.40+ -3.48+ 
  (0.81) (0.81) (1.87) (1.89) 
          
White 0.72+ 0.68+ 0.62 0.54 
  (0.39) (0.39) (1.02) (1.05) 
          
Latino -0.17 -0.16 -0.95 -1.00 
  (0.61) (0.61) (1.18) (1.21) 
          
Female 0.86* 0.89* 1.57+ 1.59+ 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.81) (0.81) 
          
Republican 2.75** 2.81** 13.61 13.15 
  (0.67) (0.68) (2229.97) (1596.09) 
          
Democrat 2.33** 2.41** 15.21 14.79 
  (0.64) (0.65) (2229.97) (1596.09) 
          
Ideology -1.08 -1.08 -1.58 -1.50 
  (0.91) (0.91) (2.23) (2.25) 
          
Loser Perception -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.71) (0.71) 
          
Constant -5.73** -5.50** -24.82 -24.13 
  (1.68) (1.70) (2229.97) (1596.10) 
N 242 242 242 242 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients for logistic regression models, not odds ratios for Sample 2. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 Difference of Means Tests for Perceptions of Inequality Between Conditions 
  Control 
Inequality 
1980 
Inequality 
Today 
Mean 
Diff. 
Sig. @ 
p<.05 
1) Opportunity to succeed 
*Higher=everyone has opportunity 
to succeed 
 
0.57   0.59 -0.03 Yes 
0.57 0.56   0.01 No 
  0.56 0.59 0.04 Yes 
2) Last 5-10 years, income inequality 
increased? 
*Higher=inequality has increased a 
great deal 
0.65   0.62 0.03 Yes 
0.65 0.73   -0.08 Yes 
  0.73 0.62 -0.11 Yes 
3) Next 5 years, will income diff 
increase? 
*Higher=inequality will increase a 
great deal 
0.61   0.61 0.00 No 
0.61 0.67   -0.06 Yes 
  0.67 0.61 -0.06 Yes 
4) Seriousness of income inequality 
*Higher=serious problem 
 
0.77   0.75 0.02 Yes 
0.77 0.81   -0.04 Yes 
  0.81 0.75 -0.06 Yes 
5) Upward mobility 
*Higher=greater mobility 
 
0.44   0.46 -0.02 Yes 
0.44 0.41   0.03 Yes 
  0.41 0.46 0.05 Yes 
6) Last several years, your economic 
situation improved 
*Higher=greatly improved 
 
0.52   0.51 0.00 No 
0.52 0.51   0.01 No 
  0.51 0.51 0.00 No 
7) Over next several years, your 
economic situation improve? 
*Higher=greatly improve  
 
0.64   0.64 0.00 No 
0.64 0.63   0.00 No 
  0.63 0.64 0.01 No 
8) Compared to parents, are you 
better off economically? 
*Higher=much better off than 
parents 
0.46   0.47 0.00 No 
0.46 0.43   0.03 Yes 
  0.43 0.47 0.04 Yes 
9) Over last 5 years, compared to 
others, how are you economically? 
*Higher=much better than average 
 
0.48   0.51 -0.03 Yes 
0.48 0.48   0.00 No 
  0.48 0.51 0.03 Yes 
Note: Values reflect means for each condition, as well as the mean differences and 
whether they were significant at p<.05. 
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Table 4.2 Disaffection Mean Differences by Inequality Condition 
Learned Helplessness   
  Mean Difference 
Inequality Today vs. Control -0.001 
Inequality 1980 vs. Control  -0.006 
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today -0.005 
    
Internal Efficacy   
  Mean Difference 
Inequality Today vs. Control -0.012+ 
Inequality 1980 vs. Control  -0.015* 
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today -0.004 
    
External Efficacy   
  Mean Difference 
Inequality Today vs. Control 0.004 
Inequality 1980 vs. Control  0.002 
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today -0.001 
    
Trust   
  Mean Difference 
Inequality Today vs. Control 0.005 
Inequality 1980 vs. Control  0.006 
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today 0.001 
    
Interest   
  Mean Difference 
Inequality Today vs. Control -0.002 
Inequality 1980 vs. Control  -0.023* 
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today -0.021+ 
Note: Values reflect mean differences calculated where the first condition was subtracted 
from the second condition, e.g., control – inequality today; control – inequality since 
1980; inequality today – inequality since 1980.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05 
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Table 4.3 Distribution of Income Across Conditions 
Level of Income Control Inequality 1980 Inequality Today Total 
Under $15,000 57 58 67 182 
% 7.97 8.39 9.48 8.61 
$15,000 to $24,999 104 74 85 263 
% 14.55 10.71 12.02 12.45 
$25,000 to $49,999 198 225 204 627 
% 27.69 32.56 28.85 29.67 
$50,000 to $99,999 270 239 265 774 
% 37.76 34.59 37.48 36.63 
$100,000 and above 86 95 86 267 
% 12.03 13.75 12.16 12.64 
Total 715 691 707 2113 
% 100 100 100 100 
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Table 4.4 Effect of Income Inequality Experimental Conditions on Learned Helplessness 
  Learned Helplessness 
Inequality Today 0.01 
  (0.01) 
  
 Inequality Since 1980 0.01+ 
  (0.01) 
  
 Internal Efficacy -0.13** 
  (0.02) 
  
 External Efficacy -0.07** 
  (0.01) 
  
 Trust -0.03 
  (0.02) 
  
 Interest -0.03* 
  (0.01) 
  
 Education 0.00 
  (0.01) 
  
 Income -0.10** 
  (0.01) 
  
 Female -0.01 
  (0.01) 
  
 Age -0.03+ 
  (0.02) 
  
 Latino 0.00 
  (0.01) 
  
 White 0.00 
  (0.01) 
  
 Republican 0.01 
  (0.01) 
  
 Democrat 0.02 
  (0.01) 
  
 Ideology -0.03* 
  (0.01) 
  
 Loser Perception 0.01 
  (0.01) 
  
 Constant 0.57** 
  (0.02) 
N 2000 
adj. R2 0.128 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 4.5 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Disaffection for Vote Likelihood 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inequality Since 1980 X   2.16+         
Learned Helplessness   (1.16)         
              
Inequality Today X   0.55         
Learned Helplessness   (1.20)         
              
Inequality Since 1980 X     -0.91       
Internal Efficacy     (1.10)       
              
Inequality Today X     1.73       
Internal Efficacy     (1.12)       
              
Inequality Since 1980 X       -0.55     
External Efficacy       (0.63)     
              
Inequality Today X       0.21     
External Efficacy       (0.62)     
              
Inequality Since 1980 X         -0.18   
Trust         (0.88)   
              
Inequality Today X         0.28   
Trust         (0.86)   
              
Inequality Since 1980 X           -0.15 
Interest           (0.59) 
              
Inequality Today X           0.10 
Interest           (0.58) 
              
Inequality Today -0.11 -0.32 -1.09+ -0.19 -0.22 -0.17 
  (0.14) (0.49) (0.65) (0.29) (0.37) (0.37) 
              
Inequality Since 1980 -0.23+ -1.07* 0.31 0.00 -0.16 -0.14 
  (0.14) (0.47) (0.65) (0.30) (0.38) (0.38) 
              
Learned Helplessness -1.97** -2.94** -2.00** -1.98** -1.97** -1.98** 
  (0.49) (0.87) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
              
Internal Efficacy 2.81** 2.84** 2.50** 2.79** 2.80** 2.80** 
  (0.52) (0.53) (0.83) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) 
              
External Efficacy -0.28 -0.29 -0.28 -0.17 -0.28 -0.28 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.47) (0.29) (0.29) 
              
Trust 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.39 0.43 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.64) (0.40) 
              
Interest 2.49** 2.49** 2.50** 2.50** 2.49** 2.50** 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.44) 
              
Education 0.65** 0.66** 0.65** 0.66** 0.65** 0.65** 
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  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
              
Income 0.70** 0.69** 0.68** 0.70** 0.70** 0.70** 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
              
Female 0.24* 0.24+ 0.23+ 0.23+ 0.24+ 0.24* 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
              
Age 1.99** 2.01** 1.98** 2.00** 2.00** 1.99** 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
              
Latino -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
              
White 0.70** 0.69** 0.70** 0.70** 0.71** 0.70** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
              
Republican 0.47* 0.47* 0.47* 0.47* 0.46* 0.47* 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
              
Democrat 0.65** 0.66** 0.65** 0.66** 0.65** 0.66** 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
              
Ideology -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
              
Loser Perceptions -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
              
Constant -3.83** -3.46** -3.64** -3.88** -3.82** -3.84** 
  (0.49) (0.56) (0.61) (0.52) (0.54) (0.53) 
N 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
pseudo R2 0.207 0.209 0.209 0.208 0.207 0.207 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 4.1 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Learned Helplessness for Vote Likelihood 
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Table 4.6 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Disaffection for Protesting 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inequality Since 1980 X   0.22         
Learned Helplessness   (1.51)         
              
Inequality Today X   3.61*         
Learned Helplessness   (1.52)         
              
Inequality Since 1980 X     0.71       
Internal Efficacy     (1.64)       
              
Inequality Today X     -2.69+       
Internal Efficacy     (1.55)       
              
Inequality Since 1980 X       -0.71     
External Efficacy       (0.85)     
              
Inequality Today X       -0.18     
External Efficacy       (0.85)     
              
Inequality Since 1980 X         -0.33   
Trust         (1.14)   
              
Inequality Today X         -0.03   
Trust         (1.16)   
              
Inequality Since 1980 X           0.01 
Interest           (0.83) 
              
Inequality Today X           -0.76 
Interest           (0.79) 
              
Inequality Today 0.12 -1.26* 1.88+ 0.21 0.13 0.67 
  (0.19) (0.61) (1.03) (0.48) (0.53) (0.61) 
              
Inequality Since 1980 0.18 0.11 -0.30 0.54 0.32 0.16 
  (0.19) (0.58) (1.11) (0.48) (0.52) (0.65) 
              
Learned Helplessness 1.95** 0.62 1.96** 1.97** 1.96** 1.96** 
  (0.66) (1.16) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
              
Internal Efficacy 3.66** 3.74** 4.44** 3.65** 3.67** 3.65** 
  (0.77) (0.77) (1.26) (0.77) (0.77) (0.77) 
              
External Efficacy 1.53** 1.58** 1.54** 1.85** 1.53** 1.53** 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.67) (0.40) (0.40) 
              
Trust -0.27 -0.33 -0.31 -0.26 -0.14 -0.28 
  (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.87) (0.53) 
              
Interest 0.76+ 0.73+ 0.76+ 0.77+ 0.76+ 1.04 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.64) 
              
Education 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 
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  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
              
Income -0.27 -0.25 -0.24 -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 
  (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
              
Female -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
              
Age -1.55** -1.56** -1.57** -1.55** -1.55** -1.55** 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
              
Latino 0.59* 0.60* 0.58* 0.60* 0.59* 0.58* 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
              
White -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
              
Republican 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 
  (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
              
Democrat 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.37 
  (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
              
Ideology -0.20 -0.20 -0.23 -0.19 -0.19 -0.21 
  (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) 
              
Loser Perceptions -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
              
Constant -5.99** -5.54** -6.49** -6.18** -6.06** -6.18** 
  (0.74) (0.81) (0.99) (0.80) (0.81) (0.83) 
N 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
pseudo R2 0.090 0.095 0.094 0.090 0.090 0.091 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 4.2 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Learned Helplessness for Protesting 
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Figure 4.3 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Internal Efficacy for Protesting 
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Table 4.7 Effect of Economic Situation on Learned Helplessness 
  (1) (2) 
Economic Situation -0.04*   
Has Improved (0.02)   
      
Economic Situation   -0.10** 
Will Improve   (0.02) 
      
Internal Efficacy -0.08+ -0.08+ 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
      
External Efficacy -0.08** -0.08** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Trust -0.08* -0.06* 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Interest -0.04+ -0.04+ 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Education 0.01 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Income -0.09** -0.09** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Female -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Age -0.01 -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Latino 0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
White -0.02* -0.03* 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Republican 0.02 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Democrat 0.02 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Ideology -0.03 -0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Loser Perceptions 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Constant 0.58** 0.63** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
N 678 678 
adj. R2 0.147 0.173 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 4.8 Effect of Economic Situation on Vote Likelihood 
  (1) (2) 
Economic Situation 0.33   
Has Improved (0.40)   
      
Economic Situation   0.88+ 
Will Improve   (0.46) 
      
Learned Helplessness -2.80** -2.43** 
  (0.90) (0.92) 
      
Internal Efficacy 2.12* 2.17* 
  (0.93) (0.93) 
      
External Efficacy -0.33 -0.35 
  (0.52) (0.52) 
      
Trust 0.40 0.32 
  (0.69) (0.70) 
      
Interest 2.70** 2.71** 
  (0.49) (0.49) 
      
Education 0.77* 0.79* 
  (0.37) (0.37) 
      
Income 0.84* 0.89* 
  (0.39) (0.37) 
      
Female 0.09 0.06 
  (0.21) (0.22) 
      
Age 1.34* 1.51* 
  (0.62) (0.62) 
      
Latino 0.39 0.36 
  (0.40) (0.41) 
      
White 0.59* 0.62* 
  (0.25) (0.25) 
      
Republican 0.69* 0.69* 
  (0.34) (0.34) 
      
Democrat 0.53 0.49 
  (0.34) (0.34) 
      
Ideology -0.36 -0.38 
  (0.54) (0.54) 
      
Loser Perceptions -0.11 -0.09 
  (0.21) (0.21) 
      
Constant -3.18** -3.77** 
  (0.87) (0.94) 
N 677 677 
pseudo R2 0.203 0.207 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Chapter 5 
Figure 5.1 Polarization Manipulations 
High Polarization                    Low Polarization 
   
 
 
Figure 5.2 Disaffection Measures 
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Figure 5.3 Mean Perceived Polarization by Condition and Sample 
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Figure 5.4 Mean Learned Helplessness by Condition 
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Table 5.1 Disaffection Mean Differences by Polarization Condition  
 
Learned Helplessness       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 
Sample 4 
Wave 2 
Low vs. Control 0.005 -0.008 0.006 
High vs. Control  0.004 -0.009+ 0.012 
High vs. Low -0.001 -0.002 0.006 
        
Internal Efficacy       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 
Sample 4 
Wave 2 
Low vs. Control 0.043* -0.015* -0.010 
High vs. Control  0.030+ -0.010+ 0.000 
High vs. Low -0.013 0.005 0.010 
        
External Efficacy       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 
Sample 4 
Wave 2 
Low vs. Control 0.000 0.017+ -0.027 
High vs. Control  -0.005 -0.005 0.025 
High vs. Low -0.005 -0.023* 0.052* 
        
Trust       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 
Sample 4 
Wave 2 
Low vs. Control 0.010 0.007 -0.005 
High vs. Control  0.009 -0.003 0.012 
High vs. Low -0.001 -0.010 0.017 
        
Interest       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 
Sample 4 
Wave 2 
Low vs. Control 0.018 -0.016 -0.026 
High vs. Control  0.023 -0.016 0.007 
High vs. Low 0.005 0.000 0.033 
Note: Values reflect mean differences calculated where the first condition was subtracted 
from the second condition, e.g., control – low; control – high; low – high.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05 
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Table 5.2 Disaffection Mean Differences by Polarization Condition between 
Independents and Partisans 
Learned Helplessness     
  Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Wave 2 
Control 0.030 -0.015 -0.021 
Low Polarization 0.004 -0.014 -0.045 
High Polarization -0.064** -0.021+ -0.022 
        
Internal Efficacy       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Wave 2 
Control 0.029 0.026+ 0.047 
Low Polarization 0.102* 0.029* 0.098* 
High Polarization 0.083* 0.001 0.093* 
        
External Efficacy       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Wave 2 
Control 0.033 0.107** 0.124* 
Low Polarization 0.197** 0.114** 0.093+ 
High Polarization 0.182** 0.140** 0.051 
        
Trust       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Wave 2 
Control 0.062* 0.055** 0.085* 
Low Polarization 0.103** 0.038* 0.071+ 
High Polarization 0.139** 0.090** 0.085* 
        
Interest       
  Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Wave 2 
Control 0.057 0.068* 0.024 
Low Polarization 0.132* 0.120** 0.073 
High Polarization 0.144* 0.024 0.093+ 
Note: Values reflect mean differences calculated where the mean for independents was 
subtracted from the mean for partisans. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
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Figure 5.5 Effect Polarization Conditions on Learned Helplessness by Independent and 
Partisan Identity 
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Table 5.3 Effect of Polarization Conditions on Disaffection for Vote Likelihood (Sample 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Low Polarization X   1.89         
Learned Helplessness   (2.17)         
              
High Polarization X   1.49         
Learned Helplessness   (2.08)         
              
Low Polarization X     0.96       
Internal Efficacy     (1.34)       
              
High Polarization X     -0.14       
Internal Efficacy     (1.33)       
              
Low Polarization X       0.11     
External Efficacy       (1.22)     
              
High Polarization X       2.27+     
External Efficacy       (1.25)     
              
Low Polarization X         0.61   
Trust         (1.75)   
              
High Polarization X         3.19+   
Trust         (1.71)   
              
Low Polarization X           -0.77 
Interest           (1.28) 
              
High Polarization X           -1.37 
Interest           (1.28) 
              
Low Polarization -0.04 -0.72 -0.60 -0.09 -0.31 0.45 
  (0.26) (0.83) (0.84) (0.59) (0.76) (0.85) 
              
High Polarization 0.18 -0.36 0.25 -0.82 -1.11 1.04 
  (0.26) (0.79) (0.84) (0.61) (0.74) (0.84) 
              
Learned Helplessness -0.65 -1.75 -0.64 -0.67 -0.75 -0.64 
  (0.89) (1.50) (0.90) (0.90) (0.90) (0.89) 
              
Internal Efficacy 0.66** 1.90** 1.71+ 1.99** 1.93** 1.91** 
  (0.23) (0.70) (1.01) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) 
              
External Efficacy 0.25 0.75 0.78 -0.04 0.74 0.75 
  (0.19) (0.56) (0.56) (0.93) (0.57) (0.56) 
              
Trust 0.34 0.36 0.30 0.32 -0.93 0.42 
  (0.78) (0.78) (0.79) (0.78) (1.22) (0.78) 
              
Interest 2.17** 2.23** 2.17** 2.25** 2.19** 2.99** 
  (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.61) (1.08) 
              
Education 1.01** 1.04** 0.99* 1.04** 1.05** 1.02** 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) 
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Income 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.17 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
              
Female 0.71** 0.70** 0.72** 0.72** 0.73** 0.72** 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
              
Age 1.52** 1.53** 1.56** 1.50** 1.46** 1.51** 
  (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) 
              
White 1.14** 1.13** 1.14** 1.15** 1.12** 1.16** 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
              
Latino -0.20 -0.18 -0.18 -0.24 -0.24 -0.20 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
              
Republican 1.24** 1.26** 1.22** 1.21** 1.23** 1.27** 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) 
              
Democrat 1.20** 1.22** 1.20** 1.17** 1.17** 1.21** 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
              
Ideology -0.69 -0.74 -0.69 -0.70 -0.71 -0.71 
  (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
              
Loser Perception 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
              
Constant -6.60** -5.29** -5.52** -5.34** -5.05** -6.24** 
  (1.02) (1.00) (1.05) (0.98) (1.01) (1.09) 
N 549 549 549 549 549 549 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.4 Effect of Polarization Conditions on Disaffection for Vote Likelihood (Sample 3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Low Polarization X   1.91         
Learned Helplessness   (1.16)         
              
High Polarization X   2.07+         
Learned Helplessness   (1.17)         
              
Low Polarization X     0.56       
Internal Efficacy     (1.13)       
              
High Polarization X     -0.60       
Internal Efficacy     (1.09)       
              
Low Polarization X       0.70     
External Efficacy       (0.62)     
              
High Polarization X       0.19     
External Efficacy       (0.61)     
              
Low Polarization X         -0.40   
Trust         (0.86)   
              
High Polarization X         -0.80   
Trust         (0.85)   
              
Low Polarization X           -0.22 
Interest           (0.59) 
              
High Polarization X           -0.31 
Interest           (0.58) 
              
Low Polarization 0.10 -0.64 -0.22 -0.18 0.26 0.23 
  (0.14) (0.47) (0.66) (0.28) (0.37) (0.37) 
              
High Polarization -0.01 -0.81+ 0.33 -0.09 0.32 0.17 
  (0.13) (0.47) (0.64) (0.29) (0.37) (0.37) 
              
Learned Helplessness -1.48** -2.85** -1.47** -1.49** -1.46** -1.48** 
  (0.49) (0.87) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
              
Internal Efficacy 2.34** 2.39** 2.37** 2.34** 2.35** 2.33** 
  (0.52) (0.53) (0.82) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) 
              
External Efficacy 0.56+ 0.56+ 0.56+ 0.27 0.56+ 0.56+ 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.46) (0.29) (0.29) 
              
Trust -0.28 -0.31 -0.29 -0.28 0.12 -0.28 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.63) (0.39) 
              
Interest 2.41** 2.39** 2.42** 2.42** 2.41** 2.59** 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.43) 
              
Education 0.77** 0.77** 0.76** 0.77** 0.77** 0.77** 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
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Income 0.70** 0.71** 0.71** 0.70** 0.69** 0.70** 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
              
Female 0.39** 0.39** 0.39** 0.39** 0.38** 0.39** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
              
Age 1.35** 1.36** 1.35** 1.34** 1.34** 1.35** 
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
              
White 0.69** 0.69** 0.70** 0.70** 0.70** 0.69** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
              
Latino -0.19 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
              
Republican 0.47* 0.48* 0.46* 0.47* 0.48* 0.47* 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
              
Democrat 0.71** 0.71** 0.71** 0.71** 0.71** 0.71** 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
              
Ideology -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
              
Loser Perception 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
              
Constant -4.03** -3.52** -4.06** -3.92** -4.20** -4.13** 
  (0.51) (0.57) (0.62) (0.53) (0.55) (0.55) 
N 2041 2041 2041 2041 2041 2041 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.5 Effect of Polarization Conditions on Disaffection for Vote Likelihood (Sample 4) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Low Polarization X   5.19         
Learned Helplessness   (3.28)         
              
High Polarization X   5.26+         
Learned Helplessness   (3.09)         
              
Low Polarization X     0.26       
Internal Efficacy     (0.54)       
              
High Polarization X     -0.30       
Internal Efficacy     (0.50)       
              
Low Polarization X       -0.48     
External Efficacy       (0.42)     
              
High Polarization X       0.23     
External Efficacy       (0.44)     
              
Low Polarization X         -0.95   
Trust         (2.17)   
              
High Polarization X         -0.75   
Trust         (1.73)   
              
Low Polarization X           -1.08 
Interest           (1.59) 
              
High Polarization X           -2.50+ 
Interest           (1.44) 
              
Low Polarization 0.98* -1.08 0.23 2.26* 1.41 1.62 
  (0.42) (1.37) (1.72) (1.12) (1.03) (0.99) 
              
High Polarization 0.35 -1.70 1.29 -0.18 0.69 1.83+ 
  (0.39) (1.20) (1.67) (1.08) (0.85) (0.95) 
              
Learned Helplessness -3.60* -6.92** -3.69** -3.76** -3.50* -3.39* 
  (1.40) (2.21) (1.39) (1.44) (1.42) (1.35) 
              
Internal Efficacy 0.80 0.21 0.23 0.12 0.19 0.20 
  (1.00) (0.26) (0.38) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) 
              
External Efficacy 0.24 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.01 
  (0.91) (0.23) (0.22) (0.31) (0.23) (0.22) 
              
Trust 0.37 0.23 0.43 0.37 0.96 0.49 
  (0.97) (0.99) (0.96) (0.99) (1.37) (0.97) 
              
Interest 3.66** 3.72** 3.65** 3.84** 3.70** 5.02** 
  (0.70) (0.71) (0.70) (0.73) (0.71) (1.15) 
              
Education 1.35* 1.32* 1.37* 1.43* 1.36* 1.24* 
  (0.59) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.61) 
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Income 0.80 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 
  (0.83) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
              
Female 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.37 
  (0.35) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) 
              
Age 3.63** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
  (1.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
              
White -1.06* -1.10* -1.12* -1.12* -1.10* -1.23** 
  (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) 
              
Latino -0.19 -0.28 -0.19 -0.10 -0.21 -0.20 
  (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.48) 
              
Republican 1.34* 1.34* 1.38* 1.51** 1.36* 1.44* 
  (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.54) (0.55) (0.58) 
              
Democrat 1.24* 1.24* 1.25* 1.32* 1.24* 1.24* 
  (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) 
              
Ideology 0.77 0.71 0.76 0.55 0.76 0.73 
  (0.82) (0.81) (0.83) (0.81) (0.82) (0.82) 
              
Loser Perception -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
              
Inevitable  -1.31* -1.31* -1.32* -1.23* -1.30* -1.26* 
Immigration Threat (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.54) (0.55) (0.56) 
              
Preventable  -0.49 -0.55 -0.53 -0.50 -0.50 -0.43 
Immigration Threat (0.60) (0.63) (0.59) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) 
              
Inevitable  -0.49 -0.51 -0.56 -0.44 -0.48 -0.49 
Terror Threat (0.64) (0.65) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64) (0.66) 
              
Preventable  0.12 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.12 0.13 
Terror Threat (0.61) (0.63) (0.60) (0.62) (0.61) (0.62) 
              
repimm 0.54 0.59 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.58 
  (0.55) (0.54) (0.56) (0.57) (0.54) (0.54) 
              
demimm 0.87 0.95 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.81 
  (0.59) (0.58) (0.61) (0.60) (0.59) (0.59) 
              
bipimm -0.23 -0.19 -0.28 -0.29 -0.21 -0.21 
  (0.57) (0.56) (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.57) 
              
Constant -4.25** -4.01* -5.62** -5.56** -5.86** -6.27** 
  (1.45) (1.79) (1.90) (1.81) (1.76) (1.77) 
N 477 477 477 477 477 477 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 5.6 Effect of Learned Helplessness by Polarization Conditions on Vote Likelihood 
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Figure 5.7 Effect of Polarization Conditions for Independents and Partisans on Vote 
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Figure 5.8 Effect of Polarization Conditions for Independents and Partisans on Vote 
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Table 5.6 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Vote Likelihood (Sample 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived Polarization X   -1.32         
Learned Helplessness   (0.98)         
              
Perceived Polarization X     0.08       
Internal Efficacy     (0.67)       
              
Perceived Polarization X       0.21     
External Efficacy       (0.69)     
              
Perceived Polarization X         -1.61   
Trust         (1.19)   
              
Perceived Polarization X           0.02 
Interest           (0.71) 
              
Perceived Polarization  -0.00 0.57 -0.05 -0.11 0.66 -0.02 
  (0.17) (0.46) (0.47) (0.39) (0.52) (0.52) 
              
Learned Helplessness -3.49* 3.22 -3.42+ -3.44+ -3.51* -3.48+ 
  (1.75) (5.33) (1.84) (1.76) (1.76) (1.79) 
              
Internal Efficacy 0.27 -0.09 -0.13 0.41 0.21 0.28 
  (1.48) (1.50) (3.77) (1.54) (1.49) (1.49) 
              
External Efficacy 0.39 0.34 0.43 -0.73 0.53 0.39 
  (1.19) (1.20) (1.24) (3.92) (1.20) (1.21) 
              
Trust -1.60 -1.48 -1.60 -1.60 6.92 -1.60 
  (1.46) (1.48) (1.46) (1.46) (6.43) (1.46) 
              
Interest 4.99** 5.05** 4.98** 4.98** 4.97** 4.90 
  (1.56) (1.57) (1.56) (1.56) (1.54) (4.31) 
              
Education 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.79 
  (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.76) (0.75) 
              
Income 1.42+ 1.63* 1.41+ 1.37+ 1.57+ 1.42+ 
  (0.80) (0.83) (0.81) (0.82) (0.81) (0.80) 
              
Female 0.70 0.89+ 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.70 
  (0.44) (0.47) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) 
              
Age 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.27 
  (0.96) (0.98) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) 
              
Latino -0.52 -0.45 -0.53 -0.55 -0.45 -0.52 
  (0.70) (0.71) (0.70) (0.71) (0.72) (0.70) 
              
White 0.96+ 0.81 0.97+ 0.97+ 0.88+ 0.96+ 
  (0.51) (0.52) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.52) 
              
Republican 3.36** 3.37** 3.34** 3.28** 3.53** 3.36** 
  (0.88) (0.91) (0.91) (0.92) (0.92) (0.89) 
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Democrat 2.92** 2.78** 2.92** 2.90** 3.10** 2.92** 
  (0.85) (0.87) (0.85) (0.85) (0.88) (0.85) 
              
Ideology -1.65 -1.89+ -1.61 -1.56 -2.03+ -1.64 
  (1.06) (1.08) (1.11) (1.10) (1.11) (1.10) 
              
Loser Perception 0.27 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.27 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) 
              
Constant -5.68** -8.29** -5.47* -5.16+ -9.30** -5.63+ 
  (2.03) (2.87) (2.74) (2.65) (3.39) (3.03) 
N 177 177 177 177 177 177 
pseudo R2 0.298 0.306 0.298 0.299 0.306 0.298 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.7 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Vote Likelihood (Sample 3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived Polarization X   0.60         
Learned Helplessness   (0.56)         
              
Perceived Polarization X     0.44       
Internal Efficacy     (0.52)       
              
Perceived Polarization X       0.04     
External Efficacy       (0.29)     
              
Perceived Polarization X         -0.65   
Trust         (0.41)   
              
Perceived Polarization X           0.27 
Interest           (0.28) 
              
Perceived Polarization  0.21** -0.02 -0.03 0.20 0.47** 0.06 
  (0.07) (0.23) (0.29) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17) 
              
Learned Helplessness -2.88** -6.05+ -2.83** -2.87** -2.98** -2.84** 
  (0.90) (3.15) (0.90) (0.90) (0.91) (0.90) 
              
Internal Efficacy 2.14* 2.18* -0.14 2.13* 2.22* 2.10* 
  (0.94) (0.95) (2.86) (0.94) (0.95) (0.94) 
              
External Efficacy -0.27 -0.24 -0.27 -0.46 -0.32 -0.22 
  (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (1.59) (0.53) (0.53) 
              
Trust 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.59 3.91+ 0.57 
  (0.70) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (2.25) (0.70) 
              
Interest 2.45** 2.46** 2.44** 2.45** 2.45** 1.08 
  (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (1.52) 
              
Education 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.59 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
              
Income 0.95* 0.97** 0.94* 0.95* 0.94* 0.95* 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) 
              
Female 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
              
Age 1.19* 1.19+ 1.17+ 1.18+ 1.24* 1.13+ 
  (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) 
              
Latino 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.42 
  (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) 
              
White 0.52* 0.50* 0.51* 0.52* 0.51* 0.53* 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
              
Republican 0.72* 0.70* 0.73* 0.72* 0.74* 0.71* 
  (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) 
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Democrat 0.58+ 0.57+ 0.57+ 0.58+ 0.57+ 0.58+ 
  (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
              
Ideology -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.20 -0.16 
  (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) 
              
Loser Perception -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 -0.08 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
              
Constant -4.07** -2.86+ -2.80 -4.00** -5.37** -3.30** 
  (0.92) (1.47) (1.75) (1.07) (1.25) (1.22) 
N 677 677 677 677 677 677 
pseudo R2 0.214 0.216 0.215 0.214 0.217 0.215 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.8 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Vote Likelihood (Sample 4 Wave 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived Polarization X   -0.56         
Learned Helplessness   (1.11)         
              
Perceived Polarization X     0.04       
Internal Efficacy     (0.18)       
              
Perceived Polarization X       -0.15     
External Efficacy       (0.15)     
              
Perceived Polarization X         -1.07   
Trust         (0.70)   
              
Perceived Polarization X           -1.37* 
Interest           (0.54) 
              
Perceived Polarization  0.21 0.42 0.09 0.59 0.69* 1.06** 
  (0.13) (0.42) (0.62) (0.39) (0.33) (0.36) 
              
Learned Helplessness -7.04** -4.57 -7.01** -7.12** -7.38** -8.07** 
  (2.30) (5.30) (2.30) (2.33) (2.39) (2.39) 
              
Internal Efficacy -0.32 -0.33 -0.49 -0.22 -0.23 -0.08 
  (0.45) (0.45) (0.84) (0.43) (0.46) (0.45) 
              
External Efficacy -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 0.59 0.03 -0.11 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.75) (0.41) (0.40) 
              
Trust 1.15 1.20 1.09 1.76 6.30+ 1.14 
  (1.86) (1.89) (1.86) (2.10) (3.74) (1.88) 
              
Interest 5.69** 5.66** 5.66** 5.57** 5.62** 11.98** 
  (1.40) (1.41) (1.40) (1.35) (1.35) (2.83) 
              
Education 1.48 1.47 1.48 1.59 1.63 1.65 
  (1.02) (1.03) (1.02) (1.05) (1.06) (1.07) 
              
Income 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
              
Female 0.44 0.49 0.44 0.57 0.59 0.61 
  (0.58) (0.62) (0.58) (0.65) (0.61) (0.61) 
              
Age 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
              
Latino -0.48 -0.48 -0.47 -0.28 -0.36 -0.21 
  (0.86) (0.86) (0.87) (0.86) (0.86) (0.91) 
              
White -1.31 -1.33 -1.29 -1.46+ -1.56+ -1.60+ 
  (0.84) (0.83) (0.83) (0.85) (0.85) (0.82) 
              
Republican 2.07 2.09 2.08 2.45+ 2.09+ 2.22* 
  (1.30) (1.35) (1.31) (1.39) (1.26) (1.12) 
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Democrat 1.93 1.90 1.93 2.01 1.72 1.60 
  (1.24) (1.29) (1.24) (1.22) (1.20) (1.07) 
              
Ideology -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.48 
  (1.14) (1.17) (1.11) (1.13) (1.15) (1.16) 
              
Loser Perception 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.55 0.63 
  (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.82) (0.81) (0.83) 
              
Inevitable Immigration -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.29 -0.25 -0.07 
Threat (0.68) (0.67) (0.67) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70) 
              
Constant -4.12 -5.05 -3.61 -6.56+ -6.51* -7.59* 
  (2.77) (3.12) (3.62) (3.60) (3.24) (3.08) 
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.9 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Rallying/Protest Behavior  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Wave 3 
Perceived Polarization  0.06 -0.29** -0.48** 
  (0.31) (0.11) (0.18) 
        
Learned Helplessness 5.66 0.00 2.13 
  (3.61) (1.29) (2.29) 
        
Internal Efficacy 8.33* 4.48** 0.11 
  (3.66) (1.48) (0.41) 
        
External Efficacy -2.62 1.87* -0.00 
  (2.42) (0.77) (0.31) 
        
Trust -3.56 -0.41 1.77 
  (3.22) (0.98) (1.52) 
        
Interest -3.11 1.12 2.74 
  (2.84) (0.75) (1.77) 
        
Education 0.61 0.68 0.46 
  (1.52) (0.55) (0.80) 
        
Income 0.95 -0.49 -0.01 
  (1.67) (0.57) (0.12) 
        
Female 1.53 -0.48 0.45 
  (0.96) (0.29) (0.59) 
        
Age -4.77+ -2.18* 0.02 
  (2.85) (0.96) (0.02) 
        
Latino 0.00 0.77 1.02 
  (0.00) (0.51) (0.79) 
        
White 1.00 -0.18 0.67 
  (1.54) (0.37) (0.76) 
        
Republican 14.96 0.08 -0.17 
  (3775.15) (0.59) (1.12) 
        
Democrat 16.50 0.33 -0.41 
  (3775.15) (0.58) (1.11) 
        
Ideology -0.49 0.38 -1.07 
  (2.57) (0.76) (1.25) 
        
Loser Perception -0.18 0.25 1.11+ 
  (0.98) (0.31) (0.62) 
        
Constant -23.51 -4.78** -5.51+ 
  (3775.15) (1.41) (3.28) 
N 160 678 216 
pseudo R2 0.365 0.141  -- 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.10 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Rallying/Protest Behavior (Sample 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived Polarization    1.98         
X Learned Helplessness   (3.47)         
              
Perceived Polarization     -2.15       
X Internal Efficacy     (2.12)       
              
Perceived Polarization       4.47+     
X External Efficacy       (2.57)     
              
Perceived Polarization         3.73   
X Trust         (3.58)   
              
Perceived Polarization           -1.92 
X Interest           (1.66) 
              
Perceived Polarization  0.06 -0.76 1.81 -1.75+ -1.12 1.68 
  (0.31) (1.37) (1.79) (1.05) (1.13) (1.48) 
              
Learned Helplessness 5.66 -5.38 4.06 7.84 6.85+ 4.84 
  (3.61) (20.61) (3.81) (4.95) (4.11) (3.54) 
              
Internal Efficacy 8.33* 9.39* 20.99 11.94* 9.61* 8.13* 
  (3.66) (4.15) (13.54) (5.02) (4.14) (3.84) 
              
External Efficacy -2.62 -2.35 -2.76 -30.37+ -2.76 -2.84 
  (2.42) (2.52) (2.41) (16.25) (2.53) (2.42) 
              
Trust -3.56 -3.80 -3.59 -2.47 -25.24 -2.71 
  (3.22) (3.40) (3.32) (3.45) (21.35) (3.26) 
              
Interest -3.11 -3.82 -3.65 -5.37 -4.16 7.62 
  (2.84) (3.12) (3.01) (3.44) (3.15) (10.01) 
              
Education 0.61 0.80 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.52 
  (1.52) (1.55) (1.55) (1.73) (1.51) (1.57) 
              
Income 0.95 0.56 1.29 -0.23 -0.36 1.13 
  (1.67) (1.84) (1.70) (1.90) (2.10) (1.66) 
              
Female 1.53 1.48 1.58 1.67 1.41 1.57 
  (0.96) (0.98) (0.98) (1.03) (0.99) (0.99) 
              
Age -4.77+ -4.77+ -4.60 -5.45+ -5.14+ -4.44 
  (2.85) (2.83) (2.92) (2.88) (2.91) (2.95) 
              
Latino 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
              
White 1.00 1.44 0.82 0.35 1.53 0.35 
  (1.54) (1.80) (1.59) (1.87) (1.64) (1.70) 
              
Republican 14.96 13.84 15.19 16.93 15.92 15.42 
  (3775.2) (1769.0) (2538.8) (2666.8) (2586.5) (2418.5) 
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Democrat 16.50 15.38 16.22 18.47 17.51 16.13 
  (3775.2) (1769.0) (2538.8) (2666.8) (2586.5) (2418.5) 
              
Ideology -0.49 -0.05 -1.33 0.08 0.75 -1.63 
  (2.57) (2.70) (2.81) (3.21) (2.80) (3.00) 
              
Loser Perception -0.18 -0.21 -0.45 -0.51 -0.34 -0.61 
  (0.98) (1.01) (1.03) (1.00) (1.03) (1.05) 
              
Constant -23.51 -18.44 -32.20 -15.17 -18.13 -31.22 
  (3775.2) (1769.0) (2538.8) (2666.8) (2586.5) (2418.5) 
N 160 160 160 160 160 160 
pseudo R2 0.365 0.372 0.380 0.412 0.382 0.385 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.11 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Rallying/Protest Behavior (Sample 3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived Polarization X   -0.00         
Learned Helplessness   (0.74)         
              
Perceived Polarization X     0.14       
Internal Efficacy     (0.78)       
              
Perceived Polarization X       -0.05     
External Efficacy       (0.40)     
              
Perceived Polarization X         -0.03   
Trust         (0.53)   
              
Perceived Polarization X           -0.01 
Interest           (0.42) 
              
Perceived Polarization  -0.29** -0.29 -0.38 -0.27 -0.28 -0.29 
  (0.11) (0.29) (0.51) (0.21) (0.24) (0.32) 
              
Learned Helplessness 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 
  (1.29) (4.12) (1.30) (1.30) (1.29) (1.30) 
              
Internal Efficacy 4.48** 4.48** 3.77 4.49** 4.49** 4.49** 
  (1.48) (1.48) (4.19) (1.48) (1.48) (1.48) 
              
External Efficacy 1.87* 1.87* 1.88* 2.12 1.87* 1.87* 
  (0.77) (0.78) (0.78) (2.24) (0.77) (0.78) 
              
Trust -0.41 -0.41 -0.42 -0.41 -0.23 -0.41 
  (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (2.87) (0.98) 
              
Interest 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.16 
  (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (2.20) 
              
Education 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 
  (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) 
              
Income -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 
  (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) 
              
Female -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48+ -0.49 -0.48 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) 
              
Age -2.18* -2.18* -2.18* -2.17* -2.18* -2.18* 
  (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) 
              
Latino 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.78 
  (0.51) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
              
White -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
              
Republican 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
  (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) 
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Democrat 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 
  (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
              
Ideology 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.38 
  (0.76) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76) 
              
Loser Perception 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
              
Constant -4.78** -4.78* -4.34 -4.89** -4.85** -4.81* 
  (1.41) (1.97) (2.80) (1.67) (1.77) (1.97) 
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 
pseudo R2 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.12 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Rallying/Protest Behavior (Sample 4) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perceived Polarization X   2.71+         
Learned Helplessness   (1.42)         
              
Perceived Polarization X     -0.36+       
Internal Efficacy     (0.21)       
              
Perceived Polarization X       -0.16     
External Efficacy       (0.21)     
              
Perceived Polarization X         -3.04**   
Trust         (1.07)   
              
Perceived Polarization X           0.04 
Interest           (0.67) 
              
Perceived Polarization  -0.48** -1.35* 0.83 -0.08 0.99+ -0.51 
  (0.18) (0.53) (0.77) (0.56) (0.52) (0.52) 
              
Learned Helplessness 2.13 -12.22+ 2.79 2.37 2.57 2.12 
  (2.29) (7.19) (2.46) (2.42) (2.29) (2.30) 
              
Internal Efficacy 0.11 -0.05 1.92+ 0.07 0.30 0.11 
  (0.41) (0.41) (1.08) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) 
              
External Efficacy -0.00 -0.09 -0.18 0.76 0.15 -0.00 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.34) (1.16) (0.33) (0.29) 
              
Trust 1.77 1.78 2.32 2.10 17.00** 1.76 
  (1.52) (1.47) (1.54) (1.60) (5.90) (1.54) 
              
Interest 2.74 2.46 2.55 2.57 2.41 2.55 
  (1.77) (1.70) (1.59) (1.70) (1.77) (3.90) 
              
Education 0.46 0.39 0.47 0.55 0.19 0.46 
  (0.80) (0.82) (0.81) (0.80) (0.90) (0.80) 
              
Income -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
              
Female 0.45 0.48 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.44 
  (0.59) (0.55) (0.53) (0.60) (0.58) (0.58) 
              
Age 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
              
Latino 1.02 1.44+ 1.35+ 1.06 1.25+ 1.01 
  (0.79) (0.73) (0.74) (0.76) (0.69) (0.78) 
              
White 0.67 0.61 0.56 0.60 0.78 0.67 
  (0.76) (0.72) (0.74) (0.73) (0.72) (0.76) 
              
Republican -0.17 -0.78 -0.27 -0.27 -0.96 -0.15 
  (1.12) (1.11) (1.10) (1.11) (1.16) (1.24) 
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Democrat -0.41 -1.02 -0.61 -0.51 -1.25 -0.39 
  (1.11) (1.06) (1.13) (1.09) (1.09) (1.15) 
              
Ideology -1.07 -0.90 -1.00 -0.94 -0.87 -1.07 
  (1.25) (1.14) (1.30) (1.24) (1.14) (1.27) 
              
Loser Perception 1.11+ 1.01 1.13+ 1.10+ 1.14+ 1.11+ 
  (0.62) (0.64) (0.63) (0.62) (0.59) (0.62) 
              
Constant -5.51+ 0.01 -12.41* -7.57 -13.39** -5.36 
  (3.28) (3.97) (5.39) (4.69) (4.61) (4.46) 
N 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 5.9 Effect of Perceived Polarization by Learned Helplessness on Rallying and 
Protesting (Sample 4) 
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Appendix A. Sample Summaries and Descriptive Statistics   
This appendix provides brief summaries of each of the samples utilized for the dissertation 
analyses. Samples 1-3 were large convenience samples collected from Amazon.com’s 
online work place, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Sample 4 was similarly a large convenience 
sample collected through Survey Sampling International (SSI) and raked weights were 
created to approximate national representativeness. The raked weights follow the iterative 
proportional fitting procedure proposed by DeBell and Krosnick (2009). These weights 
adjust the observed data to match several different known population parameters, i.e., 
race, ethnicity, gender, education, and income. Sample 5 was collected as a 1,000-person 
module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) through YouGov 
and is also weighted to approximate national representativeness.  
 
While representative samples are very difficult and expensive to gain access to, the use of 
MTurk in social science research is growing in popularity, as it provides access to more 
demographically diverse samples of the U.S. voting-age population than student-
convenience and Internet samples (see Berinsky et al. 2012; Buhrmester et al. 2011; Levay 
et al. 2016), as well as high quality data (Crump et al. 2013; Goodman et al. 2013; 
Weinberg et al. 2014). In the context of political, attitudinal and personality variables, 
recent research provides strong empirical evidence that MTurk conservatives do not differ 
from conservatives in two nationally representative samples (the ANES and GfK) on a 
number of attitudinal and personality variables (Clifford et al. 2015). 
 
To ensure the validity of the convenience samples collected from MTurk, a handful of steps 
were taken. First, to prevent workers who are not U.S. residents, respondents needed to 
confirm their US residency by providing their zip code, and the survey Human Intelligence 
Task (HIT) advertisement was only displayed to workers who met the qualification of 
having a U.S. address. Second, surveys were launched during East Coast work hours on 
work days. Third, as there were more than one MTurk sample collected, workers were 
prevented from taking multiple the surveys multiple times and were prevented from taking 
subsequent surveys. Lastly, respondents were informed in the HIT advertisement and in the 
consent form with their payment would be contingent upon their completing the survey and 
providing a unique code that would appear only upon survey completion.  
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Sample 1 – Summer 2016 MTurk  
 
Sample 1 is a large internet convenience sample. It was collected during the summer of 
2016, obtained from Amazon.com’s online workplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The 
survey was in the field between May 20, 2016 and July 20, 2016, and 4349 U.S. adults 18 
years of age or older were recruited. Respondents were provided with monetary 
compensation upon completing the survey. This survey was collected as part of 
collaborative work with Joanne Miller and Kyle Saunders on conspiracy endorsement. 
My dissertation items were included in the survey. Since this survey includes 
experimental conditions not relevant to my dissertation, discussion and analyses of 
Sample 1 are limited to the control condition. Despite sampling from the MTurk online 
population, respondents were not allowed to participate in multiple surveys. 
 
  Sample 1 
    N % 
Age (in years, range 18-84) 712 Avg.: 34.46 
    
Sex/Gender Male 310 43.48 
Female 403 56.52 
   
Race White 562 79.15 
Non-white 148 20.85 
   
Education Up to and including high school credential 50 7.05 
Some post-high school, no bachelor’s 338 47.67 
Bachelor’s degree 234 33.00 
Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor’s Degree 87 12.27 
   
Income Under $15,000 88 12.34 
$15,000 to $24,999 81 11.36 
$25,000 to $49,999 218 30.58 
$50,000 to $99,999 225 31.56 
$100,000 and above 101 14.17 
   
Ethnicity  Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 83 11.64 
Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 630 88.36 
   
Party ID Democrat 426 60.51 
  Independent 85 12.07 
 Republican 193 27.41 
    
Ideology Liberal 350 48.68 
 Moderate 183 25.45 
 Conservative 166 25.87 
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Sample 2 – Combined Summer Pilots (MTurk) 
 
Sample 2 is the second internet convenience sample collected from Amazon.com’s MTurk. 
Between June 11 and July 24, 2016, 816 U.S. adults were recruited through TurkPrime. 
Respondents participated in survey experiments on elite polarization piloted during this 
time period. Since respondents who participated in one pilot were prevented from 
participating in the subsequent pilot only a few weeks later, the pilots were combined to 
increase the cell sizes for each condition. The experimental pilots were identical – one pilot 
was originally used for an NSF Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant application and 
the second was a pilot for inclusion in the CSPP multi-investigator panel (Sample 4). 
Respondents were randomly assigned to an experimental manipulation for low or high 
elite polarization, as well as a condition where learned helplessness was induced or not. 
Respondents were compensated for their time, commensurate with norms for the sampling 
procedure. The surveys took 25 minutes, on average, to complete, depending on the 
condition to which they were assigned. 
 
  Sample 2 
    N % 
Age (in years, range 18-75) 789 Avg.: 37.37 
    
Sex/Gender Male 364 46.43 
Female 420 53.57 
   
Race White 617 78.30 
Non-white 171 21.70 
   
Education Up to and including high school credential 82 10.42 
Some post-high school, no bachelor’s 315 40.03 
Bachelor’s degree 270 34.31 
Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor’s Degree 120 15.25 
   
Income Under $15,000 87 11.04 
$15,000 to $24,999 112 14.21 
$25,000 to $49,999 232 29.44 
$50,000 to $99,999 275 34.90 
$100,000 and above 82 10.41 
   
Ethnicity  Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 68 8.62 
Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 721 91.38 
   
Party ID Democrat 438 57.11 
  Independent 108 14.08 
 Republican 221 28.81 
    
Ideology Liberal 404 50.19 
 Moderate 186 23.11 
 Conservative 215 26.71 
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Sample 3 – Pre-/Post-Election Panel (MTurk) 
 
Similar to Samples 1 and 2, Sample 3 is also a large convenience internet sample 
collected on Amazon.com’s MTurk through TurkPrime. Within this sample, 3,696 U.S. 
adults over the age of 18 were recruited during the week leading up to the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential Election (November 3 - 8, 2016). This data collection effort included two 
survey experiments, one on elite polarization and another on income inequality. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to the control or one experimental condition. The 
polarization and inequality conditions were not crossed and respondents were randomly 
assigned to the control or one of the experiments. Respondents who participated in 
Samples 1 or 2 were prevented from participating in subsequent MTurk surveys and thus, 
were not allowed to participate in the pre-election survey, Sample 3. Respondents from the 
control condition were also re-contacted post-election in June 2017. Respondents in all 
MTurk samples were compensated for their time, commensurate with norms for the 
sampling procedure. Depending on the condition to which they were assigned, the surveys 
took 20-25 minutes, on average to complete. 
 
  Sample 3 
    N % 
Age (in years, range 18-87) 3539 Avg.: 37.60 
    
Sex/Gender Male 1273 36.09 
Female 2254 63.91 
   
Race White 2849 80.66 
Non-white 683 19.34 
   
Education Up to and including high school credential 341 9.68 
Some post-high school, no bachelor’s 1387 39.37 
Bachelor’s degree 1275 36.19 
Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor’s Degree 520 14.76 
   
Income Under $15,000 320 9.05 
$15,000 to $24,999 413 11.68 
$25,000 to $49,999 1037 29.33 
$50,000 to $99,999 1310 37.05 
$100,000 and above 456 12.90 
   
Ethnicity  Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 285 8.06 
Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 3253 91.94 
   
Party ID Democrat 1838 53.92 
  Independent 399 11.70 
 Republican 1172 34.38 
    
Ideology Liberal 1706 48.19 
 Moderate 794 22.43 
 Conservative 1040 29.38 
    
Note: This table reflects pre-election, wave 1descriptive statistics.  
 
   343 
 
Sample 4 – CSPP Panel (SSI) 
 
Sample 4 was collected as part of a large, multi-investigator panel study conducted by the 
Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) at the University of Minnesota 
leading up to and following the 2016 Presidential Election. The CSPP Presidential 
Election Panel Study (CSPP-PEPS) study included a 4-wave panel design, three waves 
prior to the election and one post-election wave. Specifically, 3,552 U.S. adults were 
recruited using Survey Sampling International (SSI) for an online survey investigating 
beliefs about current events and political affairs, and were offered monetary 
compensation upon completing each wave of the study. Sample size at wave 1 was 
determined to increase the likelihood that approximately 1,500 participants would be 
retained across all 4-waves, based on estimated attrition provided by SSI. Attrition for the 
full sample across the four waves was 49%, with 1,732 participants responding to the 
post-election, wave 4 survey.  
 
The analyses below focus on measures administered at wave 1 (July 1 - 18, 2016), a 
survey experiment administered at wave 2 (September 10 - 16, 2016), wave 3, which was 
administered immediately prior to the 2016 Presidential Election (October 20 - October 
29, 2016), and measures administered at wave 4, post-election (November 7 - 10, 2016). 
Attrition from wave 1 (n= 3,552) to wave 4 (n=1,713) for participants who responded to 
all of our measures was approximately 39%. In wave 2, respondents were randomly 
assigned to a control condition or an elite polarization condition (low or high polarization). 
Respondents were then randomly assigned to a manipulation that induced learned 
helplessness or not. The respondents who participated in the experiment in wave 2 took an 
average of 69 minutes to complete the survey. It is important to note that the polarization 
and learned helplessness experiment on wave 2 was one of many experiments to which the 
respondents were exposed.  
 
The analyses reported within the chapters have been weighted to approximate national 
representativeness. The raked weights follow the iterative proportional fitting procedure 
proposed by DeBell and Krosnick (2009). These weights adjust the observed data to 
match several different known population parameters, i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, 
education, and income. As a few weights can be quite large, weight scores were truncated 
at 5.0, following general practices. The raked weights reflect distributions similar to other 
gold standard surveys, such as the American National Election Studies. 
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  Sample 4 - Unweighted Sample 4 - Weighted 
    N % N % 
Age (in years, range 18-93) 3501 Avg.: 
51.32 
3496 Avg.: 
43.81 
      
Sex/Gender Male 1342 37.93 1341 47.08 
Female 2196 62.07 2192 52.92 
     
Race White 2723 76.73 2720 79.99 
Non-white 826 23.27 824 20.01 
     
Education Up to and including high school credential 730 20.63 729 38.68 
Some post-high school, no bachelor’s 1197 33.82 1196 30.7 
Bachelor’s degree 1009 28.51 1009 18.73 
Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor’s Degree 603 17.04 600 11.89 
     
Income Under $15,000 333 9.48 332 12.56 
$15,000 to $24,999 333 9.47 333 10.17 
$25,000 to $49,999 929 26.43 928 24.97 
$50,000 to $99,999 1312 37.33 1310 30.13 
$100,000 and above 608 17.29 607 22.17 
     
Ethnicity  Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 607 17.12 607 17.43 
Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 2939 82.88 2934 82.57 
     
Party ID Democrat 1767 50.34 1764 47.57 
  Independent 367 10.46 367 12.49 
 Republican 1376 39.20 1374 39.94 
      
Ideology Liberal 1096 31.31 1094 30.57 
 Moderate 1104 31.54 1103 33.35 
 Conservative 1300 37.14 1298 36.08 
      
Note: This table reflects pre-election, wave 1descriptive statistics.  
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Sample 5 – Cooperative Congressional Election Study (YouGov) 
 
Sample 5 was collected as a University of Minnesota 1,000-person module of the 2016 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), in collaboration with Joanne Miller 
and Kyle Saunders. Brief measures of key dissertation items were included, with the 
exception of a measure of external efficacy, which was excluded from the 2016 common 
content module. Thus, analyses from this sample include brief disaffection measures, plus 
demographic measures included within the CCES Common Content (Ansolabehere and 
Schaffner 2017). The 2016 CCES was fielded in October and November 2016 (pre- and 
post-election waves) through YouGov.40 Respondents were compensated for their 
participation through the YouGov panel. Analyses included within the dissertation are 
also weighted using raked weights to approximate national representativeness. 
 
  Sample 5 - Unweighted 
Sample 5 - 
Weighted 
    N % N % 
Age (in years, range 18-87) 1000 Avg.: 
48.04 
1000 Avg.: 
46.87 
      
Sex/Gender Male 472 47.20 472 48.16 
Female 528 52.80 528 51.84 
     
Race White 725 72.50 725 73.57 
Non-white 275 27.50 275 26.43 
     
Education Up to and including high school credential 281 28.10 281 40.55 
Some post-high school, no bachelor’s 355 35.50 355 32.84 
Bachelor’s degree 216 21.60 216 17.22 
Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor’s Degree 148 14.80 148 9.40 
     
Income Under $19,999 112 12.25 112 13.62 
$20,000 to $29,999 82 8.97 82 9.91 
$30,000 to $49,999 214 23.41 214 24.63 
$50,000 to $99,999 309 33.81 309 33.91 
$100,000 and above 197 21.55 197 17.93 
     
Ethnicity  Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 101 10.11 101 9.98 
Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino 898 89.89 898 90.02 
     
Party ID Democrat 481 50.06 481 47.27 
  Independent 153 15.92 153 15.00 
 Republican 327 34.02 327 37.73 
      
Ideology Liberal 325 34.57 325 31.47 
 Moderate 241 25.64 241 24.44 
 Conservative 374 39.78 374 44.08 
      
Note: This table reflects pre-election, wave 1 descriptive statistics.  
                                                
40 Additional information on the CCES may be found at: https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/. 
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Appendix B. Question Wording (Response Options in Italics) 
Elite Polarization Manipulation Check Question 
On a scale of 1-7, with 1 being least polarized and 7 being most polarized, how polarized 
would you say the parties are in America today? Not at all Polarized (1), Extremely 
Polarized (7) [Samples 1-4] 
 
 
Inequality Manipulation Check Questions 
Now I’d like to ask you some questions about differences among people in our society. 
Do you think everyone in American society has an opportunity to succeed, most do, only 
some have this opportunity, or no one does? Everyone does, Most everyone does, Only 
some people do, No one does [Sample 3] 
 
Over the last 5-10 years, do you think income inequality has increased, stayed the same, 
or decreased? Increased a great deal, Increased slightly, Stayed the same, Decreased 
slightly, Decreased a great deal [Sample 3] 
 
Over the next 5 years, do you think income differences will increase, stay about the same, 
or decrease? Increase a great deal, Increase slightly, Stay about the same, Decrease 
slightly, Decrease a great deal [Sample 3] 
 
Do you see the current extent of income inequality in our society as a serious problem, 
somewhat of a problem, or not much of a problem? Serious problem, Somewhat of a 
problem, Not much of a problem, Not a problem at all [Sample 3] 
 
How much upward mobility – children doing better than the family they come from – do 
you think there is in America? A great deal of upward mobility, A lot of upward mobility, 
A moderate amount of upward mobility, A little upward mobility, No upward mobility at 
all [Sample 3] 
 
Over the last several years has your economic situation improved, stayed the same, or 
gotten worse? Greatly improved, Somewhat improved, Slightly improved, Stayed the 
same, Slightly worsened, Somewhat worsened, Greatly worsened [Sample 3] 
 
Over the next several years, do you think your economic situation is likely to improve, 
stay the same, or get worse? Greatly improve, Somewhat improve, Slightly improve, Stay 
the same, Slightly worsen, Somewhat worsen, Greatly worsen [Sample 3] 
 
Compared to your parents, are you better off economically, about the same, or worse 
off?  Much better off, Somewhat better off, About the same, Somewhat worse off, Much 
worse off [Sample 3] 
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Over the last 5 years, when you compare your economic situation to how others in our 
society are doing, do you think you are doing better than average, about the same, or 
worse than average? Much better than average, Somewhat better than average, About the 
same, Somewhat worse than average, Much worse than average [Sample 3] 
 
 
Political Participation 
How likely is it that you will vote in the national election in November 2016? Extremely 
likely, Very likely, Somewhat likely, Not too likely, Not at all likely [Samples 1-5] 
 
How confident are you in this choice [voting for your preferred candidate]? 
Extremely confident (7), Not confident at all (1) [Sample 2] 
Extremely confident (5), Not confident at all (1) [Sample 3] 
 
CCES Common Content – CC16_364 
Does R Intend to Vote in 2016? Yes, definitely, Probably, I already voted (early or 
absentee), No, Undecided, Skipped, Not Asked [Sample 5] 
 
Thinking back to the 2016 national election, for whom did you vote for president? 
Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Other, I’m not eligible to vote, I didn’t vote [Sample 3 
post-election] 
 
In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to 
vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time.   
Which of the following statements best describes you? 
I did not vote in the election this November, I thought about voting this time, but did not, 
I usually vote, but did not this time, I am sure I voted [Sample 4 post-election] 
 
CCES Common Content – CC16_401  
Voted 2016: I did not vote in the election this Nov., I thought about voting this time - but 
didn’t, I usually vote, but didn't this time, I attempted to vote but did not or could not, I 
definitely voted in the General Election, Skipped, Not Asked [Sample 5] 
 
Within the last 3 months, have you taken part in a rally in support of a candidate running 
for national, state, or local office or in support of a political issue? Yes, No [Samples 1-3, 
5 (asked 6 months)] 
 
Within the last 3 months, have you taken part in a rally in opposition of a candidate 
running for national, state, or local office or in opposition of a political issue? Yes, No 
[Samples 1-3, 5 (asked 6 months)] 
 
Within the last 3 months, have you taken part in a rally in support of / opposition to a 
candidate running for national, state, or local office or in support of / opposition to a 
political issue? No, Yes [Sample 4] 
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Cynicism 
Do you think that quite a few of the people running the federal government are crooked, 
not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? Many of the people 
running the federal government are crooked, Not very many people running the federal 
government are crooked, Hardly any people running the federal government are crooked 
[Samples 1-4] 
 
Do you think that quite a few of the people running your local government are crooked, 
not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? Many of the people 
running the local government are crooked, Not very many people running the local 
government are crooked, Hardly any people running the local government are crooked 
[Samples 1-3] 
 
How often do politicians lie? All of the time, Most of the time, Some of the time, Rarely, 
Never [Samples 1-3] 
 
Having elections makes the government pay attention to what people think. 
Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree [Samples 1-4] 
 
 
Democratic Satisfaction 
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the United States?  
Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Not very satisfied, Not at all satisfied [Samples 1-3] 
 
 
Government Feeling Thermometer 
We would like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and groups, as well 
as other people who are in the news these days. You will see the name of a person or group. 
We’d like you to rate that person or group using something we call a feeling thermometer. 
Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm 
toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel 
favorable toward the person and that you don’t care too much for that person. You would 
rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the 
person. To register your rating, just move the slide bar up or down until you reach the 
number on the scale that best represents your feelings toward the person or group. If you 
don’t recognize a person or group, you can just click “Next” to move on to the next 
question. The Federal Government in Washington [Samples 1-3] 
 
 
Learned Helplessness 
Now we have a set of questions concerning how people feel. After reading each item, 
please respond as to how closely you agree or disagree with how each item describes you 
and your feelings about yourself. (Response options: Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, 
Strongly disagree) [Samples 1-4] 
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*No matter how much energy I put into a task, I feel I have no control over the outcome. 
I feel that my ability to solve problems is the cause of my success. 
I can find solutions to difficult problems. 
I don’t place myself in situations in which I cannot predict the outcome. 
If I complete a task successfully, it is probably because of my ability. 
I have the ability to solve most of life’s problems. 
When I do not succeed at a task I do not attempt any similar tasks because I feel that I 
will fail them also. 
When something doesn’t turn out the way I planned, I know it is because I didn’t have 
the ability to start with. 
*Other people have more control over their success and/or failure than I do. 
I try new tasks if I have failed similar ones in the past. 
When I perform poorly it is because I don’t have the ability to perform better. 
I accept tasks even if I am not sure that I will succeed at them.  
*I feel that I have little control over the outcomes of my work. 
I am successful at most tasks I try. 
*I feel that anyone else could be better than me in most tasks. 
I am able to reach my goals in life. 
When I don’t succeed at a task, I find myself blaming my own stupidity for my failure. 
*No matter how hard I try, things never seem to work out the way I want them to. 
I feel that my success reflects my ability, not chance. 
My behavior seems to influence the success of a work group. 
 
*These five questions were included in the brief measure used in Sample 5. 
 
 
Learned Helplessness 
Now we have a set of questions concerning how people feel about participating in 
politics. After reading each item, please respond as to how closely you agree or disagree 
with how each item describes you and your feelings about yourself. (Response options: 
Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree) [Sample 3] 
 
No matter how much energy I put into a politics, I feel I have no control over the 
outcome. 
Other people have more control over political successes and/or failures than I do. 
I feel that I have little control over the political outcomes. 
I feel that anyone else could be better than me in most tasks related to politics. 
No matter how hard I try, political outcomes never seem to work out the way I want them 
to. 
 
 
Internal Efficacy 
I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our 
country. Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree [Samples 1-3] 
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I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics. 
Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree [Samples 1-3 and 5] 
 
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't 
really understand what's going on. Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree 
[Samples 1-3] 
 
How often do politics and government seem so complicated that you can't really 
understand what's going on? Always, Most of the time, About half of the time, Some of the 
time, Never [Samples 1-4] 
 
How well do you understand the important political issues facing our country? 
Extremely well, Very well, Moderately well, Slightly well, Not well at all [Samples 1-4] 
 
 
External Efficacy 
How much do public officials care what people like you think? 
A great deal, A lot, A moderate amount, A little, Not at all [Samples 1-4] 
 
How much can people like you affect what the government does? 
A great deal, A lot, A moderate amount, A little, Not at all [Samples 1-4] 
 
Public officials don't care much what people like me think. 
Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree [Samples 1-3] 
 
People like me don't have any say about what the government does. 
Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree [Samples 1-3] 
 
 
Trust 
How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington, 
D.C. to do what is right? 
Almost always, Most of the time, Some of the time, Almost never [Samples 1-5] 
 
How much of the time do you think you can trust law enforcement to do what is right? 
Almost always, Most of the time, Some of the time, Almost never [Samples 1-5] 
 
How much of the time do you think you can trust the media to do what is right? 
Almost always, Most of the time, Some of the time, Almost never [Samples 1-5] 
 
How much of the time do you think you can trust people in general to do what is right? 
Almost always, Most of the time, Some of the time, Almost never [Samples 1-5] 
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Political Interest 
How interested are you in information about what's going on in national government and 
politics? Extremely interested, Very interested, Somewhat interested, Not too interested, 
Not at all interested [Samples 1-4] 
 
How much of the time are you interested in the news on government and politics? 
Most of the time, Some of the time, Only now and then, Hardly at all [Sample 5] 
 
 
Political Ideology 
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point 
scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely 
liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
Extremely Liberal, Liberal, Slightly Liberal, Moderate; Middle of the Road, Slightly 
Conservative, Conservative, or Extremely Conservative [Samples 1-5] 
 
 
Party Identification 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or what?  Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other Party, please specify 
[Samples 1-4; Branched] 
 
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? 
Strong Democrat, Not very strong Democrat 
 
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
Strong Republican, Not very strong Republican 
 
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party? 
Closer to the Democratic Party, Closer to the Republican Party, Closer to Neither Party 
 
pid7, 7-point Party ID: Strong Democrat, Not very strong Democrat, Lean Democrat, 
Independent, Lean Republican, Not very strong Republican, Strong Republican  
[Sample 5] 
 
 
Sex 
Are you male or female? [Samples 1-5] 
 
 
Age 
What age did you turn on your most recent birthday?  [Samples 1-3] 
 
What is your age? [Sample 4] 
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In what year were you born? [Sample 5] 
 
 
Education 
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received? Less than 1st grade, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade, 5th or 6th grade, 7th or 8th 
grade, 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade, 12th grade no diploma, High school graduate - 
high school diploma or equivalent (for example: GED), Some college but no degree, 
Associate degree (For example: Occupational/vocational program or Academic 
program), Bachelor's Degree (For example: BA, AB, BS), Master's Degree (For 
example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA), Professional School Degree (For example: 
MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD), Doctorate degree (For example: PhD, EdD), Other, please 
specify [Samples 1-3] 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? Less than high school, High 
school diploma or equivalent, Some college, Associate’s Degree, Bachelor’s Degree, 
Master’s Degree, Advanced Degree (PhD, DPHIL, JD, MD, DDS, etc.) [Sample 4] 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? No HS, High school 
graduate, some college, 2-year, 4-year, post-grad [Samples 5] 
 
 
Income 
The next question is about the total income of YOUR HOUSEHOLD for the PAST 12 
MONTHS. Please include your income PLUS the income of all members living in your 
household (including cohabiting partners and armed forces members living at home). 
Please count income BEFORE TAXES, including income from all sources (such as 
wages, salaries, tips, net income from a business, interest, dividends, child support, 
alimony, and Social Security, public assistance, pensions, or retirement benefits). 
 
What was your total HOUSEHOLD income in the past 12 months? Under $5,000, 
$5,000-9,999, $10,000-12,499, $12,500-14,999, $15,000-17,499, $17,500-19,999, 
$20,000-22,499, $22,500-24,999, $25,000-27,499, $27,500-29,999, $30,000-34,999, 
$35,000-39,999, $40,000-44,999, $45,000-49,999, $50,000-54,999, $55,000-59,999, 
$60,000-64,999, $65,000-69,999, $70,000-74,999, $75,000-79,999, $80,000-89,999, 
$90,000-99,999, $100,000-109,999, $110,000-124,999, $125,000-149,999, $150,000-
174,999, $175,000-249,999, $250,000 or more 
[Samples 1-3] 
 
We would like to get an estimate of your total household income in the past 12 months 
before taxes. Please select one of the items from the list below: Please select one of the 
following: Less than $10,000, $10,000 - $14,999, $15,000 - $24,999, $25,000 - $34,999, 
$35,000 - $49,999, $50,000 - $74,999, $75,000 - $99,999, $100,000 - $149,999, 
$150,000 - $199,999, $200,000 or more [Sample 4] 
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Less than $10,000, $10,000 - $19,999, $20,000 - $29,999, $30,000 - $39,999, $40,000 - 
$49,999, $50,000 - $59,999, $60,000 - $69,999, $70,000 - $79,999, $80,000 - $99,999, 
$100,000 - $119,999, $120,000 - $149,999, $150,000 - $199,999, $200,000 - $249,999, 
$250,000 - $349,999 [Sample 5] 
 
 
Latino 
Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino? Yes, No [Samples 1-4] 
 
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino or Hispanic origin or descent: Yes, No [Sample 5] 
 
 
Race 
Below is a list of five race categories. Please choose one or more races that you consider 
yourself to be. Check all that apply: White, Black or African-American, American Indian 
or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, Other, please specify 
[Samples 1-3] 
 
What racial or ethnic group best describes you? Black, Asian, Native American, White, 
Other [Sample 4] 
 
White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Mixed, Other, Middle Eastern  
[Sample 5] 
 
 
Loser Perception 
Thinking about the way things are going in politics today, on the issues that matter to 
you, would you say your side has been winning more often than it’s been losing, or losing 
more often than it’s been winning? winning more often than losing, losing more often 
than winning [Samples 1-5] 
 
 
Authoritarianism 
Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every 
person thinks that some are more important than others. Below are pairs of desirable 
qualities. For each pair, please indicate which one you think is more important for a child 
to have: 1) independence or respect for elders; 2) curiosity or good manners; 3) 
obedience or self-reliance; 4) being considerate or well behaved. [Samples 1-5] 
 
 
Experience with Law Enforcement 
Have you ever been pulled over by a law enforcement officer? 
Never, Once or twice, A few times, Many times [Sample 3] 
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[If respondents said they had been pulled over] 
On average, these experiences have been… 
Extremely negative, Somewhat negative, Neither negative nor positive, Somewhat 
positive, Extremely positive [Sample 3] 
 
 
Experience with Government Officials 
Suppose there were some questions that you had to take to a government office. Do you 
think you would be given equal treatment? Yes, It depends, No [Sample 3] 
 
If you explained your point of view to the officials, would they give your point of view 
serious consideration? A great deal of consideration, Some consideration, Not much 
consideration, No consideration at all, I wouldn’t say anything [Sample 3] 
 
 
Experience with Welfare 
Speaking of government programs, I'd like to ask about the experience of you and 
members of your immediate family with several programs. Please say for each of the 
following if you, a family member, or both you and a family member have received some 
benefit / payment. Family here means brothers or sisters, your children, or your parents? 
Welfare or public assistance [Sample 3] 
 
 
Behavioral Measure 
At the end of this survey, before submitting the HIT, would you be willing to give a few 
extra minutes of your time or a small donation to participate in one or more of the 
following activities? If you are interested, please select the activities you are willing to 
participate in and you will be redirected to the appropriate page. If you select more than 
one, you will be directed to multiple locations. [Please select all that apply] Write a brief 
note to one of your elected representatives (1); Write a post on social media (2); Donate 
to a political campaign of your choosing (3); Donate to a non-profit or community 
organization of your choosing (4); Watch a political ad of your choosing (5); Watch a cat 
video (6); No, thanks. I'm not interested in participating. (7) 
 
The previous question was a measure of willingness to participate and engage. You will 
not be asked to complete any of the activities selected. Thank you very much for your 
willingness to participate in these additional activities. Click the next button to complete 
the remainder of the survey and receive your unique code. [Sample 3] 
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Appendix C. Inequality Experimental Manipulations 
 
Inequality Today Experimental Manipulation 
 
In the following pages, you will be presented with some information about today’s U.S. 
income distribution and you will be asked a few questions regarding the information. 
Please look over the information carefully, as you will be asked a few questions about the 
information presented. 
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Based upon recent IRS Individual Income Tax Statistics, which reflect average annual 
household income, the following distribution shows the total sum of incomes earned in 
households, before taxes or deductions. These values include wages and salaries from all 
jobs, pension income, any investment and business income, and/or unemployment 
benefits. If you file taxes, the average annual household income amount is what you 
report on your federal income tax return before taking any deductions.    
                 
10% of households earn less than $5,000                   
17% of households earn less than $10,000                   
25% of households earn less than $15,000                   
32% of households earn less than $20,000                   
39% of households earn less than $25,000                   
46% of households earn less than $30,000                   
52% of households earn less than $35,000                   
57% of households earn less than $40,000                   
62% of households earn less than $45,000                   
66% of households earn less than $50,000                   
69% of households earn less than $55,000                   
73% of households earn less than $60,000                   
75% of households earn less than $65,000                   
78% of households earn less than $70,000                   
80% of households earn less than $75,000                   
82% of households earn less than $80,000                  
84% of households earn less than $85,000                   
86% of households earn less than $90,000                   
87% of households earn less than $95,000                   
89% of households earn less than $100,000                   
90% of households earn less than $105,000                   
91% of households earn less than $110,000                   
93% of households earn less than $125,000                   
95% of households earn less than $150,000                   
97% of households earn less than $175,000                   
98% of households earn less than $200,000                   
98% of households earn less than $250,000                   
99.1% of households earn less than $300,000                   
99.4% of households earn less than $500,000                   
99.8% of households earn less than $1,000,000 
 
Please enter your approximate annual household income in U.S. dollars in the box below: 
_____ 
 
Based upon the information above, approximately what percentage of U.S. households 
earn less than your household? _____ 
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Also, based upon the information above, what percentage of US households earn less 
than... (Click on and slide the bar to select the correct percentage) 
______ households earning less than $15,000 
______ households earning less than $50,000 
______ households earning less than $85,000 
______ households earning less than $105,000 
______ households earning less than $250,000 
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Inequality Since 1980 Experimental Manipulation 
 
In the following pages, you will be presented with some information about the difference 
between today’s U.S. income distribution and 1980’s U.S. income distribution.  Please 
look over the information carefully, as you will be asked a few questions on the 
information presented. 
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Income inequality has increased dramatically in the U.S. since 1980. Incomes of 
poorer and middle-income families have grown very little, while top family incomes have 
grown a lot.         
                  
A household today   would have made  This household would have  
making $_____  $_____ in 1980:      earned: 
$2,490       $4,230       70% more in 1980.        
$4,240       $6,550       54% more in 1980.        
$5,480       $8,000       46% more in 1980.        
$10,000       $14,000       39% more in 1980.        
$15,400       $21,400       39% more in 1980.        
$20,000       $27,800       39% more in 1980.        
$25,000       $34,100      36% more in 1980.        
$30,400       $41,400       36% more in 1980.        
$35,500       $47,900       35% more in 1980.        
$40,500       $53,800       33% more in 1980.        
$44,900       $58,900       31% more in 1980.        
$51,000       $65,600       29% more in 1980.       
$55,100       $69,900       27% more in 1980.        
$61,300       $76,000       24% more in 1980.        
$65,000       $79,300       22% more in 1980.        
$71,000       $84,800       20% more in 1980.        
$75,200       $88,800       18% more in 1980.        
$104,000       $113,000       9% more in 1980.        
$121,000       $126,000       4% more in 1980.        
$153,000       $147,000       4% less in 1980.        
$200,000       $175,000       12% less in 1980.        
$250,000       $206,000       18% less in 1980.        
$493,000       $329,000       33% less in 1980.        
$1,200,000       $597,000      50% less in 1980. 
 
[PRESENTED IN A CLEAN GRID] 
 
Please enter your approximate annual household income in US dollars in the box below: 
_____ 
 
How would YOU be doing if inequality had not increased since the 1980s? Based upon 
the information above, approximately what would your household income be if income 
inequality had not increased? _____ 
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Also, based upon the information above, what percentage more (or less) would the 
following households be earning if income inequality had not increased since 1980?  
(Click on and slide the bar to select the correct percentage)    
______ households today earning $15,400 
______ households today earning $51,000 
______ households today earning $75,000 
______ households today earning $104,000 
______ households today earning $250,000 
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Appendix D. Polarization Experimental Manipulations 
 
Low Polarization Experimental Manipulation 
 
In the following pages, we will present you with some information about the policy 
positions of the political parties in America today and ask you your opinion on these 
policies.  We ask that you please look over the information carefully, as we will 
subsequently ask you some questions on the information presented. 
 
[page break] 
 
The federal government is currently considering legislation that would require mining 
companies to spend more time than they currently do reviewing the environmental impact 
of a new project prior to starting mining operations.  Some people support this proposal, 
others oppose it. 
 
We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed this proposal that 
would require that mining companies spend more time reviewing the environmental 
impact of a project than they are currently required to in order to start new mining 
operations.  Here's how they responded: 
 
As you can see, the partisan divide is not stark on this issue, as the parties are not very far 
apart. Democrats tend to support the proposed additional requirements on mining 
companies; Republicans tend to oppose the proposed additional requirements on mining 
companies.   
 
However, members of each party can be found on both sides of the issue. 
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What is your opinion on the proposal that would require mining companies to spend more 
time reviewing the environmental impact of a project prior to starting new mining 
operations? 
I strongly support the proposal 
I support the proposal 
I somewhat support the proposal 
Neutral 
I somewhat oppose the proposal 
I oppose the proposal 
I strongly oppose the proposal 
 
[page break] 
 
The federal government is currently considering legislation over whether to cut spending 
on Medicaid (government supported health insurance for the poor).  Some people support 
cutting spending on Medicaid.  Others oppose cutting spending on Medicaid. 
  
We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed cutting spending on 
Medicaid. Here’s how they responded: 
 
 
As you can see, the partisan divide is not stark on this issue, as the parties are not very far 
apart. Democrats tend to oppose cutting spending on Medicaid; Republicans tend to 
support cutting spending on Medicaid.   
 
However, members of each party can be found on both sides of the issue. 
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What is your opinion on the proposal to cut Medicaid spending? 
I strongly support the proposal 
I support the proposal 
I somewhat support the proposal 
Neutral 
I somewhat oppose the proposal 
I oppose the proposal 
I strongly oppose the proposal 
 
[page break] 
 
The federal government is currently considering legislation that would roll back 
affirmative action laws by banning the use of racial criteria in college admissions.  Some 
people support this proposal, others oppose it. 
  
We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed the proposal to ban 
the use of racial criteria in college admissions.  Here's how they responded: 
 
 
As you can see, the partisan divide is not stark on this issue, as the parties are not very far 
apart. Democrats tend to oppose the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college 
admissions; Republicans tend to support the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in 
college admissions.  
 
However, members of each party can be found on both sides of the issue. 
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What is your opinion on the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college 
admissions? 
I strongly support the proposal 
I support the proposal 
I somewhat support the proposal 
Neutral 
I somewhat oppose the proposal 
I oppose the proposal 
I strongly oppose the proposal 
 
[page break] 
 
The federal government is currently considering legislation to combat global warming. 
 Some people support legislation to combat global warming, others oppose it. 
  
We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed legislation to combat 
global warming.  Here's how they responded: 
 
 
 
As you can see, the partisan divide is not stark on this issue, as the parties are not very far 
apart. Democrats tend to support legislation to combat global warming. Republicans tend 
to oppose legislation to combat global warming.   
 
However, members of each party can be found on both sides of the issue. 
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What is your opinion on legislation to combat global warming? 
I strongly support the proposal 
I support the proposal 
I somewhat support the proposal 
Neutral 
I somewhat oppose the proposal 
I oppose the proposal 
I strongly oppose the proposal 
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High Polarization Experimental Manipulation 
 
In the following pages, we will present you with some information about the policy 
positions of the political parties in America today and ask you your opinion on these 
policies.  We ask that you please look over the information carefully, as we will 
subsequently ask you some questions on the information presented. 
 
[page break] 
 
The federal government is currently considering legislation that would require mining 
companies to spend more time than they currently do reviewing the environmental impact 
of a new project prior to starting mining operations.  Some people support this proposal, 
others oppose it. 
 
We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed this proposal that 
would require that mining companies spend more time reviewing the environmental 
impact of a project than they are currently required to in order to start new mining 
operations. Here's how they responded: 
 
As you can see, the partisan divide is stark on this issue, as the parties are very far apart. 
Democrats strongly support the proposed additional requirements on mining companies; 
Republicans strongly oppose the proposed additional requirements on mining companies.  
Also, most members of each party are on the same side as the rest of their party on this 
issue. 
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What is your opinion on the proposal that would require mining companies to spend more 
time reviewing the environmental impact of a project prior to starting new mining 
operations? 
I strongly support the proposal 
I support the proposal 
I somewhat support the proposal 
Neutral 
I somewhat oppose the proposal 
I oppose the proposal 
I strongly oppose the proposal 
 
[page break] 
 
The federal government is currently considering legislation over whether to cut spending 
on Medicaid (government supported health insurance for the poor).  Some people support 
cutting spending on Medicaid.  Others oppose cutting spending on Medicaid. 
  
We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed cutting spending on 
Medicaid. Here’s how they responded: 
 
As you can see, the partisan divide is stark on this issue, as the parties are very far apart. 
Democrats strongly oppose cutting spending on Medicaid; Republicans strongly support 
cutting spending on Medicaid.  Also, most members of each party are on the same side as 
the rest of their party on this issue. 
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What is your opinion on the proposal to cut Medicaid spending? 
I strongly support the proposal 
I support the proposal 
I somewhat support the proposal 
Neutral 
I somewhat oppose the proposal 
I oppose the proposal 
I strongly oppose the proposal 
 
[page break] 
 
The federal government is currently considering legislation that would roll back 
affirmative action laws by banning the use of racial criteria in college admissions. Some 
people support this proposal, others oppose it. 
  
We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed the proposal to ban 
the use of racial criteria in college admissions.  Here's how they responded: 
 
 
 
As you can see, the partisan divide is stark on this issue, as the parties are very far apart. 
Democrats strongly oppose the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college 
admissions; Republicans strongly support the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in 
college admissions.  Also, most members of each party are on the same side as the rest of 
their party on this issue.   
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What is your opinion on the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college 
admissions? 
I strongly support the proposal 
I support the proposal 
I somewhat support the proposal 
Neutral 
I somewhat oppose the proposal 
I oppose the proposal 
I strongly oppose the proposal 
 
[page break] 
 
The federal government is currently considering legislation to combat global warming.  
Some people support legislation to combat global warming, others oppose it. 
  
We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed legislation to combat 
global warming.  Here's how they responded: 
 
 
 
As you can see, the partisan divide is stark on this issue, as the parties are very far apart. 
Democrats strongly support legislation to combat global warming.  Republicans strongly 
oppose legislation to combat global warming.  Also, most members of each party are on 
the same side of as the rest of their party on this issue. 
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What is your opinion on legislation to combat global warming? 
I strongly support the proposal 
I support the proposal 
I somewhat support the proposal 
Neutral 
I somewhat oppose the proposal 
I oppose the proposal 
I strongly oppose the proposal 
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Appendix E. Learned Helplessness Experimental Manipulations 
Manipulation  
Please think about a time when you repeatedly tried to do something and failed to 
succeed. Then write a paragraph about that experience.  
 
Manipulation Check 
Regarding the statement above, how important to you was what you wrote about?  
 
  
 
 
 
 
